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Synopsis 
 
―The goal of university research is the creation, dissemination, and preservation of knowledge.‖  
– Steven E. Hyman, Provost of Harvard University 2001–2011 
 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry recently identified the media and entertainment 
industry as a strategic sector in South Africa because of its growing contribution to 
economic development through both local and foreign investments, export opportunities 
and job creation potential, as well as the significant spill-over possibilities in industries like 
tourism and retail usually associated with emergent industries. However, deficient research 
and development has been identified as one of the notable constraints to ensuring 
sustainability and competitiveness of local cultural industries, in which annual expenditure 
currently amounts to R100 billion.  
 
This emergent nature of South Africa’s cultural industries, their strategic importance as part 
of South Africa’s growth path as dictated by the government and the current dearth of 
academic literature concerning entertainment technology innovations instigated a three-
tiered research objective: First, to determine whether this industry is a legitimate subject for 
engineering management study by examining its technology-foundation; second, to 
examine the impact which technological change has historically had on the industry, 
building on theories by Meza (2007) and Burgelman and Grove (2007); and thirdly, to 
provide an analysis of the global trend of contention and convergence between content 
creators and technology companies. Integrating these objectives into one deliverable, the 
ultimate aim of this study is to establish a synthesised knowledge base on the media and 
entertainment industry for the Department of Industrial Engineering with specific emphasis 
on the intersection between technological innovation and business model innovation.  
 
A hybrid multiple-case study research approach is utilised to answer eight research 
questions which contribute to this research goal. Four notable insights gained from 
answering these are (1) entertainment companies have historically reacted to technological 
change in a very particular manner, reducible to a four-phase process: invention, ascension, 
contention and sensation – referring to the observation that incumbent organisations’ 
response to disruptive innovations is usually one of trepidation, a reaction which leads to 
legal battles and subsequent contention between technology and media content companies 
yet simultaneously providing opportunity for inter- and intra-industry convergence and for 
new business models to be developed; (2) cross-boundary disruptors are those 
organisations which have the capability of influencing not only inter-industry organisations 
but also how business is conducted in entirely-different industries; (3) industry effects 
account for more than 60% of profit variance in the Entertainment and Lodging economic 
sector, justifying a study of entertainment companies from an industry perspective; and (4) 
because of digitalisation, the Internet, exponentially increasing computing power and the 
proliferation of networking capabilities, the media and entertainment industry is 
transitioning from a business model which is based on media-directed “push” relationships, 
fragmented audiences and the provision of passive consumption to one which provides 
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ubiquitous immersive experiences, multi-device operability and value-based content which 
may be customised to consumer requirements. 
 
As Porter (2008b) suggests, a historical analysis may prove to be not only informative but 
also instructive. The synthesised knowledge base and deductions made from this historical 
examination of disruptive innovation management in the media and entertainment industry 
may consequently be used as a basis for future research, for which a few possibilities are 
offered. 
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Opsomming 
 
 ―Ons sal nie ophou verken nie, en die einde van al ons verkenning sal wees om te arriveer 
waar ons begin het maar om dan die plek vir die eerste keer te verstaan.‖ 
— T. S. Eliot 
 
 
Die media- en vermaaklikheidsbedryf is onlangs deur die Departement van Handel en 
Nywerheid geïdentifiseer as 'n strategiese sektor in Suid-Afrika as gevolg van die groeiende 
bydrae wat hierdie industrie lewer tot ekonomiese ontwikkeling deur middle van plaaslike 
en buitelandse beleggings, uitvoergeleenthede en werkskeppingpotensiaal. Hierdie 
industrie beskik ook oor beduidende oorloopmoontlikhede in bedrywe soos toerisme en 
kleinhandel. Gebrekkige navorsing en ontwikkeling is egter geïdentifiseer as een van die 
vernaamste beperkings tot volhoubaarheid en mededingendheid van plaaslike kulturele 
industrieë, `n bedryf waarin jaarlikse besteding reeds R100 biljoen beloop. 
 
Die kombinasie van hierdie ontluikende aard van Suid-Afrika se kulturele industrieë, hul 
strategiese belangrikheid as deel van Suid-Afrika se Industriele Aksieplan en die gebrekkige 
akademiese literatuur met betrekking tot vermaaklikheidstegnologië het gelei tot 'n drie-
ledige navorsingsdoelwit: Eerstens, om vas te stel of hierdie bedryf 'n legitieme akademiese 
onderwerp vir die ingenieursbestuur-dissipline is deur die aard en tegnologie-fondasie van 
die industrie te bestudeer; tweedens, om die impak wat tegnologiese verandering histories 
op die bedryf gehad het te ondersoek, met Meza (2007) en Burgelman en Grove (2007) se 
teorieë as fondasietekste; en derdens, om 'n analise te verskaf omtrent die wêreldwye 
mededinging en konvergensie tussen inhoudverskaffers en tegnologie-maatskappye. 
Geïntegreerd in een aflewerbare is die uiteindelike doel van hierdie studie om ‘n 
saamgestelde kennisbasis aangaande die media- en die vermaaklikheidsbedryf vir die 
Departement Bedryfsingenieurswese te lewer, met spesifieke klem op die ontmoetingspunt 
tussen tegnologiese innovasie en die innovasie van besigheidsmodelle. 
 
'n Hibriede meervoudige-gevallestudie navorsingsbenadering is aangewend om uiteindelik 
agt navorsingsvrae te beantwoord. Hierdie vrae het gedien as riglyne om die doel van die 
tesis te bereik. Vier noemenswaardige insigte wat uit die beantwoording van hierdie vrae 
gekom het is (1) die vermaaklikheidsbedryf het histories op `n besondere wyse gereageer op 
'n tegnologiese verandering, een wat gereduseer kan word tot 'n vier-fase proses: uitvinding, 
aanvaarding, mededinging en sensasie. Hierdie proses verwys na die waarneming dat 
bestaande organisasies aanvanklik met angs reageer tot ontwrigtende innovasies, 'n reaksie 
wat lei tot wetlike gevegte en daaropvolgende twis tussen tegnologie maatskappye en 
inhoudverskaffers, maar tegelykertyd geleentheid bied vir inter- en intra-industrie 
konvergensie sowel as vir die ontwikkeling van nuwe sake-modelle; (2) ontwrigtende 
innovasies bied geleentheid vir kruis-grens ontwrigters om die manier te beïnvloed wat 
ander organisasies, insluitende diegene in geheel-verskillende industrieë, besigheid doen (3) 
bedryfsfaktore is verantwoordelik vir meer as 60% van winsvariansie in die 
vermaaklikheidsbedryf, `n waarneming wat 'n studie van vermaaklikheidsbedryf vanuit 'n 
industrie-perspektief regverdig, en (4) digitalisering, die Internet, eksponensieel-groeiende 
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berekeningspoed en die vermenigvuldiging van netwerke het veroorsaak dat die media- en 
vermaaklikheidsbedryf `n besigheidsmodelaanpassing moes ondergaan vanaf een wat 
gebaseer is op media-gerigte "stoot" verhoudings, gefragmenteerde gehore en die 
verskaffing van passiewe verbruik na een waar aanpasbare, waarde-gebaseerde inhoud 
alomteenwoordig beskikbaar is en verbruik kan word op veelvuldige toestelle volgens 
verbruikers se  behoeftes. 
 
Porter (2008b) noem dat 'n maatskappy se geskiedenis nie slegs informatief is nie, maar 
selfs ook voorskriftelik. Gevolglik kan die afleidings wat gemaak is uit hierdie historiese 
ondersoek aangaande ontwrigtende innovasies in die media- en vermaaklikheidsindustrie 
gebruik word as `n fondasie vir toekomstige navorsing –`n paar aanbevelings hiervoor word 
in die gevolgtrekking van hierdie dokument gelys.  
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1. Introduction 
 
―It is commonplace in most lines of economic endeavour that those who process raw 
materials, transform them and merchandise the finished product receive the lion’s share of 
economic rewards. The field of cultural endeavours is relatively unique in that we strongly 
desire to reward our creators, commune with their audiences, but avoid or ignore the 
organisational middlemen linking each to the other.‖  
– Paul Hirsch 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the reasons why this study has been undertaken, to 
state its objective and to explain the approach taken in the pursuit thereof. 
 
1.1 Academic Justification 
Few thoughtful academics in business science and industrious practitioners thereof would 
disagree that human resources, production, logistics, sales, marketing, operations and 
strategy should all be managed. Likewise is the case with technology and innovation.  
 
The concept of technology and innovation management for the purpose of competitive 
advantage notably started gaining traction during the 1980s and has since been a popular 
topic in business and management science. Hamel (2007) observes that abstracts of 
academic articles have featured the terms “technical innovation” and “technology 
innovation” more than 52 000 discrete times in the last 70 years. When Germany, Japan, 
South Korea and other countries started obtaining significant market share in major 
industries traditionally monopolised by the United States of America during the 1970s and 
1980s, the demise of America's technological superiority became apparent. Initially 
challenged in established, capital-intensive industries such as Motor Manufacturing and 
Steel Production but later also in other industries such as Telecommunications and 
Consumer Electronics, American businesses started becoming attentive to the necessity of 
competent technological innovation management on both corporate and national levels 
(Hayes and Abernathy, 1980). Burgelman, Christensen and Wheelwright (2008) suggest that 
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it was exactly the USA’s aspiration for competitive advantage which has led to the surge in 
academic research on the management of technology and innovation. 
 
Yet one has to agree with Paul Hirsch that conscious academic efforts to study and drive 
technological innovation in industries like Manufacturing, Mining and Agriculture far 
outweigh those of the cultural industries, a global business in which total expenditure 
amounts to one trillion US dollars per year (Vogel, 2011). The deficiency of academic studies 
on the media and entertainment industry from a business or engineering perspective is also 
discernable in South Africa1, and that while expenditure in the local industry currently 
equals R100 billion according to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011). Offsetting the effect of the 
2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup, which enabled real industry growth of 21.1% between 2009 
and 2010, total expenditure is forecasted to increase to R140 billion by 2015 as 
demonstrated by Figure 1, adapted from PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011): 
 
 
Figure 1: Spending in the South African Media and Entertainment Industry: 2006-2015 with forecasted 2011-
2015 CAGR=7.4% 
                                                     
1
 A search for articles containing “entertainment industry” and “South Africa” in Engineering, Business, Management and 
Accounting, Econometrics and Finance and Economics subject areas return 44 results through ScienceDirect 
(http://tinyurl.com/sciencedirect-entertainment), while a similar search for scholarly articles containing “South Africa” 
AND “entertainment” on EBSCOhost yields only 9 results (http://tinyurl.com/ebscohost-entertainment). 
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South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry identifies the media and entertainment 
industry as a strategic sector in the country “not only because it has the potential to 
contribute directly to economic development in terms of employment, investment and 
export”, but also because of its significant spill-over potential in industries like tourism and 
retail (Department of Trade and Industry, 2010). In his 2010 parliamentary address, South 
Africa’s incumbent minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies specifically listed cultural 
industries among the sectors which require focussed development and which will enjoy 
broadened intervention from the Department in terms of access to financing and enabling 
legislation (Davies, 2010).  
 
It is this emergent nature of South Africa’s cultural industries, their strategic importance as 
part of South Africa’s growth path as dictated by the government and the current dearth of 
academic literature concerning entertainment technology innovations which form the 
context of this study. 
 
1.2 Problem Description 
Released by South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry in 2010, a proposed Industrial 
Policy Action Plan for 2010/11 - 2012/13 builds on the notion that the media and 
entertainment industry, as a strategic sector, exhibits enormous potential to improve South 
Africa’s trade balance, provide employment and even promote foreign investment in several 
other sectors of the economy through its ambassadorial merits (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2010). Noting that this industry is also a key growth driver in the global economy, 
the South African government acknowledges the need to expand the country’s value 
offering both for local and international consumption and to shift the industry towards “a 
more sustainable competitive footing”. Several constraints to achieving this have been 
identified, and provide opportunity for academia and industry to collaborate and decisively 
engage in development of this industry: 
 a lack of skills development, both in terms of technical and business or 
entrepreneurial capability, and formalised processes which can promote and 
coordinate skills transfer from international to local productions; 
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 a diminished focus on technology innovation in the local industry and an over-
reliance on technologies from other countries; 
 a need for more content development and the development of strategies to expand 
production, marketing and distribution operations; 
 lacking audience development, and plans to ensure that social and spatial 
inequalities are overcome through clever logistical solutions; 
 a need for increased financing, financial models, domestic and international market 
development and marketing strategies; and 
 a lack of research and development with regards to the media and entertainment 
industry as a whole. 
 
The problem tackled by this study, then, is to address this last-mentioned constraint to the 
advancement of South Africa’s media and entertainment industry by providing a historical 
analysis of disruptive innovations in various media sectors. As an introductory examination 
which highlights the intersection between technological innovation and business model 
innovation, it also addresses the question of how exactly technological change has 
propagated through these sectors through theory building. A third problem which this study 
addresses is the global trend of contention between content creators and technology 
companies through lessons learnt and a case for greater convergence. 
 
Michael Porter is quoted as saying that “a company’s history can also be instructive. What 
was the vision of the founder? What were the products and customers that made the 
company? Looking backward, one can re-examine the original strategy to see if it is still valid. 
Can the historical positioning be implemented in a modern way, one consistent with today’s 
technologies and practices? This sort of thinking may lead to a commitment to renew the 
strategy and may challenge the organisation to recover its distinctiveness. Such a challenge 
can be galvanising and can instil the confidence to make the needed trade-offs (Porter, 
2008b).” It is the author’s belief that a historical investigation of technology management in 
the global media and entertainment industry may prove to be not only informative, but 
indeed also “instructive”, as Porter suggests is possible. 
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1.3 Research Objective 
This study endeavours to provide a convenient and useful knowledge base pertaining to the 
media and entertainment industry as studied from an economic and institutional 
perspective for the Department of Industrial Engineering at Stellenbosch University. 
Additionally, it serves as a case for further and increased research on this industry from an 
engineering management and industrial engineering viewpoint, on both strategic and 
operational levels.  
 
This study limits itself to a predetermined number of industry segments, all of which will be 
studied from a strategic point of view as opposed to operationally. These include: 
 Radio  
 Recorded music 
 Filmed entertainment 
 Television 
 Video recording 
 The Internet, specifically pertaining to filesharing technology 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
Eight research questions were identified and explored by this study to facilitate the 
achievement of the research objective stated in section 1.3: 
 Why is technology management an organisational necessity? 
 What is a disruptive innovation, and how are organisations in the media and 
entertainment industry affected by technologies of such a nature?  
 What is the origin of the modern-day media and entertainment industry and which 
sectors officially constitute it? 
 Knowing that technology brings about change, in which ways has technological 
change impacted the media and entertainment industry historically?  
 What structural changes have media markets undergone in terms of costs, profit, 
number of transactions and legal frameworks?  
 Why did certain innovations succeed as entertainment offerings while other 
innovations, some even exhibiting superior capability, failed to gain adoption? 
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 What is industry convergence, which forces in entertainment organisations shape 
and contribute to this convergence and how has it affected this particular industry? 
 What contribution does an academic study on entertainment history make to aid 
with technology management today and in the future? 
 
1.5 Research Approach, Focus and Methodology 
Mouton (2008) writes that research design types for a Masters or Doctoral degree may be 
categorised as either empirical or non-empirical, and describes these types of study as 
follows: 
 Empirical studies are conducted by either using primary data (experiments, surveys 
and case studies), or existing data in the form of text data (content analyses, 
discourse analyses and historical studies) or numeric data (statistical modelling and 
secondary data analyses). 
 Non-empirical studies, conversely, are done by way of literature reviews, 
philosophical analyses, conceptual analyses or theory building.  
 
Trochim and Donnelly (2006) add another dimension to research methods by stating that 
research can be conducted either quantitatively or qualitatively: 
 Quantitative research involves the systematic empirical examination of quantitative 
properties, observable phenomena and their relationships. 
 Qualitative research involves the asking of a broad question and then accumulating 
word-type data which is subsequently analysed in the pursuit of themes and reasons 
for observed phenomena.  
 
A third dimension to carrying out research, especially pertaining to studies which are 
conducted on an industry level or which refer to information systems and technology, has 
been presented by Crowston and Myers (2004). They suggest three distinct research 
perspectives which are beneficial in directing researchers as to which types of data should 
be acquired and analysed depending on the perspective employed for a particular study: an 
economic perspective, an institutional perspective and a socio-cultural perspective. Adapted 
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from Crowston and Myers, a summary of these three research perspectives are displayed in 
Table 1 (2004): 
 
Table 1: Summary of the Three Research Perspectives Employed for Industry Analysis 
Perspective Key focus Phenomenon of 
interest 
Types of data Characteristics of 
industry 
transformation 
Economic The relation 
between inputs 
and outputs of an 
industry 
The structure of the 
market: the product, 
the firms supplying the 
product, the buyers, 
and the transactions 
Economic data such as 
costs, profits, number 
of transactions 
A change in the 
structure of a market 
Institutional The contextual 
issues that 
surround an 
industry 
Legal and institutional 
arrangements: the 
regulatory framework 
governing an industry; 
organisations that 
regulate and constrain 
interactions 
Legal documents, court 
decisions, interviews 
with key informants 
A change in the 
regulatory framework 
and/or legal and 
institutional 
arrangements 
Social and 
cultural 
The processes and 
structures within 
an industry 
Social relationships and 
networks, beliefs, 
norms and values 
Notes from fieldwork 
and observations, 
interview data, 
documents 
 
A change in social 
relations, social 
structure, social 
networks and culture 
 
Molina Azorín and Cameron (2010) write that a mixed research approach, rather than a 
single “monomethod design” has gained popularity since 2003 in business, organisational 
and management research as evidenced by use in and acceptance by academic journals 
such as the Strategic Management Journal, Organisational Research Methods and the 
Journal of Organisational Behaviour. A mixed research approach has also become 
increasingly popular in academic disciplines such as sociology, psychology and health 
sciences, and Mearns (2008) notes that in the knowledge management and information 
management discipline especially it has become “the trend to use”. She writes that “it is 
generally accepted” that such a combined research approach can actually enrich a study and 
“improve validity” (Mearns, 2008). Molina Azorín and Cameron (2010) make a strong case 
that mixed methods “result in research which provides broader perspectives than those 
offered by monomethod designs”. 
 
Best suited for an introductory study on disruptive entertainment technologies from an 
industry point of view, the approach for this study is, therefore, a hybrid multiple-case study 
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approach – a combination between an empirical and a non-empirical study which uses 
various case studies and historical analyses (empirical study) in conjunction with theory 
building (non-empirical study). The nature of this thesis is qualitative as opposed to 
quantitative, and from an industry analysis viewpoint it employs both an economic 
perspective and an institutional perspective, while observations of some social and cultural 
trends in entertainment companies as enabled by a socio-cultural perspective are also 
pointed out.  
 
This approach is substantiated by the reality that engineering management, as a discipline, 
is highly-integrative in its very nature – an opinion which is shared by Bill Omurtag, who has 
founded and chaired the School of Engineering, Management and Science at Robert Morris 
University, the California State University-Sacramento School of Business and the 
Department of Industrial Engineering at the Middle East Technical University. In his article 
on the definition of engineering management, Omurtag (2009) writes that it his “firm belief 
that engineering management is a new, broadly integrative and synthesis-focused 
enterprise engineering discipline. Functionally, [he believes] that managerial engineering is 
what these engineers do; that is, they do engineering in the managerial realm… of a 
technological enterprise. Anchored in science, mathematics, and engineering principles, and 
reaching into managerial areas, engineering management graduates can design and 
integrate the total enterprise system with its technical, financial, operational, organisational, 
marketing and human aspects within the global competitive environment… In summary 
they are enterprise engineers doing managerial work.” As a first step to designing and 
integrating total enterprise systems which incorporate all organisational functions in the 
media and entertainment industry, the research focus of this study is to understand the 
fundamental technologies and business models of the industry and how they have evolved 
over time. One cannot optimise a system not understood, and primary research in the 
pursuit of original data can only be conducted after researchers have acquired insight into 
problems by collecting secondary data. 
 
Resulting from this research approach and focus, the methodology employed for this study 
can be described as follows:  
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1. Execute a thorough literature study to gain a good theoretical foundation in a range 
of subjects: 
a. strategic management 
b. information systems and knowledge management 
c. marketing management 
d. financial management 
e. chaos theory and industry change theory 
f. enterprise 2.0 technologies and organisational change theory 
g. innovation management and disruptive innovation theory 
2. Decide on case study research questions for the sectors and companies selected for 
this study: 
a. Which companies or individuals were responsible for inventing the disruptive 
technology, and what were the circumstances which surrounded or enabled 
the commercialisation of these inventions? 
b. What was/is the company’s technology strategy? 
c. How did/does the company’s business model support or undermine new 
technologies? 
d. How did/does the company relate to other organisations with regards to 
intra-industry and inter-industry collaboration? 
3. Collect data by obtaining literature which describes the history and development of 
the media and entertainment sectors under discussion. 
4. Analogous to gaining expert opinion, analyse trade journals, auditing reports, 
industry outlooks and published strategic insights from global consulting firms such 
as: 
a. the IBM Institute for Business Value, 
b. the Global Technology, Media and Telecommunications Group at Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, and 
c. PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Entertainment and Media Industry Group. 
5. Analyse and evaluate historical and expert data. 
6. Synthesise findings in report form. 
7. Develop hypotheses for the reasons why change propagates through the media and 
entertainment industry in a distinct manner (presented graphically in section 1.6), 
based on how companies respond to new technologies. 
8. Make conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
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1.6 Document Roadmap 
The layout of this thesis is based on the hypothesis that technological change transpires 
through the media and entertainment industry in a very distinct manner, derived from 
Meza’s ‘Road to Prosperity’ (2007) and Burgelman and Grove’s theory of cross-boundary 
disruption (2007), a theory which is expounded in section 2.2 of this document. 
 
Figure 2 portrays this process graphically: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Thesis Outline and Roadmap 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the motivation behind this study, provides academic 
justification thereof from an engineering management perspective and describes the 
research methodology utilised to establish a knowledge foundation for the Department of 
Industrial Engineering. Chapter 2 offers a concise context and literature study on disruptive 
innovation before it chronicles the invention of the major disruptive technologies which 
constitute the underpinnings of the media and entertainment industry. Chapter 3 records 
how the entertainment technologies discussed in the previous chapter underwent the 
innovation chasm challenge and examines the reasons why some organisations have 
ascended and others failed to achieve mass adoption. Chapter 4 argues that it is contention 
between technology and media content companies, resulting from a resistance to 
technological change and subsequent business model adaptation on top-level management 
level, which aggravate consumers and present opportunity for cross-boundary disruptors to 
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provide alternative products and services which are capable of disrupting entire sectors. 
Chapter 5 shows the economic benefit of convergence and close collaboration between 
entertainment and technology companies as well as the possibility of creating new markets 
when trepidation towards new innovations and strategies, which ostracize entertainment 
consumers, are relinquished and new business models developed. Chapter 6 provides a 
summarised overview of disruptive innovation management in the media and 
entertainment industry as documented by this study and makes some suggestions for future 
studies in the engineering management field which pertains to this particular industry. 
 
 
 
A quote by John Seely Brown, former Chief Scientist of Xerox Corporation and winner of 
Harvard Business Review’s McKinsey Award, and Paul Duguid, adjunct professor at 
University of California’s School of Information Management and Systems, makes for an apt 
conclusion to this introductory chapter: “University research… is at its most effective when 
it conducts research that the private sector is unable or unwilling to pursue. Much early 
Internet research falls into this category… Conversely, it is at its weakest when it merely 
duplicates research going on elsewhere…” (Brown and Duguid, 2000). As research on an 
industry which has traditionally not been a widely or formally studied one by either industry 
or academia, it is the author’s desire to present a document which is effective in the pursuit 
of its objective. 
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2. The Innovation Phase 
 
―Chance only favours the prepared mind…‖ – Louis Pasteur 
 
―Television? The word is half Greek, half Latin. No good can come of it!‖  
– CP Scott, editor of the Manchurian Guardian for 60 years 
 
 
This chapter offers key definitions and concepts relating to disruptive technologies, provides 
a brief overview of the history of innovation studies in academic literature and subsequently 
chronicles the invention of the major disruptive technologies which constitute the 
underpinnings of the media and entertainment industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Technology, Humans and the Enterprise 
Many attempts to define the broad scope of technology exist in modern-day business 
literature, yet most seem to revolve around one core concept, i.e. the knowledge and 
practical application of scientific deductions. From a scientific point of view, technology can 
be seen as “systematic knowledge and action, usually of industrial processes but applicable 
to any recurrent activity (McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, 1982)”, 
therefore linking technology with engineering; while a business paradigm considers 
technology to be “developed applications for industry and the industrial arts… for example, 
desktop computers represent advanced electronic technology (Dictionary of Business 
Terms, 2007)”, linking technology with implementation and tools. Incorporating both 
scientific and business paradigms, Betz (2003) perceives technology to be “the knowledge of 
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the manipulation of nature for human purposes,” invariably utilised by means of goods and 
services (Gaimon, 2008). The formal definition of choice for this study, consequently, is one 
provided by Willem Barnard based on its clarity and specificity. According to Barnard (2008), 
technology refers to the “knowledge of processes and standards through which the result of 
the processes can be accurately predicted to a useful degree.” He furthermore insists that 
“technology is locked up in people, not books, laboratories, computers, plants or equipment 
– it is knowledge,” and that technology stems from exploration and innovation. Technology 
is a devise not limited to physical apparatus but is actually a function of human knowledge, 
with ‘usability’ distinguishing it from science itself. Sauer and Willcocks (2004) go on to say 
that “when we think about the technology as enabling future possibilities, it only does so if 
people have the right skills and competencies, the right culture, approach to learning, and 
preparedness to innovate.” The technology can therefore never be separated from the 
human creating, yielding or experimenting with it – an important concept for this study. 
 
If technology involves the human, and the technology-human combination drives change in 
an organisation, then naturally technology should be managed. In corporate terms, 
technology should be managed over a long term to generate enterprise profit (Schiling, 
2008), however Firer et al. (2008) maintain that profitability alone is a deficient motivator 
for management, and that the rudimentary aim of any company should be to ultimately 
ensure value creation in the enterprise. Profitability and effective risk management are 
certainly factors which affect the creation of shareholder value in a firm; however, when it 
comes to the media and entertainment industry, these are not the only contributing factors 
to delivering products and services which add firm value. Product quality, critic favourability, 
artistic excellence, technical leadership and customer expectations (Simonton, 2009) all 
contribute to the value created in media firms and therefore serve as additional stimulus to 
industry-wide and organisational technology management, yet all with the ultimate goal of 
enterprise value creation. Enterprise value creation results in a competitive advantage over 
other players in the industry. Harrison and Samson (2002) further opine that not only has 
technology become a key aspect of competitiveness in the recent business context, but that 
it will probably become more pervasive in the future, boldly stating that “technology 
management is the ultimate battleground that will determine which companies and owners 
will be the winners and losers in the wealth creation game.” Managing technology in the 
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corporate context thus necessitates the integration of technology with a firm’s overall 
strategy. 
 
Following this logic of the inseparability of technology, humans and the enterprise, a formal 
definition of technology management is subsequently required. Gaimon (2008) describes 
technology management from a production and operations management perspective: 
“management of technology addresses how to develop, adapt, and exploit technological 
capabilities to create new or improved products or services to accomplish the strategic goals 
of an organisation.” Manyika, Roberts and Sprague (2007) seem to agree with this definition 
by noting that “technology alone is rarely the key to unlocking economic value: companies 
create real wealth when they combine technology with new ways of doing business.” 
Considered authorities in the field of strategic management of technology and innovation, 
Burgelman, Christensen and Wheelwright (2008) finally corroborate this notion by stating 
that technology management is actually a basic business function and that companies 
should develop technology strategies alongside human resource and financial strategies 
which speak to the commercialisation of technologies. They state six questions which a 
sufficient technology strategy should be able to answer: 
 What are the technological competences and capabilities which may distinguish your 
organisation from competitors so as to establish and preserve competitive 
advantage? 
 Which technologies should be utilised for the implementation of core product design 
concepts, and how will the products embody them? 
 What is the organisation’s investment threshold for technological innovation? 
 What is the organisation’s technology sourcing policy? 
 When and how will new technologies be commercialised? 
 How will the company be structured so as to enable effective innovation 
management? 
 
Also acknowledging the importance of fit between an enterprise’s business strategy, 
organisational structure, management systems and technology strategy, Grant (2008), 
however, emphasises organisational configuration and commercialisation approaches, the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
28 
 
subjects addressed by Burgelman, Christensen and Wheelwright’s fifth and sixth 
aforementioned concerns, as either vehicles or significant barriers to change and success in 
an enterprise. Grant states that a firm’s ability to adapt organisationally when confronted 
with technological change or innovation (and therefore also its ability to explore new 
business models) mostly depend on the implications of the new technology. He asserts that 
new technologies may either enhance an organisation’s existing capabilities, or that they are 
“competence destroying” on the other hand. The notion of new technologies affecting an 
organisation’s core assets and activities corresponds with Anita McGahan’s model of 
Trajectories of Industry change which is displayed in Figure 3, adapted from McGahan 
(2004): 
 
 
  CORE ACTIVITIES 
 
 THREATENED NOT THREATENED 
C
O
R
E
 A
S
S
E
T
S
 
TH
R
EA
TE
N
ED
  
 
Radical Change 
Everything is Up in the Air. 
 
Creative Change 
The industry is constantly 
redeveloping assets and 
resources. 
N
O
T 
TH
R
EA
TE
N
ED
  
 
Intermediating Change 
Relationships are fragile. 
 
Progressive Change 
Companies implement 
incremental testing and 
adapt to feedback. 
 
Figure 3: Four Trajectories of Industry Change 
 
 
McGahan argues that intelligent investments within a company cannot be made unless top 
management understands in which manner its industry is undergoing change – technology 
being one of the chief drivers thereof. She lists four modes of industry change, 
differentiated by the effect of change on core assets (durable tangible and intangible 
resources which make companies unique) and core activities (recurring activities performed 
to maintain old and attract new buyers and suppliers, which make companies profitable): 
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 radical change, which usually occurs with the mass adoption of some new 
technology; 
 creative change, which typically occurs when consumers or clients have new 
alternatives due to acquiring unprecedented access to information; 
 intermediating change, which occurs when an industry is constantly redeveloping its 
assets and resources, but relationships between organisations, suppliers and 
customers remain stable; 
 progressive change, which describes sustaining industries known for incremental 
innovations which do not threaten core assets or business models. 
 
Debate has long existed as to whether industry effects actually influence individual firms’ 
performance, in effect challenging Michael Porter’s traditional “Five Forces” view that 
competitive interaction within a specific industry forms the basis of organisational strategy 
management (Porter, 1980 and 2008a). An alternative view on enterprise performance, one 
which Connor terms “a resource-based view” (1991), argues that it is not industry structure 
and competition which determine performance but rather “unique organisational processes” 
and “idiosyncratic historical factors”. Presenting their results from an empirical study on 
American firm profitability using ANOVA techniques, McGahan and Porter found that, 
indeed, some economic sectors are less affected by industry effects than others. But 
whereas their results showed that industry effects affected profit variance among firms in 
the Manufacturing industry less significantly, it accounted for more than 60% of profit 
variance in the Entertainment and Lodging economic sector (McGahan and Porter, 1997), 
justifying industry analysis as a key determinant to strategy development at least in some 
industries.  
 
Deduced from literature, then, the merit of studying technological change in the media and 
entertainment industry from a holistic perspective, as a significant aspect of technology 
management, becomes apparent. 
 
Grant notes that where more extreme technological change necessitates adaptation of 
either an industry’s architecture (core assets) or business models (core activities), 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
30 
 
established organisations have difficulty adapting and new start-up companies tend to be 
more successful. However, he writes that not only radical but “even apparently modest 
technological changes associated with new product generations can give newcomers the 
ability to unseat established market leaders”, and that this ability to disrupt an industry 
becomes possible when companies “offer a very different package of attributes” from those 
of existing technologies (2008). Meza (2007) states that exactly these types of technologies, 
termed disruptive innovations, led to the creation and expansion of the media and 
entertainment industry as we know it today. 
 
2.2 Defining Disruptive Innovations 
Disruptive innovation theory, although expanded upon and popularised by Clayton 
Christensen’s writings from the mid-1990s onwards (Christensen and Bower, 1996; 
Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Christensen, 2006), finds its origin much 
earlier in academic literature by such authors as Schumpeter (1942), Henderson and 
Clark(1990) and Moore (1991). Especially notable was Schumpeter’s entrepreneurial theory 
of how change propagates through an industry. Burgelman and Grove (2007) describe the 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur as one that is typically a start-up company which engages in 
“rule-changing strategic actions that create non-linear strategic industry dynamics”, 
providing opportunity for fast adopters to enjoy competitive advantage and a new industry 
configuration to be established. Figure 4 illustrates a series of studies on technological 
innovation which form the foundation of disruptive innovation theory: 
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Figure 4: Timeline of the Evolution of Disruptive Innovation Theory, adapted from Yu and Hang(2010) 
 
Yu and Hang (2010) observed that subsequent to Christensen’s initial writings, numerous 
other studies on the topic of disruptiveness have been conducted in the process of refining 
the theory and providing guidelines for start-ups and managers in industries which find their 
core assets or core activities threatened by new technologies. They noted, however, that as 
numerous as the studies are on this type of innovation, the literature often conflicts as to 
the actual definition of a disruptive innovation and that clarification on its attributes was 
required to prevent ambiguity in future research. Taking into account how Christensen’s 
theory has developed over the years, as well as the various reservations, challenges, 
critiques and suggestions of scholars such as Daneels (2004), Govindarajan and Kopalle 
(2004), Yu and Hang stated Christensen’s (1997) description of a disruptive innovation, 
along with some clarifications, in their 2010 paper: “disruptive innovation happens in a 
process” and may be defined as innovations “that provide different values from mainstream 
technologies and are initially inferior to mainstream technologies that are most important 
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to mainstream customers”, but later help to establish new markets or disrupt incumbent 
organisations by displacing existing technologies.  
 
Raynor (2011) states that in its simplest sense “disruption… is a theory of innovation—of 
how particular types of new products and services, or ‘solutions,’ come to achieve success 
or dominance in markets, often at the expense of incumbent providers.” Having confidence 
in the predictive value of disruptive innovation theory, he compares disruptive innovations 
with sustaining innovations and endorses Thomas Thurston’s hypothesis that disruptive 
innovations which are launched autonomously and which “improve in ways that allow them 
to compete for mainstream markets from a position of structural advantage”, will be 
successful. The autonomy he refers to is possible if the ventures responsible for 
commercialising the technology are “able to design strategic planning processes and control 
systems and financial metrics, among other characteristics, independently of systems built 
for incumbent organisations (Raynor, 2011).”  Figure 5 illustrates this hypothesis: 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Disruption Theory as a Predictor of New Venture Success: Thurston's 
Hypothesis, adapted from Raynor (2011) 
 
Yu and Hang (2010) make sure to dispel some misunderstandings pertaining to 
disruptiveness: 
 disruptors are not necessarily start-up companies as incumbent companies can also 
disrupt industries if they have specific experience in entering new markets; 
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 disruptors innovations can impact existing markets significantly without necessarily 
displacing it if opportunities for niche markets desiring older products exist; and 
 disruptive innovation does not necessarily correspond to destructive innovations, as 
competitors may react to the new technology by creating their own versions thereof. 
 
Building on disruptive innovation theory and Schumpeter’s (1942) idea that start-ups’ 
activities can radically alter industry structures, Burgelman and Grove (2007) developed the 
concept of trans-industry disruption. Cross-boundary theory deviates from Schumpeterian 
theory in that it identifies an additional change agent which serves as a catalyst to industry 
transformation – one termed a cross-boundary disruptor (XBD). The cross-boundary 
disruptor has the capability of influencing not only inter-industry organisations but also how 
business is conducted in entirely-different industries.  
 
An organisation is more prone to engage in XBD endeavours if: 
 it has a strong but restricted product-market in its domestic industry; 
 it possesses wealth in terms of capital and human resources; 
 it has a growth-oriented strategy; 
 its core competencies and brand appeal are technology-related, increasing the 
potential of convergence with neighbouring industries; 
 it enjoys little downside due to an established customer-base in its domestic industry; 
or 
 if it faces modest opportunity cost due to limited opportunities for growth in its 
domestic industry (Burgelman and Grove, 2007). 
 
Some of the entertainment companies examined as case studies for this paper may be 
classified as cross-boundary disruptors, as they comprise some or all of the six attributes 
which Burgelman and Grove ascribe to this type of organisational entity. At this point 
however, a definition of the media and entertainment industry becomes necessary before 
the invention of these technologies is discussed. 
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2.3 Defining the Media and Entertainment Industry 
According to Webster’s Third Unabridged International Dictionary (1967), entertainment is 
defined as “the act of diverting, amusing, or causing someone’s time to pass agreeably” or 
“something that diverts, amuses, or occupies the attention agreeably”. Vogel (2011) 
expands on this definition by stating that entertainment is more than just the act of 
diverting, but that it alludes to “a satisfied and happy psychological state” through either 
active or passive means, bringing the cause and effect of entertainment together. The 
media and entertainment industry, consequently, are those groups of companies which 
engage in commercial activities with that aim of providing consumers with contented 
psychological states. As stated in section 1.1 of this study, this is a growing industry in which 
spending currently amounts to over one trillion dollars a year. 
 
Although the industry structure has been altered significantly through digitalisation, 
traditionally distinction can be made between various segments within media and 
entertainment which constitute the industry and contribute to the same aforementioned 
goal. In this study these segments are referred to as sectors. These sectors can be classified 
as either media-dependent entertainment or live entertainment, although also a traditional 
view, but Vogel (2011) chooses to allocate the sectors as follows in Table 2 anyway: 
 
Table 2: Segmentation of the Media and Entertainment Industry 
Media-dependent entertainment Live entertainment 
 Movies 
 Television broadcasting 
 Music 
 Radio broadcasting 
 Cable television 
 Publishing (books, periodicals and 
multimedia) 
 Toys, games and video games 
 
 Gaming and wagering 
 Sports 
 Performing arts and culture 
 Amusement parks and theme parks 
 
 
In its trade articles and annual industry outlook reports, PricewaterhouseCoopers chooses 
to delineate the media and entertainment industry by using the following segments (2010a). 
Noticeable is fragmentation of the publishing sector into four divisions: 
 Internet 
 Television 
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 Filmed entertainment 
 Radio 
 Music 
 Consumer magazine publishing 
 Newspaper publishing 
 Consumer and educational book publishing 
 Business to business publishing 
 Out-of-home advertising 
 Video games 
 Sports 
 Gaming 
 
Incorporating some aspects of both these views but excluding all forms of live 
entertainment, publishing, toys and gaming, this study focuses specifically on the following 
technology-centred media-dependent sectors with a distinct focus on video recording 
technology rather than combining it with filmed entertainment: 
 Radio  
 Recorded music 
 Motion pictures 
 Television 
 Video recording 
 The Internet, with a specific focus on filesharing technologies 
 
The following section recounts how the discrete technologies which underpin these sectors 
were invented with specific focus on the individuals and corporations behind the 
innovations, and how these technologies navigated through the innovation phase before 
obtaining mass adoption.  
 
2.4 Inventing the Radio 
Although Reginald Fessenden first succeeded in transmitting audio content over radio in the 
form of a Handel aria and some violin music in 1906, it is Guglielmo Marconi from Italy who 
is credited with being the “Father of Radio” as we know it today (Harlow, 1936). The science 
behind radio broadcasting technology, however, is dated back as early as the 1860s when 
James Clerk Maxwell established electromagnetic radio wave theory and the 1880s when 
Heinrich Hertz produced and detected the waves described by Maxwellian theory. After 
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coming across an academic article which described the working of Hertzian waves in 1894, 
Guglielmo Marconi became convinced that the radio waves described by Hertz could be 
utilised for a purpose greater than just transmitting signals – two-way communication. After 
some experimentation, Marconi displayed an invention which could transmit Morse code 
over radio waves to the Italian government in an attempt to secure funding for further 
research, yet they were not interested in what he had to show them. The British 
government, conversely, issued Marconi with the world’s patent on radio technology when 
they anticipated the usefulness of radio for its naval operations. Marconi had speculated 
that the technology which he had developed in the form of a wireless telegraph would be 
used primarily for military purposes. At a mere 23 years old, Marconi established the 
Wireless Telegraph and Signal Company as a vehicle for selling his wireless telegraph with 
the help of British investors, a company which he renamed Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph 
Company in 1897. Apart from providing the government with his technology, Marconi 
started selling his wireless telegraph to shipping companies as a means of communication 
between ships and on-land receivers. His company signed its first significant contract with 
London-based naval insurance company Lloyds in 1901 (Barnouw, 1966). 
 
Douglas (1988) writes that Marconi wanted to exercise complete control over the business 
of radio and did so through continuous innovation, attempting to increase the speed at 
which his telegraph could transmit Morse code, and by establishing noninterconnection 
with competitors who had started emulating his technology. Marconi argued that 
disintermediation was not possible between the devices he used and the transmission 
services which he offered. The result was that Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company, 
through contractual agreements, refused to transmit and receive signals produced by their 
competitors, thereby cementing its policy of nonintercommunication. Marconi hoped to 
capture network externalities associated with his wireless technology, a phenomenon 
explained in Chapter 3 of this study, through his monopoly. In 1902 the company expanded 
its infrastructure by increasing its number of shore stations in both Britain and the USA. By 
that year Marconi’s devices were capable of transmitting “marconigram” messages at 20 
words per minute, and customers could send these marconigrams from England to America 
at a mere 12 cents per word, comparable to US$3.10 in 2011, which was a fraction of the 
price of international telegraphs.  
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A problem eventually arose in that competitors' equipment could also communicate Morse 
code messages with that of Marconi's. Marconi attempted to counter this development by 
marketing his equipment as being more advanced than that produced by rival companies 
and depended on noninterconnection, knowing that his company was not financially secure 
enough at that time to fight patent-related legal battles. Marconi’s company only broke 
even in 1911 due to its overoptimistic "Marconigram" message sales forecasts and the 
significant capital expenditure it incurred while setting up shore stations in the USA. Finally, 
Marconi was unable to exercise the control over the industry which he started, and Meza 
(2007) opines that his conservative view of the blossoming wireless communications 
industry and a stubborn commitment to an increasingly-dated business model eventually 
led to Marconi's failure to envision and allow technological development in the form of 
voice-over-radio. 
 
Reginald A. Fessenden, Lee de Forest and Edwin H. Armstrong were innovators who not only 
experimented with wireless transmission technology because of the conviction that it could 
be used to broadcast speech and music, but they also possessed the business acumen to 
ensure that radio eventually achieved adoption outside of the military and naval markets at 
which Marconi initially aimed his wireless telegraph (Douglas, 1988). 
 
Originally a member of Thomas Edison’s staff and college lecturer, Fessenden became an 
employee of the American Weather Bureau in 1900 for the specific purpose of designing a 
wireless weather data transmission system. His agenda, however, was to develop a means 
of broadcasting audio content by means of wireless technology rather than discrete Morse 
Code messages. Fessenden alleged that Marconi's interrupted waves could be improved 
upon by using continuous waves, serving as a vehicle for voice or music as modulations. 
Fessenden proved his hypothesis in 1902 by combining voice with radio waves via a 
telephone microphone. Fearing that the American government would claim ownership of 
his technology while still an employee of the Weather Bureau, Fessenden started his own 
company with the help of private financiers and became the world's first disk jockey when 
he succeeded in broadcasting music on 25 December 1906 (Barnouw, 1966). 
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Lee de Forest was also an engineer who experimented with voice transmission technology 
while being employed by a corporation, being a researcher at Western Electric which was a 
division of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) at the time. In 1901, the New York 
Herald hired both De Forest, who designed an improved Morse code transmitter based on 
Marconi’s work, and Marconi himself to employ their newest technologies to report the 
results of America's Cup yacht races in New York. This venture connected de Forest with a 
financier who enabled him to establish the De Forest Wireless Telegraph Company in 1902, 
the first of his many enterprises which never existed for too long due to a combination of his 
“abrasive personality”, which alienated him from his investors, and the dishonest business 
practices of his partners (Illinois Engineering Hall of Fame, 2006).  
 
Made possible with financial backing, he developed an apparatus called the "grid audion" in 
1905, a device which was instrumental in making radio feasible as an industry according to 
Barnouw (1966), as it formed the foundation of amplification technology. De Forest 
patented the audion in 1907 and founded the De Forest Radio Telephone Company as a 
vehicle for utilising his invention in the marketplace. He experimented by broadcasting 
records and live music over the airways, becoming obsessed with his technology by even 
attempting broadcasts from the Eiffel Tower while in Paris with his newly-wed bride at the 
time. De Forest partnered with the United States Navy by providing twenty six grid audion 
sets for their Great White Fleet which underwent a tour around the globe. Envisioning a day 
that radio technology would enjoy ubiquitous infiltration De Forest is quoted as saying: "I 
look forward to the day when opera may be brought into every home. Someday the news 
and even advertising will be sent out over the wireless telephone." Fewer than originally 
planned though, he built only eleven radio broadcast stations around the USA and even 
these were working erratically (Douglas, 1988). 
 
In 1912, questionable and corrupt practices in De Forest's company were exposed when De 
Forest Radio Telephone Company shareholders launched legal action against de Forest and 
some of the other founders. Although found innocent by the courts, de Forest was bankrupt 
at the time and was forced to sell the patent rights of his grid audion to AT&T, which 
consequently caused patent wars between AT&T and the Marconi company because of its 
similarity to one of Marconi’s patents (Coon, 1939).  
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De Forest could never scientifically explain why exactly his grid audion worked, but this was 
later determined through research by Edwin H. Armstrong, an independent undergraduate 
student at Columbia University (Illinois Engineering Hall of Fame, 2006). In 1914, Armstrong 
obtained a patent for his discovery of a regenerative electric circuit which made feedback to 
the audion possible, enabling it to both produce and receive radio waves, and also invented 
the syperheterodyne, which enabled receivers to tune into various radio stations which 
operated on different frequencies for the first time (Douglas, 1990). This was a landmark 
achievement in commercialising broadcast radio, and Armstrong is consequently regarded 
as the inventor of FM radio. 
 
2.5 The Origin of Recorded Music 
Whereas incandescent light bulb inventor Thomas A. Edison is universally credited with 
being the innovator who founded the recorded music sector, a study by Rosen (2008) 
revealed that the invention of Edison’s phonograph was preceded by Édouard-Léon Scott de 
Martinville’s invention which consisted of a stylus which followed trail of spots which had 
been blackened by an oil lamp on paper and could play different notes in succession. 
According to a study by Duke University (2000), other engineers like Thomas Young, Charles 
Cros and Leon Scott also experimented with devices with the aim of reproducing sounds, 
and it was only 17 years after de Martinville’s first invention that Edison developed the 
concept of a phonograph. Edison’s first version of a phonograph consisted of a cylinder 
covered with tinfoil which could be rotated manually with a handle, as well as a metal stylus 
which was attached to a diaphragm. The diaphragm vibrated when sound waves made 
contact with it, enabling the stylus to cut grooves on the tinfoil cylinder while the handle 
was being cranked. Sound could be played back by reversing the procedure, which 
instigated the vibration of the diaphragm as the stylus made contact with the grooves on 
the cylinders. 
 
When Edison developed the phonograph in 1877, he envisioned a great range of uses for his 
device, but suspected that it would mostly be used to pre-record messages which could be 
sent as telegraphs (Edison, 1878). An entrepreneur as much as an inventor, Edison formed 
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the Speaking Phonograph Company in 1878, replaced by the Edison Phonograph Company 
in 1887, as a platform for selling his enhanced phonograph. Elliot (1989) writes that 
audiences could pay a nickel to listen to songs or comedic speeches reproduced by a 
phonograph at their nearest parlour – the foundation of recorded music sector’s first 
business model. Edison also established a company which sold phonographs which played 
music when coins were inserted to the machines, thus creating the ancestor to the modern-
day jukebox. He also released the Edison Spring Motor Phonograph to the slowly growing 
music consumer market in 1895, a device which could play music and could be bought in the 
form of record cylinders (Eliot, 1989). By 1899, Edison’s cylinders, accompanied by a 
repertoire of marches, hymns and comedic speeches could be bought for a mere 50 cents 
each (US$13.33 in 2011). 
 
Simultaneous to the commercialisation of Edison’s phonographs, German engineer Emile 
Berliner invented a method for etching audio onto flat metallic disks. It was proven that the 
metal disks invented by Berliner could produce much better sound quality than Edison's 
cylinders, and that it offered greater capacity for storage than its cylindrical counterpart. 
Berliner’s device was also easier to produce and, along with his invention which enabled him 
to mass-produce metal disk copies from one original recording, he finally possessed a 
product which could contend with Edison’s in the music consumer market. Berliner and 
Eldridge R. Johnson established the Victor Talking Machine Company in 1901 as a vehicle for 
selling their improved device, which had undergone even more continuous innovation to 
become the gramophone, a devise not too dissimilar to modern-day turntables used by disk 
jockeys. Johnson, who had invented the automation technology which replaced the 
gramophone's manual crank thereby enabling a constant rotation speed for the turning 
table, was appointed as Victor Talking Machine Company’s first chief executive (Jones, 1985). 
 
2.6 The Origin of Motion Pictures 
Placing pictures on a ribbon of film which moved was by no means a new or unique idea for 
19th century photographers. Margolies and Gwathmey (1991) write that it was already a 
well-known fact by the late-1800s that it is the human eye’s persistence of vision which 
retains an image slightly longer in the mind, thereby creating an optical illusion of continuity 
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when a series of pictures are seen, which enables viability of motion pictures as we know 
them today. Bakker (2005) lists a range of technologies which were all combined to produce 
motion pictures, all of them available from the late-1880s onwards:  
 photography, invented in 1830; 
 the ability to take negative pictures whilst printing the positives, invented in the 
1880s; 
 roll films, invented in the 1850s; 
 celluloid, invented in 1868; 
 high-sensitivity photographic emulsion, invented in the late-1880s; and 
 image projection technology, invented by Athanasius Kircher in 1645 already. 
 
But yet again it was the prolific Thomas Edison who synthesised science, physiology and 
technology in the form of his kinestoscope invention to officially initiate the motion picture 
sector in 1893. The kinestoscope, basically described, offered individual viewers the 
opportunity to watch a short film through a small peephole. These short films were 
recorded through a device which was co-invented by William Kennedy Laurie Dickson 
termed the kinetograph camera, a specialised camera which was capable of taking 
successive photographs of a moving object.  
 
The world's first film studio, where motion pictures are filmed, was built by Edison in 1893 
in New Jersey. Exhibition sites were opened first in New York and then across the rest of the 
USA where the films shot at Edison's studio were displayed to patrons on an individual basis. 
"Nickel Theaters", colloquially called nickelodeons referring to the cost per individual to 
watch a movie, were positioned as go-to movie houses in large US cities, and became the 
principal exhibition outlets in America by 1906. The Motion Picture Patents Company, 
nothing other than a corporate monopoly because of its desire to control the film industry, 
was formed in 1908 by a group which consisted of Thomas Edison and the other most 
prominent moving picture patent holders. This conglomerate, which cooperatively licensed 
the patents of its founders, was eventually classified as unlawful by the American legal 
system in 1915 and had to disband as a result of this ruling. 
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But similar to the cases of the invention of the wireless telegraph, the phonograph and the 
gramophone, innovations which contributed to cinema emerged in Europe at the same as it 
did in the USA. Frenchmen Jean Marey, Georges Demeny and the Lumière brothers filed 
patents for their versions of film cameras in 1888, 1893 and 1895 respectively, while Friese 
Green, an Englishman, managed to design his own film camera in 1890 (Bakker, 2005). 
Moreover, Putnam (1997) writes that it was Europeans like Charles Pathé, and not the 
Americans, who first regarded cinema as a legitimate art form. Yet, as mentioned previously, 
it was Edison who succeeded in establishing the first feasible business model for motion 
pictures, connecting audiences with a new form of entertainment first through nickelodeons 
up to 1896, thereafter through fixed cinemas for larger audiences. 
  
2.7 Inventing the Television 
Television broadcasting operations started as a mere laboratory curiosity in the early-20th 
century; today it represents a global industry generating almost US$200 billion a year 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010a). Different experiments by several inventors in fields 
which range from electromagnetics to radio led to the invention of the television. Utilising 
some earlier scientific discoveries like Faraday’s findings regarding electromagnetic fields, a 
young German engineer called Paul G. Nipkow designed and patented a spinning disk 
instrument and named it after himself. The Nipkow spinning disc was quite revolutionary in 
its working because it enabled the sequential sending of dissected images through wires 
when placed between a light sensitive selenium photocell and the scene which was to be 
broadcasted. Reiman (2004)  writes that light passing through the pinholes (which were 
arranged on the Nipkow disc in a spiral shape) while the disc rotated produced a rectangular 
scanning pattern, which was used to either produce images from the signal at the receiver, 
or for generating electrical signals. Regardless of the fact that Paul Nipkow never further 
developed the invention which had patented in 1884, the working of his spinning disc 
formed the basis for most subsequent attempts at expanding the technology of the 
television.  
 
John Logie Baird, a scientist from Scotland, and Charles Francis Jenkins, an engineer from 
USA, utilised Nipkow's spinning disc technology in their offerings of basic television systems, 
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making use of electromechanical equipment to receive simple broadcasted images. 
Nipkow’s spinning disc technology, however, was inadequate to produce high-resolution 
moving pictures that did not flicker substantially, and both Baird and Jenkins’s devices failed 
commercially due to poor quality (Reiman, 2004). 
 
An all-electrical television was designed as a solution to the mechanical inadequacy offered 
by Nipkow's spinning disc technology by none other than a fifteen year old inventor from a 
rustic suburb in Idaho (Everson, 1974). Yet Philo T. Farnsworth experienced some harsh 
personal circumstances growing up before his ideas for television were finally realised. 
Farnsworth conceived of an idea of manufacturing an all-electrical television already when 
he was only 15 years old, but it was only in his 19th year that George Everson and Leslie 
Gorrell, two consultants who helped establish Salt Lake City’s Community chest, saw some 
potential in Philo's invention (if not the enthusiasm about his ideas) and sponsored him 
financially to design the television technology he so ardently promoted. Still in the 
development phase and requiring more capital to perfect his initial technology, Farnsworth 
and Emerson approached additional investors, and with their help established the Television 
Laboratories, Inc. to commercialise the image dissector (a camera containing a vacuum tube) 
and oscillate (a picture tube) which then-30 year old Farnsworth had designed in his garage 
at home. With the technologies combined, Farnsworth’s device successfully transmitted 
images of Mary Pickford, the well-known silent era actress, combing her hair, thereby 
incentivising his benefactors enough to start marketing the invention.  
 
After a lengthy delay in the application process, Farnsworth obtained a patent in 1930 for 
his version of the television, the cathode ray picture tube, which by that time was designed 
to be both a transmitting and receiving device, unlike modern-day televisions which can 
only receive television signals. The Radio Corporation of America (RCA), a technology 
company which had substantial research and development (R&D) facilities at the time, 
appealed the patent that was rewarded to Farnsworth for his device by claiming that 
Vladimir Zworykin, one of RCA’s employees, was actually the inventor of the television. RCA 
lost their legal battle against Television Laboratories, but nevertheless ended up winning 
commercially due to the ultimate superior performance of Zworykin’s iconoscope 
(Abramson, 1995): Zworykin, a revered former scientist at the company Westinghouse, had 
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the inspiration to design an all-electrical television at the same time which Farnsworth had 
conducted his experiments, and released his version thereof through RCA soon after 
Farnsworth's television was introduced to the public. With the help of a significant 
marketing budget, a benefit which Television Laboratories certainly did not enjoy at their 
conception, RCA was swift to position Victor Zworykin as the actual "Inventor of Television" 
in the mind of the general public by the early-1930s, even though Farnsworth conceived of 
the idea while still only in high school.  
 
In reality, Zworykin’s device did offer a significant technological improvement over 
Farnsworth's: Zworykin’s iconoscope had a specification which enabled memory storage, 
while Farnsworth's image dissector did not. Abramson (1995) writes that Zworykin's 
iconoscope technology finally formed the foundation of modern-day camera and picture 
tube technology. RCA, however, recognised the value in Farnsworth’s invention and 
obtained the legal right to utilise his transmission and reception technologies in 1939, 
granting him licence to use comparable technologies developed by RCA in return. 
 
2.8 Inventing the Video Recorder 
Combining the first letters of his initials with "ex", representing 'excellence', engineer 
Alexander M. Poniatoff established the Ampex company in 1944 with the vision of designing 
the world's first audio recording technology (Rosenbloom and Freeze, 1985). Fulfilling this 
vision already in 1948 by producing a first prototype of a tape recorder, Ampex introduced 
this prototype to entertainer Bing Crosby, who was so impressed with the technology that 
he placed an order for twenty tape recorders which would enable him to prerecord 
programmes for his radio show. When television obtained consumer favour and television 
technology started surpassing the stage of early adoption on the technology life cycle, 
television networks were founded and strategic partnerships were formed with 
broadcasting companies across the USA. Poniatoff's company, competing with the well-
established RCA company, pursued the development of a technology which could not only 
record audio, but video as well. RCA's iconoscope technology was deemed too expensive at 
that stage and a more efficient technology was required. Both RCA and Ampex realised that 
a solution could be found by recording video on magnetised tape, but, according to 
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Rosenbloom and Freeze (1985), it was Poniatoff's engineers who first successfully 
developed a vehicle for this technology in the form of the Mark IV video tape recorder (VTR). 
According to Lemelson-MIT (2002), Charles P. Ginsburg led the team of Ampex-researchers 
who was responsible for developing the technology which enabled the recording of 
televised content on tape – a process which necessitates a high-frequency response from 
recording devices, because television waves are broadcast at a very high frequency (VHF). 
The VTR enabled videotape to run at slow speed while its recording heads rotated at high 
speed. Ampex’s first VTR models sold for US$50 000 apiece when it was commercialised in 
1956, which is equivalent to $409 000 per recorder in 2011. 
 
Ampex exhibited the capability of its Mark IV to 200 delegates of the CBS broadcasting 
company in 1956 to great success. After recording a presentation in front of a live audience 
and playing it back to them directly afterwards, Ampex sold more than 100 VTRs, 
establishing itself among the top three technology companies in Silicon Valley at the time 
(Fernandes, 1999). Their market at that time, however, was limited to corporate clients and 
not yet public consumers. Ampex identified this opportunity and developed a B2C marketing 
strategy and mass production infrastructure to target the consumer market.  
 
After enjoying a period of VTR market leadership with their Mark IV, Ampex started 
attracting substantial competition from technology-orientated companies like Philips, 
Matsushita and Sony. Advances in solid state circuit electronics in Japan especially posed a 
solution to size, portability, cost and reliability problems. Following a failed corporate 
partnership with Sony in the early 1960s, Ampex agreed to a joint venture (JV) with Toshiba 
in Japan, but due to the continuous innovations yielded by its Japanese competitors, it 
never again regained market leadership in the video recording market. Fernandes (1999) 
writes that in 1971, product innovation initiatives at Sony led to the development of video 
cassette technology which replaced bulky reel-to-reel magnetic tapes which had to be used 
in conjunction with the large VTR machines. They named their product the U-Matic, which 
used ¾inch tapes similar to that which could be found in VHS and Beta versions of the video 
cassette by the mid-1970s (Park, 2004). 
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2.9 The Origin of Filesharing Technology and Peer-to-Peer 
Computing 
Filesharing technology finds its origin in space exploration academia, as opposed to 
technology developers or entertainment content companies. In 1998, programmers at 
Berkeley Space Sciences Lab developed computer software which enabled scientists to 
transfer data from the Arecibo radio telescope in Puerto Rico to thousands of personal 
computers worldwide. Intricate incoming signals from space could be divided into smaller 
250kB data packages, distributed and transmitted to screensaver programmes on inactive 
computers across the globe via the Internet for processing. Analysed data would be 
transmitted back to a central database in Puerto Rico. Berkley reports that over two million 
Internet-users volunteered their personal computers for signal analysis within the first two 
years of this project, termed SETI@home, and that their combined network offered 
processing capability of ten trillion calculations per second, amassing data which would've 
taken 345 000 years to analyse had the distributed computing technology not been 
developed (Burgelman and Meza, 2000). 
 
Yet what started as a technology which contributed positively to Berkeley’s space program 
has become the disruptive technology of scorn for the media and entertainment industry, 
instigating “hundreds of lawsuits, thousands of takedown notices, and [the expenditure of] 
millions of dollars” to constrain illegal filesharing as first popularised by Napster, the world’s 
first peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing program (Bridy, 2009).  
 
While still a first-year student at the US-based Northeastern University in 1999, Shawn 
Fanning coded a software program supported by P2P technology which could facilitate the 
sharing of MP3 music files with other people over the Internet. The easily-downloadable 
software program was called Napster, and started gaining traction among his fellow 
university students. Recognising the significant potential influence of this technology on the 
status quo of distribution in the recorded music sector, Shawn Fanning incorporated a 
company in partnership with his uncle John later in 1999. Funding through his company 
enabled Parker to distribute his software to an audience wider than just the local university 
over the Internet, and Bhattacharjee, Gopal, Lertwachara, Marsden and Telang (2007) write 
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that entertainment consumers rapidly adopted the new technology which enabled them to 
download their favourite music “for free”. They add that “the entertainment industry, in 
particular the music business, has been profoundly impacted by [the] recent technological 
advances… *as embodied by+ audio-compression technologies [and] P2P filesharing 
networks (Bhattacharjee et al., 2007).”  
 
Napster offered its proprietary filesharing technology to Internet users in the form 
downloadable software free of charge, yet Fanning never registered Napster as a non-profit 
organisation – his plan was always to monetise its user-base once it reached a critical mass. 
Yet no clear plan to achieve this existed, and before this ideal ever realised Napster was 
forced to cease its filesharing services because of its illegitimacy through a ruling from the 
District Court in California (A&M Records, Inc., et al. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 - 
District Court, ND California, 2000).  
 
Both Napster and the aforementioned SETI@home project founded their basic business 
processes on distributed computing technology, more recently referred to as P2P 
technology. Distributed computing technology denotes the instantaneous transferral of data, 
resources or services between a network or networks of dispersed computers (referred to 
as clients), servers, routers and hubs as administered by commands processed by a central 
server. Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) list three different P2P network topologies as 
defined by their composition: centralised P2P, decentralised P2P and hybrid P2P. Currah 
(2007) writes that centralised P2P architectures such as those pioneered by Napster have 
gradually been replaced with topologies that are decentralised, eliminating the file sharers’ 
dependency on dedicated web servers. Services like Gnutella, BitTorrent, DC++ and eDonkey 
have utilised alternative topologies to centralised P2P, which has made it more difficult for 
law enforcers to find the true sources of illegal content. For explanatory purposes, the 
architecture of these three topologies is illustrated in Figure 6 on page 48, adapted from 
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007). Note that in a hybrid P2P topology, clients connect to 
supernodes which act like central servers, as is the case with a centralised P2P topology. 
However, rather than downloading files directly from these supernodes, clients download 
the required content from other client computers after supernode indexes have been 
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searched, search requests passed on from supernode to supernode and ideal client sources 
identified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6: Peer-to-Peer Filesharing Topologies 
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2.10 Chapter Conclusion  
Several deductions can be made through this chapter’s historical analysis of sector-starting 
inventions in the media and entertainment industry. First, it should be noted that the radio, 
the phonograph, the gramophone, the image dissector, the iconoscope, the television, the 
VTR and Napster were all technologies which disrupted old ways in which consumers 
enjoyed entertainment. New markets were created and old approaches to entertainment 
consumption were forever impacted with the invention of each of these technologies – 
attributive of disruptive innovations. It should also be observed that all of these innovations 
occurred through a combination of existing technologies, and that the innovation process 
for each of them was truly a global one, as collaboration between inventors from various 
countries as opposed to just one ensured successful operation of these technologies. Thirdly, 
it is interesting to note that each of these technologies enjoyed quicker adoption than the 
steam engine, railroad and the steamship; a feat which, Bakker (2005) says, permits a 
technology to be termed a “major innovation”. 
 
The most noteworthy observation from this historical analysis, however, is that the 
innovation phase (as the first phase of industry change) occurs in a myriad of ways as 
opposed to simply one. Different inventions in this industry transpire through different 
means. Analogous to innovation attempts at modern-day R&D departments in large 
enterprises, some discrete innovations were conceived in a corporate context, exemplified 
by the host of practical technologies invented by Thomas Edison and the engineers he 
employed at his company. Other innovations in the entertainment industry took place when 
talented inventors partnered with individual businessmen who could provide necessary 
capital for the patenting and manufacturing of their technological devices, as evident in the 
cases of Lee de Forest and Philo T. Farnsworth. However, similar to Guglielmo Marconi 
inventing basic radio technology in his basement, Shawn Fanning creating Napster while still 
at university or even successes shown by recent internet upstarts initiated by entrepreneurs 
like Mark Zuckerberg etc., some inventions simply do not find their origin through the 
utilisation of structured innovation frameworks in large enterprises. Disruptive innovation 
does not occur in one specific way or in one specific environment only. The hypothesis 
deduced from this analysis, however, is that regardless of its origin, entrepreneurial 
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involvement and financial investment are always requirements for success of disruptive 
innovations in the entertainment industry; legitimate entrepreneurs, moreover, ensure that 
that success is sustainable. The ability of disruptive innovations to attain mass adoption is 
further discussed in Chapter 3. 
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3. The Ascension Phase 
 
―Cinema is not art. It’s an industry that has changed the idea of art.‖  
– André Malraux, former French Minister of Culture 
 
 
This chapter argues that all of the technologies discussed in Chapter 2 undertook the 
innovation chasm challenge – some ascended as a technology and evolved into an industry, 
while others failed to achieve mass adoption – and contends that it is the presence or 
absence of positive network externalities which makes the difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though Napster's operations as a company never emanated from a profit-generating 
business model, and even though Fanning’s plans to eventually monetise its offering never 
came to fruition due to being pronounced illegal, Napster is regarded as a corporate success 
story in at least one aspect - it attracted more than 80 million users worldwide with its 
filesharing technology in its lifetime as a company (Kim and Mauborgne, 2009), and 
positioned P2P technology over the Internet as a viable alternative to physical devices for 
the delivery of entertainment-related content to consumers. Companies like Apple, Netflix 
and Hulu offering filesharing technology-based services after Napster's collapse have 
researched technology and business strategy alignment and fashioned business models that 
can generate profit from the use of its technology, and proved that network externalities 
achieved with filesharing technology can be canalised to create value for the enterprise. 
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Network externalities, an element observed in the Napster case study, denote one of the 
chief phenomena which can be observed in the ascension phase of industry change. Grant 
(2008) describe network externalities as those standards which exist “whenever the value of 
a product to an individual customer depends on the number of other users of that product.” 
Positive network externalities, specifically, are those advantages which occur as a result of 
increased technology adoption of a particular technological device among consumers. For 
example, when Alexander Graham Bell invented the first telephone, it could not be truly 
useful unless there were other adopters of the technology. However, as the telephone 
became more ubiquitous, its expediency increased and users of the technology benefitted 
thereby.  
 
Radio broadcasting, television, the recorded music sector and the film industry each grew 
significantly as sectors of the media and entertainment industry by way of distinctive 
business models, and popularised entertainment even more by supplying technology for the 
delivery of audio, video and digital content, surpassing initial applications of the respective 
technologies. For instance, Guglielmo Marconi initially designed radio technology to 
transmit messages in Morse code over great distances, but radio became truly popular 
when its list of applications was broadened to include the broadcast of audio content, 
especially music, to entertainment consumers. Parties in the music recording sector were 
paid for their content by radio broadcasters, who in turn received income from advertising 
agencies. Furthermore, radio technology enabled a fresh avenue for marketing new content 
released by the music artists. A relationship of corporate symbiosis was established 
between these two entertainment sectors through new applications of radio technology. 
Similar strategic partnerships can also be observed between filesharing companies and the 
information industries, especially prevalent between the Apple's iTunes Store and content 
companies Sony, BMG, Warner Brothers Records, EMI Group and Universal Music Group 
(Kim and Mauborgne, 2009). Corporate symbiosis is also prevalent in the form of joint 
ventures between motion picture production companies and the television networks which 
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broadcast their content (Scott, 2004). To substantiate the occurrence of the ascension phase 
when observing how industries respond to radical technological change, further 
examination follows on the discrete innovations in the media and entertainment industry 
mentioned in the previous chapter and the network externalities which helped them 
achieve mass consumer adoption. 
 
3.1 Radio 
After the invention of basic radio technology in the early 1900s, early adopters thereof 
started experimenting and fiddling with the technology, to the detriment of corporate 
developers and users of radio. Instructions from the military were simulated and counterfeit 
messages were sent to the Navy at sea, compelling the US government to authorise 
licensing laws which would regulate the use of radio technology in 1912. This law allowed 
the US government to seize radio equipment from civilians if improperly used, and also 
necessitated the acquisition of a broadcasting licence for corporations wishing to transmit 
audio content over the airwaves. Regulation, however, did not deter radio from attracting 
early majority adopters. University students and private home users were fascinated by the 
radio and the number of users increased, incentivising entrepreneurs to develop a proper 
business model for entertaining and conveying information to listeners. Broadcasters would 
make use of advertisers' money to conduct broadcasts over the airways in exchange for 
marketing to consumers via an exciting marketing channel never before utilised. An 
indication that radio had entered the ascension phase was “the battle involving commercial 
radio that took place in the early 1920s between amateur enthusiasts and 'the interests', to 
use the phrase of the day, such as technology patent holders including RCA, Westinghouse, 
and AT&T" (Meza, 2007). 
  
David Sarnoff, a young man from Russia working for the American branch of the Marconi 
Company, was the first to suggest some practical applications of the radio as a commercial 
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product. He suggested that radio was to be marketed towards the home user. Archer writes 
that Sarnoff prophetically proposed the possibility of radio becoming… "a 'household utility' 
in the same sense as the piano or phonograph. The idea is to bring music into the house by 
wireless… The receiver can be designed in the form of a simple 'Radio Music Box' and 
arranged for several different wave lengths, which would be changeable with the throwing 
of a single switch or pressing of a single button. The 'Radio Music Box' can be supplied with 
amplifying tunes and a loud-speaking telephone, all of which can be neatly mounted in one 
box. The box can be placed in the parlour or living room, the switch set accordingly and the 
transmitted music received… The same principle can be extended to numerous other fields, 
as for example, receiving lectures at home which can be made perfectly audible, also events 
of national importance can be simultaneously announced and received. Baseball scores can 
be transmitted in the air… This proposition would be especially interesting to farmers and 
others living in outlying districts removed from cities. By the purchase of a 'Radio Music Box' 
they could enjoy concerts, lectures, music, recitals, etc., which may be going on in the 
nearest city within their radius…" (1938). 
  
Executing this vision by commercialising the radio, however, would have to wait. With the 
advent of the first Wold War, then-President of the USA Woodrow Wilson issued a 
command for the seizure of equipment of all unlicensed broadcasters. Patents founded on 
radio, telephone and other technologies were taken over by the American government 
during the War period, and two men were assigned specific responsibility for stewarding the 
mix of radio patents: Josephus Daniel, secretary of the U.S. Navy, and a certain young man 
serving as Daniel's deputy called Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who would later become the 
32nd President of the United States of America.  
  
World War I caused the expansion of radio's military market and consequently became a 
catalyst of its technological development. Communication between different countries 
before the War took place by means of undersea telegraphy cables, and the United 
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Kingdom mostly acted as a central hub of communication due to the fact that most cables 
were physically connected with Britain. The United Kingdom also monopolised the market 
for commercial telegraphy, in that British companies owned right of usage of critical 
elements and parts needed to construct undersea wires during that time. Being able to cut 
off Germany of all undersea communication with the advent of the War, Britain in effect 
ignited a greater reliance on the burgeoning radio technology among their opponents in war. 
Moreover, the German telecommunications corporation Telefunken was the first enterprise 
to pay royalties to Edwin Armstrong, who received a patent in 1914 for the apparatus he 
developed which could detect and generate radio waves, the foundation of FM radio 
technology as it is utilised today. 
  
Thus wireless technology for communication purposes gained traction internationally due to 
the susceptibility of undersea telegraphy cables, and the American government felt obliged 
to exercise greater control over the wireless technologies in its own country. In fact, the 
nationalisation of radio property became such a popular notion among congressmen and 
advocates like Josephus Daniel, that Guglielmo Marconi was persuaded to sell his radio 
company to General Electric rather than aim to compete with their then-superior 
technology, spawning a merger called RCA - the Radio Corporation of America. The merged 
company was officially incorporated as an all-American company in 1919, which had to be 
managed with United States interests in mind, as revealed by the compulsory attendance of 
a U.S. Navy delegate at all RCA board meetings. Former General Electric vice-president 
Owen Young was appointed as RCA's chairperson, while former American Marconi vice-
president Edward Nally took on the role of RCA president - corporate competitors-become-
colleagues. The post of RCA commercial manager came to the young Russian David Sarnoff, 
mentioned earlier as the American Marconi technology manager who envisioned the 
potential of Armstrong's audion feedback technology integrated with the radio (Lehman 
Brothers Collection, Baker Library, Harvard Business School, 2010). 
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However, with the conclusion of World War I, the Radio Corporation of America was well-
positioned technologically to realise Sarnoff's ideal of producing a "Radio Music Box" for 
every household and broadcasting music and a myriad of other audio programmes to it. The 
combination of Marconi experience and market acumen with General Electric's 
Alexanderson alternators providing electrical power to the devices, made for a product 
superior to its competitors'. When presenting his business plan to chairperson Nally, Sarnoff 
made the following sales forecasts of RCA's first radio. Each Radio Music Box was to be 
priced at US$75 (Beninger, 1986): 
 
Table 3: Three-year Forecasted Sales for RCA's Radio Music Boxes 
Year of operation Projected Sales Projected Revenue 
1
st
: 1922 100 000 Radio Music Boxes $7.5 million ($95.0 million in 2011) 
2
nd
: 1923 300 000 Radio Music Boxes $22.5 million ($291.8 million in 2011) 
3
rd
: 1924 600 000 Radio Music Boxes $45.0 million ($570.1 million in 2011) 
  TOTAL: $75.0 million ($956.9 million in 2011) 
  
At that time, AT&T not only monopolised telecommunications in the USA, but also held the 
patent of another piece of radio equipment - the grid audion originally designed by Lee de 
Forest in 1905. Although RCA (which defined its industry as 'wireless telegraphy') and AT&T 
(which termed its industry the 'telephone business') were not in direct competition at the 
time, RCA anticipated that voice transmission via radio could instigate future conflict 
between the companies. In an attempt to reach a compromise between the desire to 
establish itself as radio technology pacesetter and the potential antagonism with AT&T due 
to its ownership of a key radio patent, RCA entered into a strategic partnership with their 
future rival in July 1920 (Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker Library, Harvard Business School, 
2010). The terms to this partnership stated that AT&T would agree to the cross-licensing of 
patents on de Forest's audion in exchange for 10% ownership of RCA. Additionally, Sarnoff 
insisted that AT&T would legally permit RCA to build and operate wireless transmitting 
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stations from which they could later broadcast radio programmes. With a diminished risk of 
radio patent battles after the establishment of a JV with AT&T, RCA consequently possessed 
both the Alexanderson alternator, developed by General Electric engineers, and de Forest's 
audion, including improvements successively made to both technologies and licence to 
establish radio broadcast stations. RCA also continued with rigorous in-house research and 
development operations to continuously enhance the technologies in their possession. 
  
Westinghouse, aiming to contend with General Electric and the Radio Corporation of 
America for the market of radio listeners, started establishing radio broadcast stations in 
1920. Moreover, Westinghouse owned the patent to Reginald Fessenden's technology 
through which one could send continuous audio signals wirelessly, as well patents on Edwin 
Armstrong's feedback technology and superheterodyne. Because the patents to these 
technologies had been taken over by the American government during World War I, the 
efficiency of these technologies had already been demonstrated and highly regarded. In the 
same year that the agreement between RCA and AT&T was signed, Westinghouse 
transformed its factory rooftop in Pittsburgh into their very first radio broadcast station. In a 
tactical bid to appeal to as broad a base of listeners as possible, the first programmed 
schedule involved the airing of music tracks, news bulletins, boxing matches and even 
Christian church services. This led to an increased demand of Westinghouse's own radio 
devices. Deficient in the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, however, were capabilities and 
infrastructure to further develop the radio technologies for which they owned the patents, 
in spite of their burgeoning broadcasting operations. In a similar attempt to avoid arduous 
competition with RCA as was the case with AT&T, Westinghouse agreed to a partnership 
with RCA: for 20% of its stock and a subcontracting agreement to manufacture radio sets 
and other equipment for them, RCA would receive total patent ownership of Westinghouse 
transmission technologies. Thus, after General Electric, Westinghouse subsequently became 
the largest shareholder of the Radio Corporation of America (Lewis, 1991).  
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Another seemingly-unrelated company, in terms of classified industry, joined the list of RCA 
shareholders shortly afterwards - the United Fruit Company. The UFC, which may be 
classified as an early radio technology adopter (having used wireless technology as 
communication means between fruit plantation managers and exporting ships) received 4% 
of RCA's stock in exchange for its interest in another enterprise which possessed patents on 
antennas which could efficiently detect radio signals.  
  
Thus due to multiple mergers, strategic manufacturing partnerships, technology acquisitions 
and prolific R&D operations, the Radio Corporation of America was well-poised to expand 
the radio broadcasting sector of the early 1920s- both in terms of core technology and 
business.  
  
Many other companies started establishing radio broadcasting networks during this time 
and, aiming to sell more of its radio sets, RCA also considered the development of its own 
radio network. Whereas RCA shareholders Westinghouse, General Electric and United Fruit 
Company benefited respectively from agreements to assemble radio sets, manufacture 
parts and provide capital, AT&T also continued to manufacture equipment for radio 
transmission, but realised that its share in this market and subsequently its contribution to 
the radio broadcasting sector were steadily declining. Radio broadcast stations simply 
preferred using unlicensed transmission equipment produced by other suppliers to buying 
their expensive AT&T counterparts – even if many of these pieces of equipment directly 
contravened patent rights owned by AT&T. To increase its footprint in the industry, AT&T 
decided to also enter the radio broadcasting arena by establishing the WEAF station in New 
York City and the WCAP station in Washington, D.C. through which it could do toll 
broadcasts. This entailed an alternative application of AT&T's telephone call transmission 
equipment. However, instead of simply supplying the technology to customers and 
obligating them to provide the content themselves as its business model for telephony 
dictated, AT&T was now compelled to provide the audio content as well. "With no content, 
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you [have] no listeners, and therefore a station [has] little value (Meza, 2007).” Executing 
AT&T's new business plan, WEAF started broadcasting content in August 1922, of which a 
10-minute advertisement for apartments in New York by Queensboro Corporation was its 
very first presentation. According to Barnouw, this broadcast proved successful for AT&T, as 
many other businesses followed suit to advertise over radio (1966). 
  
By the mid-1920s, the radio broadcasting sector had become a lucrative industry – another 
indication that radio broadcasting had entered the ascension phase as a technology 
(Hettinger, 1939). American consumers purchased $60 million worth of radio receiving sets 
in 1922 alone, equivalent to $760.2 million in 2011. When RCA finally started selling their 
radios in 1922, commercial manager Sarnoff's forecasts proved to be remarkably accurate, 
as demonstrated in   Figure 7:  
 
 
   Figure 7: Forecasted vs. Actual RCA Radio Music Box Sales and Revenues: 1922-1924 
  
By the third year of operation, RCA had cumulatively sold nearly 1.2 million radios and 
accrued a yearly income of US$50 million (comparable to US$633.5 million in 2011). With its 
significant market and product adoption rate, radio broadcasts had become RCA's star 
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product and biggest source of revenue, its income surpassing that which was generated 
through transoceanic and nautical communications deals. 
 
As radio increased in popularity, AT&T decided to employ a greater diversification strategy 
and compete aggressively with RCA for the radio broadcasting and device sales market 
share, initiating this move by selling all its RCA shares. Careful not to violate any of the RCA 
patents, AT&T commissioned Western Electric, its manufacturing subsidiary, to develop 
radio receiver devices which could compete with RCA's radio sets while AT&T itself focused 
on the establishment of broadcast stations WEAF and WCAP. Because AT&T controlled most 
of America's telephone lines at the time, it also had a distinct advantage over its competitor: 
because telephone lines were the only way by which radio networks could transmit audio 
content between different radio stations, AT&T maintained the right to deny requests for 
new telephone connections from their competitors (Coon, 1939). RCA eluded the use of 
AT&T telephone lines by connecting its stations with wires supplied by Postal Telegraph and 
Western Union. 
  
1926 marked the year in which RCA officially introduced its first radio network that would 
broadcast audio content on a national level, adequately termed the National Broadcasting 
Company (NBC). Two months after its debut in November 1926, NBC was partitioned into 
two separate networks called NBC-Blue and NBC-Red. The business model for radio proved 
to be profitable and sustainable when more advertisers realised the marketing potential of 
the medium and companies signed on to connect their names to specific radio programs by 
means of sponsorships (Barnouw, 1966).  
  
In contrast with minor independent radio stations which mostly targeted regional markets, 
the only other radio network which offered significant competition to RCA's National 
Broadcasting Company was CBS, the Columbia Broadcasting System, which was bought as a 
small radio network but cultivated into a formidable contender for national broadcasting by 
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William Paley during the mid-1920s. These networks employed two fairly divergent business 
models to increase its market share, both of which would later be discarded on demand of 
the Federal Communication Commission in 1941 (Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker Library, 
Harvard Business School, 2010): NBC charged the stations which were affiliated with its 
network $90 per hour for evening programmes which were unsponsored and produced by 
NBC itself, while affiliates received $30 per hour from NBC for airing programs which were 
sponsored by outside companies.  However, the responsibility rested on these stations to 
determine their own broadcasting line-ups, and many affiliates declined broadcasting NBC's 
programs in favour of their own programs or those sponsored by local companies. CBS, on 
the other hand, decided on a different strategy for generating income. The network's 
revenue would come solely from companies sponsoring specific programs, while CBS 
affiliates could broadcast any of the network's unsponsored programs at no cost 
whatsoever. Unsponsored programs were also referred to as sustaining programs at the 
time. In return for this 'benevolence' displayed by CBS, affiliates had to allocate a specific 
duration of broadcasting time to CBS during which sponsored programs from the main 
network could be aired. Apart from this time, individual radio stations exercised absolute 
freedom as to the audio content they wanted to broadcast - they could use some or all of 
the free resources provided by CBS or absolutely none at all by using only locally produced 
content. This arrangement secured CBS and gave assurance to companies which sponsored 
specific radio shows that these would be aired from CBS stations, unlike the uncertainty 
whether NBC sponsors' programs would be purchased via its affiliates. CBS charged 
companies a predetermined rate for sponsoring programs, depending on the individual 
station airing them, and split this income 70/30 between CBS itself and the specific radio 
station involved. CBS was responsible for covering all costs for producing and transmitting 
the programs to its affiliates. When the American economy entered the Great Depression in 
the 1930s, this customisable approach to programming became exceptionally popular, 
according to Barnouw (1968).  
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Unable to compete with the network structures which were developed by RCA and CBS, 
AT&T yet again entered into a partnership with RCA in 1926 by signing a business deal which 
constituted three parts: 
1. All of AT&T's (fledgling) radio stations would be amalgamated under a new company, 
the Broadcasting Company of America, of which ownership had to be exercised by RCA. 
RCA would acquire this network of stations, of which WEAF in New York was the 
greatest, for $1 million; 
2. Both companies had to agree to the cross-licensing of their radio patents; and 
3. AT&T had to retract their 1921-decision and agree to RCA using their telephone lines 
for broadcast transmission purposes. 
  
Consequentially, in exchange for all of RCA's telephone transmission business, AT&T had 
effectively retired from the radio broadcasting sector, leaving RCA's National Broadcasting 
Company and Paley's Columbia Broadcasting System as the only major competitors for 
market share in the radio broadcasting sector of the entertainment industry. 
 
3.2 Recorded Music 
Advances in the radio broadcasting sector of the entertainment industry not only coincided 
with but also spurred development and contention in the recorded music sector. 
  
By the end of the 19th century, Eldridge Johnson and Emile Berliner had developed the 
automatic gramophone, a significant improvement on the phonograph invented by Thomas 
Edison some 20 years earlier. The company which Johnson and Berliner established in 1901, 
the Victor Talking Machine Company, was the driving force of technological development in 
the recorded music sector to the extent that any record player produced at the time 
irrespective of manufacturer was referred to as a "Victrola" (Jones, 1985). Recorded music 
in the early 1900s was synonymous with the image of a captivated fox terrier eager to hear 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
63 
 
"his master's voice" through a gramophone – the trademark of the Victor Talking Machine 
Company. Berliner and Johnson's diversified company not only manufactured the 
gramophones it sold, but also managed an in-house orchestra and signed contracts with 
popular musicians of the time to secure exclusive recordings under Victor's label. However, 
as the radio broadcasting sector experienced mass technology adoption and radio became 
an alternative competitor for the entertainment consumer market, the recorded music 
sector and the Victor Talking Machine Company as its market leader started experiencing 
difficulty to maintain the high profitability it once did. Victor record player profits declined 
from $7 million in 1921, derived from $47 million’s worth of revenues and equivalent to 
$531 million in 2011, to $6.6 million in 1922 and $1.2 million in 1923. By 1924, record player 
sales had decreased so drastically that the Victor Talking Machine Company recorded a loss 
of $140 000 for the first time after it started dominating the recorded music sector (Sobel, 
1986). A decline in record sales accompanied the decline in gramophone and phonograph 
sales. Berliner and Johnson tried to counter the slump in music sales by decreasing the price 
of their records. According to Sobel, this strategy proved to be unsuccessful, as record sales 
continued to drop afterwards (1986). The Universal Music Group attempted a similar pricing 
strategy in 2003 when CD sales declined notably in the early 2000s, with a similar ineffective 
outcome (Meza, 2007). 
 
The Victor Talking Machine Company acknowledged that it had to utilise a different 
corporate strategy to ensure survival as radio gained traction in the entertainment industry. 
In 1925 the company decided against merging with another company, but entered into a JV 
with General Electric, which enabled it to manufacture devices which could both play 
records and receive radio signals. Apart from the emergence of radio as an exciting new 
competitor to the record player, a lack in product quality was another reason why 
entertainment consumers were replacing their phonographs with radios. AT&T recognised 
the phonograph's deficiency and developed the technology to reduce audio distortions 
caused by the record player, licensing it to most American record companies. AT&T's 
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improved technology was included in the devices manufactured by the JV with GE, and in 
1925 the Victor Talking Machine Company introduced their improved record players to the 
market to great success (Sobel, 1986). With profits exceeding $7 million again in 1926 but 
admitting that it was unsustainable due to R&D limitations, Berliner and Johnson 
reconsidered a merging strategy, and turned to the Radio Corporation of America as the 
corporate partner of choice. RCA, already manufacturing phonographs of their own, agreed 
to the merger. Consequently, the New York Stock Exchange displayed remarkable market 
efficiency when someone revealed news of the merger to the media and share prices of 
both companies tripled within a day (Meza, 2007).  
 
When the merging endeavour with the Victor Talking Machine Company was concluded in 
1929, RCA even further expanded their involvement in the entertainment industry by 
acquiring two sizeable music publishing companies. This successful merger inspired the 
Columbia Broadcasting System to diversify in 1938 by acquiring both a recording company 
and a phonograph manufacturing company, thereby establishing Columbia Records and the 
Columbia Phonograph Company. This strategy failed to enable CBS to dethrone RCA as 
market leader in the recorded music sector. However, when CBS invented its long-playing 
record (LP) in 1948 it proved to be a disruptive technology which would force RCA and other 
recording companies to adopt CBS's standard. LP technology made it possible to record 23 
minutes of music on both sides of a vinyl record and played at 33 1/3 rpm, and was 
considered to be a popular improvement over older record technologies by consumers in 
the 1950s. 
 
3.3 Filmed Entertainment 
With the invention of Edison's iconoscope and the kinetograph at the inception of the 20th 
century, traditional theatre business waned and entertainment consumers flocked to see 
short films at the nearest nickelodeon. Film had become a disruptive technology to 
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traditional forms of entertainment such as vaudeville and cabaret theatres. However, 
observable characteristics associated with the ascension phase only became evident when 
the motion picture sector's business model changed from charging patrons one nickel to 
watch a short film individually to movie theatres which allowed groups of people to enjoy 
films together. Film technology transcended the early adoption stage and many traditional 
cabaret theatres were converted into movie houses. By 1905, the motion picture business 
had developed into an entertainment sector in its own right, entailing the same six phases 
which are still prevalent in the filmmaking process today: (1) development, (2) pre-
production, (3) production, (4) post-production, (5) marketing and distribution, and (6) 
exhibition (Young, Gong and Van der Stede, 2008).  
 
As the industry progressed through the ascension phase, the motion picture sector 
developed from a horizontal industry into a vertical industry in a manner contrary to how 
other industries generally develop. Vertical industries are predominantly marked by 
companies who have to supply all of the constituents of a product, manufacture, market 
and distribute it instead of outsourcing activities along the value chain to other companies 
(Burgelman, Christensen and Wheelwright, 2008). After shooting a movie, filmmakers would 
initially sell it directly to exhibition companies who had to justify a $10 - $25 purchase by 
showing a film for a nickel per patron until its prints wore out. Fast-declining consumer 
demand for a particular film at a local theatre, however, made this practice unprofitable for 
exhibitors, which led to an illegal practice called "bicycling": one exhibitor would buy a film, 
rent it out and literally bicycle it to other exhibition companies in an attempt to divide 
expenses. Not even the institution of distributors as third-party film exchangers could 
reduce the occurrence of bicycling. Several organisations were inspired to reinvent the way 
in which movies were first distributed: 
 Edison and his partners attempted to formally organise the motion picture sector 
with the establishment of the Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC) in 1908. 
According to Stanley (1978), this organisation owned patents for a myriad of films, 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
66 
 
cameras and projectors, as well as many major distribution companies, essentially 
becoming a natural monopoly in the film industry. The MPCC employed two 
distribution models simultaneously in a bid to reach two different movie-going 
markets. The road show distribution model was used in upmarket metropolitan 
areas, also referred to as “A” theatres, while the states' rights distribution model was 
utilised in secondary markets or “B” theatres. In a bid to retain profits through doing 
road show exhibitions, movie producers rented theatres directly rather than selling 
their films to regional exhibitors, as was the case with the states' right model 
through which exhibitors earned more money than producers. 
 W.W. Hodkinson, a former employee of the MPCC, founded the Progressive 
Company in 1911 through which he employed an alternative distribution method: 
For 65% of final box office revenues, filmmakers could sell exclusive rights to their 
films to distributors, who in turn had to distribute and market the films. This 
distribution model was originally targeted at independent filmmakers, as it was 
rejected by the MPCC. Hodkinson later changed the name of his company to 
Paramount Pictures Corporation. 
 Other independent film producers decided to produce longer, more artistic films 
featuring well-known actors (also referred to as "stars"), which were generally 
considered superior to short films produced by the MPCC using unknown actors to 
keep down costs. This quality differentiation strategy proved to be successful by the 
mid-1910s as more viewers were attracted to independent movies than to short 
MPCC films exhibited at nickelodeons. 
  
Some of the successful independent filmmakers who supported Hodkinson's distribution 
model and subsequently signed contracts with his company were revered director-producer 
Cecil B. DeMille (creator of such films as The Ten Commandments, Cleopatra and The 
Greatest Show on Earth), Adolph Zukor (founder of the Famous Players Company), Jesse 
Lasky (founder of the Jessy L. Lasky Feature Play Company) and Samuel Goldwyn (who 
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would later co-establish Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer) (Cecil B. DeMille's Filmography, 2004). 
However, after expanding his company to America’s East Coast and undertaking the name-
change to Paramount in 1914, Hodkinson’s relations with these filmmakers took some strain 
as it was perceived that he tried to enforce his will upon the filmmakers he partnered with. 
After a failed extrication attempt from Zukor because of Hodkinson's refusal to terminate 
his contract, Paramount Pictures Corporation was subjected to a hostile takeover by Zukor 
and Lasky in 1915. Zukor and Lasky obtained a majority share in Paramount and expelled 
Hodkinson from the company. In 1916 Zukor and Lasky horizontally merged their companies 
to form a major motion picture studio which could both produce and distribute films. The 
merged company was called the Famous Players-Lasky Corporation, and gaining from 
Paramount's capabilities it caused a significant shift in the balance of power in Hollywood at 
the time, albeit often with unscrupulous business practices. 
  
In conjunction with rapid technology development, industry formation and inter-industry 
collaboration, another network externality is observable when a technology moves through 
its ascension phase in the entertainment industry: constructive legislation which regulates 
the industry in an attempt to protect free enterprise. This feature is perceptible in the case 
study of anticompetitive practices in the Famous Players-Lasky Corporation, and particularly 
in the numerous times the United States government had to file federal lawsuits and 
enforce regulatory measures upon the motion picture industry between 1920 and 1950, 
some of which are mentioned in Table 4 on page 70.  
 
Two of the anticompetitive practices employed by Famous Players-Lasky and Paramount 
before the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against the companies for 
restraining trade in 1921 were “blind bidding” and “block booking” (Orbach and Einav, 2007): 
 Blind bidding refers to a practice whereby distributors coerce exhibitors into bidding 
and receiving licences for movies which they had to display in their theatres, but 
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without providing adequate information regarding the film or screening the film for 
exhibitors beforehand. 
 Block booking, which the FTC officially declared an anticompetitive approach to 
business in 1927, is a practice whereby producers oblige exhibitors to accept a block 
of films rather than just one at time according to exhibitors' requirements. Most of 
the other films in a block at the time were usually of a lesser quality than desired as 
by exhibitors, but this practice guaranteed the selling of a studio's inventory in its 
entirety, thereby increasing profitability. The FTC ordered Famous Players-Lasky to 
cease and desist with block booking, and when Adolph Zukor and Jesse Lasky 
disputed FTC's findings in 1928, the commission ultimately rejected the studio's 
compliance report. The FTC subsequently mandated itself to regulate the entire 
motion picture sector so as to eradicate unfair trade. 
 
On 27 April 1928, two antitrust cases were filed collectively against 10 companies in the 
motion picture sector by the US Department of Justice. Two of these companies were 
Famous Players-Lasky and Paramount. The government’s accusation against these 
companies was that they monopolised 98% of distribution activities in the United States, 
deemed an unfair trade practice. When neither the government nor the accused were 
satisfied with the outcome of the New York District Court’s judgement in 1929, both parties 
decided to appeal to the US Supreme Court. All ten defendants were found guilty by this 
court in 1930. The 1930s, however, were marked by the Great Depression and the motion 
picture sector was not excluded from the economic adversity of the time. Then-president 
Roosevelt responded to a plea by motion picture studios to not implement the 
restructurings imposed upon the industry by the Supreme Court until the sector's general 
financial situation improved. An agreement was signed which allowed the film companies to 
maintain the practices which they were prosecuted for, including block booking. 
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The US Department of Justice decided to sue the big movie studios again in 1938, but 
reached a consent decree with the companies in 1940, which prohibited blind bidding but 
again allowed them to continue with block booking until 1943, albeit under new terms. 
Blocks had to be limited to 5 films, and the practice of trade shows was implemented which 
allowed potential buyers to see films and accordingly decide whether they wanted to exhibit 
the films. Additionally, studios would have had to obtain consent from the federal 
government if they wanted to increase their share in exhibition companies. The government, 
however, refused a second extension of the consent decree after its expiry in 1943, and 
decided to legally address studios' dubious exhibition activities through United States vs. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 US 131 (1948), or Paramount 2, a case which proceeded from 
the District Court in New York to the US Supreme Court in 1948. The Supreme Court's 
assessment was that block booking was indeed illegal, and judged vertical integration in the 
form of theatre ownership as monopolising. Major motion picture studios were 
subsequently ordered to fully divest the exhibition arms of their companies, and Paramount 
finally complied with this order by divesting its theatre operations in 1949. Noteworthy 
antitrust actions and regulations of the motion picture sector from 1900 to 2000 are 
summarised in Table 4: 
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Table 4: Significant antitrust actions and the regulation of the motion picture sector: 1900-2000, 
adapted from Vogel (2011) 
Year Antitrust action 
1908  The Motion Picture Patents Company is instituted 
 Ten big film companies, which between them holds most of the filmmaking patents in the 
motion picture industry, are integrated 
 Cross-licensing agreements become popular 
1910  Acquisition of 68 local distribution companies by the General Film Company (vertical 
integration) 
1914  Five film distribution companies merge as Paramount Pictures Corporation (vertical 
integration) 
1916  The Famous Players-Lasky Corporation is formed as a result of a hostile takeover and 
becomes a major film studio (horizontal integration) 
1917  Paramount and 12 small producers are acquired by Famous Players-Lasky (both horizontal 
and vertical integration) 
 The US government decides that both the MPCC and its distribution department, the 
General Film Company, must dissolve because of innovations by independents and 
anticompetitive operations 
 The First National Exhibitors Circuit is formed by 3 500 exhibitors, which enables financing 
for independent filmmakers (both horizontal and vertical integration) 
1921  US Federal Trade Commission files a complaint against Famous-Players Lasky for block 
booking 
1925  Multiple federal lawsuits are filed against exhibitor partnerships because of coercion of 
distributors 
1927  The US government orders Paramount to cease and desist all anticompetitive operations 
1929  A proposed standard exhibition contract is rejected because it would restrict open trade 
 Sound manufacturers win the lawsuit against exhibitor and the sanction against film 
sound technology is lifted, paving the way for the first film to feature sound (talkies) 
1930  Complete vertical integration along the motion picture value chain is established as the 
standard in filmmaking 
 Film studios give preferential treatment to big exhibitor circuits 
 Film studios own specific actors as ‘natural resources’ 
1938  The US Justice Department brings Paramount case 1, its first antitrust lawsuit against 
Paramount and other players in the motion picture industry, before the District Court 
1940  Major motion picture studios enter into a succession of consent decrees 
1944  The US Justice Department files Paramount 2 and  asks for the divestiture of the segment 
in studios responsible for film exhibition 
 The US District Court orders this practice in major studios to cease, but does not order the 
divestiture of exhibition arms 
 Both parties in the case appeal this decision by the District Court 
1948 – 1949  The US Supreme Court orders the full divestiture of exhibition arms of major studios 
 Major motion picture studios make alternative consent decrees 
1950 – 2000  A range of anticompetitive operations, including price fixing and violations of consent 
decrees between studios occur 
 Multiple federal and private antitrust lawsuits are filed against several players in the film 
sector 
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According to Balio (1990), the US government's attempts to regulate the motion picture 
sector were not the only problems threatening profitability in film companies and forcing 
industry transformation at the time, but that another threat had appeared which would 
challenge the sustainability of the sector as a whole: the popularisation of television in the 
late 1940s. With the closure of four thousand theatres and movie audiences shrinking by 50% 
in America by 1950, television had become a legitimate competitor for the entertainment 
audience and therefore a disruptive technology in the eyes of motion picture studios. 
 
3.4 Television 
Even though Victor Zworykin is generally attributed with a reputation for pioneering the 
television broadcasting sector (Abramson, 1995), numerous parties are actually responsible 
for inventing and developing television as a technology utilised for entertainment purposes. 
Paul Nipkow's ‘spinning disc', Philo T. Farnsworth's cathode ray picture tube and Zworykin's 
iconoscope are just some of the multiple technological innovations from the early 1930s, 
but contrary to the way in which radio technology was developed during World War I, the 
development of television broadcasting technology was stalled with the advent of World 
War II and ordinary television broadcasts would only resume after the war ended.  
 
RCA-owned NBC and its competitor CBS were the first two companies to broadcast 
television content to the American public, benefitting from years of management, 
marketing, programming, sales and technology development experience in the radio 
broadcasting sector. Both NBC and RCA had been broadcasting content to television sets 
since 1939, albeit only sporadically, and it was only in 1941 that these two companies 
commenced with regular broadcasting programmes. Allen B. DuMont was the only 
entrepreneur who could successfully produce a new entrant to the television broadcasting 
sector before the War. Allen B. DuMont Laboratories, a company which possessed valuable 
R&D facilities, legally exercised ownership over the newly-established DuMont network. 
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Wanting to capitalise on these facilities, DuMont decided to employ a vertical integration 
strategy to challenge the incumbents in this sector: the company would manufacture and 
sell its own television sets, as well as produce and broadcast its own content to its own 
stations. 
 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent USA government agency 
already formed in 1934, was responsible for determining technical specifications for 
television technology and apportioning the broadcast spectrum between broadcasters. 
Stations could either operate in the very high frequency (VHF) range (30 to 300 MHz), 
superior at the time, or in the experimental ultra high frequency (UHF) range (300 to 3000 
MHz), which required additional antennas to receive a signal. The FCC agency, who "is 
charged with regulating [American] interstate and international communications by radio, 
television, wire, satellite and cable (Federal Communications Commission, 2010)", was 
accused of partiality towards NBC and CBS because of the large ranges of VHF and UHF 
frequencies which were allocated to them for broadcasting purposes. This decision 
positioned these two companies as strong incumbents in the television broadcasting sector 
and created a seemingly-insurmountable barrier to entry for companies wishing to compete 
in this industry. 
  
A fourth company entered the television broadcasting sector in 1943 in the form of the 
American Broadcasting Company (ABC), a company which mainly consisted of a divested 
partition of NBC's radio network. Film exhibition chain United Paramount Theatres (UPT), 
another divested company which was previously owned by Paramount but separated due to 
the 1940s consent decrees, subsequently merged with ABC into a new public company. The 
merger positioned ABC to outperform the DuMont network, which was eventually 
liquidated in 1955,  and compete with CBS and NBC to become one of the "big three" 
television broadcasting companies as they are still commonly referred to, according to Meza 
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(2007). In a short amount of time ABC had become a legitimate proportionate competitor 
for the television broadcasting market. 
 
Although two hundred television sets were already sold in and around New York City after 
RCA obtained Farnsworth's patent on his cathode ray picture tube in 1939, 1945 is generally 
accepted as the actual baseline year for the introduction of television technology to the 
general public (Hannemyr, 2003). With the culmination of the World War II, technology 
adoption took place rapidly and the number of sets sold in the United States rose to 14 000 
in 1947, to 172 000 in 1948 and to its first million in 1949. 80 million people, 50% of 
American households at the time, owned a television set only ten years after the 
introduction of TV to the public (Winston, 1998). By 1960, 142 million Americans 
representing 80% of the total population owned a television, and nine out of ten users were 
viewing content broadcasted either by ABC, CBS or NBC – the makings of an oligopoly.  
 
Television adoption in the United States between 1945 and 1970 is displayed in Figure 8: 
 
 
Figure 8: Number of television set owners and percentage adoption in the USA: 1945-1970 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Year
Television Adoption in the USA (millions)
Television owners Percentage of population
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
74 
 
3.5 Video Recorders 
Some inventions are not as fortunate as the radio, the camera, the television and the CD to 
cross the chasm between early adopters (enthusiasts) and early majority adopters 
(pragmatists) among entertainment consumers (Moore, 1991). Enhanced technology from 
competitors is one such a cause of failed adoption, while a lack of capital also hinders many 
technologies to transcend the innovation phase to successful commercialisation even if they 
boast superior technology (Moore, 1999). Three such technologies that could not obtain 
mass consumer adoption were the Betamax video standard, the DiscoVision and the 
Selectavision system. 
 
Subsequent to the invention of the U-Matic video tape recorder (VTR) in 1971, a group of 
technology companies in Japan agreed to share VTR patents by signing a cross-licensing 
agreement in order to further video recording technology. The group constituted Sony, JVC 
and Matsushita. However, this cross-licensing agreement did not last long due to a conflict 
of interests between Matsushita and Sony. Going in separate directions, Sony decided to 
commercialise a video recording device it had been developing prior to its agreement with 
the other Japanese companies, while Matsushita explored the possibility of launching its 
own device. As a result, the Betamax-standard videocassette recorder (VCR) was released in 
1975 while the Video Home System (VHS) VCR was launched in 1976 by the Sony 
Corporation and Matsushita respectively.  
 
Although both Betamax and VHS standards were based on Sony's original U-Matic 
technology, opinion varies as to whether Betamax technology was actually superior to VHS 
(Borés, Saurina and Torres, 2003), or whether both standards were equal competitors in 
terms of recording technology (Park, 2004). However, in terms of platform specifications 
and business practices employed by the companies who produced these devices, it is 
apparent that Matsushita's VHS standard did initially offer three advantages over Sony's 
Betamax standard: 
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 The Betamax standard only provided two hours of recording time, while VHS tapes 
could record up to four hours of content, a significant benefit from consumers' 
perspective as the VCR was mostly used for recording television shows at the time, 
according to Park (2004). Popular programs required a recording time of more than 
two hours. Sony developed a Betamax tape which could record 5 hours of content in 
1979, but was countered by the following launch of Matsushita's improved 6-hour-
recording-time VHS tape. 
 According to Klopfenstein (1985), the initial price of US$995 for a VHS VCR was 
cheaper than the $1 265 Sony charged for its Betamax-standard VCR. The price of a 
Betamax VCR was dropped to $1 095 after the launch of the VHS device in 1976.  
 Additionally, Sony was reluctant to directly build VCRs for its licensees, according to 
Cusumano, Mylonadis and Rosenbloom (1992). 
  
Sony enjoyed majority market share with its Betamax from 1975 to 1977 as a first mover in 
the video recording industry, but in the second year of the release of the VHS standard, 
adoption of Matsushita's product surpassed that of its competitor with VHS VCR sales of 
approximately 190 000 compared to only 140 000 Betamax sales (Cusumano, Mylonadis and 
Rosenbloom, 1992). Sony would trail Matsushita in both production and market share until 
ultimate technology rejection in the late 1980s when VHS sales outnumber Betamax sales 
by a factor of 40, as displayed in Figure 9: 
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Figure 9: Relative Sales and Relative Installed Base Size: Matsushita VHS vs. Sony 
Betamax: 1981-1988, adapted from Park (2004) 
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that Matsushita's VHS emerged as the format which would not only have a 1.3% household 
penetration rate just four years after its introduction (Park, 2004), but also ultimately enjoy 
the majority market share in the video recording business until the invention of the DVD. 
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responsible for the commercialisation of the radio. The DiscoVision made use of a laser 
which could read plastic discs on which content was loaded, similar to Compact Disc (CD) 
player technology today, whereas the Selectavision utilised needle-in-groove technology 
comparable to the device used to play LP records. Both these videodisc devices offer 
additional examples of entertainment platforms that never reached mass technology 
adoption, albeit for different reasons than was the case with Betamax. First, discs played on 
MCA platforms were read-only, contradictory to VHS and Betamax tapes which could be 
used for recording content from television by users themselves. This product specification 
proved to be an order winner for VHS VCRs over the videodisc platforms. Second, and the 
more important reason for failure, was that MCA's release strategy was perhaps not 
thoroughly thought through: videodisc platforms were sold without enough initial content 
available for consumers to play through these devices. Agreements with content providers 
should have been signed for the development of enough videodiscs before the 
commercialisation of the DiscoVision and Selectavision. Without enough movies on 
videodisc to incentivise buying a videodisc player over a VHS VCR, combined with the 
devices' inability to record content from television, early videodisc technology failed to 
secure consumer adoption. According to Rohlfs (2001), Philips gained valuable experience 
with its DiscoVision-misfire when it commercialised the CD player by employing a vertical 
integration strategy. The record label Polygram, which was 50%-owned by Philips, was used 
to create an array of music content discs which were released concurrently with the Philips 
CD player. 
  
An interesting fact is that MCA acquired Universal Studios in 1962, and Meza (2007) notes 
that, ironically, this company together with Disney would later try to illegalise video 
recording technology because of the supposed copyright infringement threat it initially 
posed for content producers, a frequent occurrence when disruptive technologies gain 
widespread adoption. 
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3.6 Filesharing and Uploading 
The Internet is one of the innovations which has exhibited rapid technology adoption 
globally, and similar to the television, had 80 million users in the USA alone only 10 years 
after its introduction to the public in 1989 (Hannemyr, 2003). The significance of the 
Internet for media and entertainment enterprises, according to Currah (2007) and Benkler 
(2006), is that it forms the foundation of digitally networked social and economic networks: 
simultaneously the enabler of filesharing technology but also a disruptor of traditional 
entertainment technologies. 
 
With the incorporation of Napster in 1999, Internet users could search for specific music 
files by title or artist on computers of other users connected to the Internet, facilitated by 
software written by Fanning. For this process to be successful, users had to be logged in to 
Napster.com and run a program downloaded from this website. Music files, converted to 
MP3 format, could be downloaded effortlessly and played offline on users' personal 
computers by using any of the ubiquitous freeware programs available on the Internet at 
the time, some of which were provided by Nullsoft-Winamp or Microsoft. MP3s could also 
subsequently be burnt onto CDs and freely distributed, a phenomenon which Elberse says 
has negatively affected the sales of recorded music on physical media ever since (2010). 
According to Cha and Rajgopal (2004), Napster had become one of the first significant 
"infomediaries" on the Internet: the company facilitated a filesharing network between 
millions of individuals around the world without actually owning the content which was 
distributed between its users, neither the format (MP3) in which the files were coded, nor 
the programs which were used to play or burn the downloaded files afterwards. 
 
An additional strength contributed to Napster’s success in ultimately attracting 80 million 
registered users (Kim and Mauborgne, 2009): Napster was completely community-oriented, 
benefiting from the need for niche social communities long before the social media boom of 
the mid-2000s. Not only could users trade music files, but a platform was created for them 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
79 
 
to talk about their likes and dislikes with likeminded enthusiasts, similar to the Internet 
Movie Database’s (IMDB) offering to film enthusiasts since the early 1990s. Enthusiasm 
among Internet users and entertainment consumers, however, did not translate to 
enthusiasm among recording companies or the United States government. 
 
According to Kim and Mauborgne (2009), recording companies did initially approach 
Napster with a revenue-sharing proposition which could have benefited both Napster and 
the labels, but this offer was rejected when Napster failed to realise "that it needed a 
people proposition aimed at this critical constituency" and was idealistic with regards to the 
confounding growth of its user-base. In 2001, Napster was taken to court by the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA), representing itself as an institutional player as well 
as the five major recording companies at the time (Crowston and Myers, 2004). The 
complaint against Napster was that it was promoting music piracy and thus engaging in 
unfair and illegal competition, a charge which Napster denied by stating that it was unfairly 
suffering attack from recording companies because it challenged traditional business 
models and therefore recording companies’ strongholds on distribution (Cha and Rajgopal, 
2004). Ironically, Napster failed to ever financially exploit this alternative to the staunch 
business models of music distribution at the time, regardless of the hundreds of millions of 
files which were available for download through its platform, its tremendous user-base, the 
huge amount of press it received and the fact that the company was valued to be worth 
more than $60 million in 2000 (Bhatia, Gay and Honey, 2003). A professor of statistics at 
Stanford University, Dr. Ingram Olkin, determined that 87.1% of files shared on Napster 
indeed belonged to copyright holders and were therefore distributed without permission 
(A&M Records, Inc., et al. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 - District Court, ND California, 
2000). The RIAA finally won a court injunction and Napster was ordered to implement 
preventative measures which could impede users from downloading copyrighted files via its 
network servers (Crowston and Myers, 2004). 
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Bhattacharjee et al. (2007) remark that it did not take long for the so-called sons of Napster 
to emerge and produce alternative filesharing services to the millions of individuals 
worldwide who became accustomed to downloading copyrighted files from the Internet on 
a routine basis. According to Rupp and Smith (2004), an observable anthropological 
phenomenon of the 21st century is that it has become morally acceptable to upload and 
download content to and from the Internet without compensating the producers thereof, 
and Internet users have generally shown to be apathetic towards legislation attempting to 
counter piracy. Companies who have subsequently released P2P filesharing services are 
Freenet, WinMX, eDonkey, Morpehus, KaZaA, LimeWire, Grokster, Gnutella and BitTorrent 
(Cook and Wang, 2004). Diverging from Napster's centralised P2P architecture, these 
companies have largely been able to avoid legal prosecution by deploying hybrid or 
decentralised P2P architectures which enable dynamic indexing of audio and video files 
(Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007). An architectural layout of these topographies is 
displayed in Figure 6 on page 48. 
 
BitTorrent, in particular, is attracting similar frustration and pressure from recording 
companies and motion picture studios as was the case with Napster in 2000. BitTorrent's 
underlying technology, developed by programmer Bram Cohen, enables users to share large 
content files, including movies, over the Internet by partitioning requested files into smaller 
packages and directing users to BitTorrent peers who offer optimal network connections for 
downloading these particular partitions of a file. Piracy watchdog institutions have difficulty 
in prosecuting companies like BitTorrent and the other aforementioned filesharing 
platforms, because they are mostly located outside of the United States and do not operate 
through one central server. Institutions like the RIAA have subsequently altered its legal 
strategy by targeting individual fileswappers through seeking sanctions against them in 
addition to investigating the filesharing companies (Bhattacharjee et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, within two years of the closure Napster, more Internet users were 
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downloading files illegally through these new platforms than the highest number of users 
that ever registered on Napster's website (Benkler, 2006). 
 
3.7 Chapter Conclusion 
As an innovation finding itself in the ascension phase, radio broadcasting exhibited 
particular observable network externalities: 
 Continuous technology development: Progress in radio technology occurred rapidly 
after Heinrich Hertz's first experimentation with Maxwellian radio waves. Apart from 
discrete developments by other corporate and individual role-players, RCA secured a 
myriad of patents from other companies, acquired experienced human capital from 
their competitors and mandated continuous in-house research and development of 
radio technology. 
 The availability of complementary services: The same radio signals could be received by 
any radio regardless of its manufacturer. Even when the American Department of 
Commerce established formal protocols for broadcasting, dictated 833 and 619 kHz as 
standard wavelengths for new broadcasting stations and tried to ban transmissions by 
amateur broadcasters after World War I, radio increased in popularity as an 
entertainment medium and commercial radio stations increased in number. As radios 
became more ubiquitous, commercial radio broadcast stations also started giving 
listeners more entertainment options, leading to an increase in radio sales again in 
return. As complementary radio services, in the form of commercial radio stations, 
increased so did adoption of the radio device itself. 
 Inter-industry attraction: General Electric, AT&T and the United Fruit Company are all 
examples of companies in neighbouring industries which became interested in how 
Westinghouse and RCA were developing radio technology. Similar to how Apple is 
currently attracting interest from major record labels and filmed content companies 
because of its iTunes software, and strategic partnerships are consequently formed 
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between these companies, RCA also attracted attention from adjacent-industry 
companies and partnered with them to develop and promote radio technology. 
Moreover, businesses from every other industry became interested in radio as 
marketing tool after the success of WEAF's first advertisement for the Queensboro 
Corporation. 
 The ability to economise on switching costs: From academic science experiment to 
wireless telegraphs being used exclusively for military purposes to the novel 
transmission of audio messages to the ubiquitous broadcast of audio programmes for 
millions of listeners, radio broadcasting transcended the innovation phase and 
progressed through the ascension phase through social identification. When users 
became linked to a network through social identification, the probability of switching 
entertainment devices started to decrease, enabling radio broadcasting to become a 
legitimate sector in the media and entertainment industry in the early 1920s. 
 
Exactly the same network externalities were observed as the LP record, cinema, the 
television, the VHS VCR and P2P services transcended the innovation phase and progressed 
through the ascension phase. The aforementioned positive network externalities enabled 
these initially-inferior technologies to evolve from mere inventions with high switching costs 
into legitimate industries with significant user-bases. Yet, as new technologies gain mass 
adoption, the first reaction of companies whose business models revolve around previous 
innovations is often one of trepidation rather than one of possible collaboration – a reaction 
which has historically led to obvious contention in the entertainment industry. Contention 
between companies which develop technology platforms and companies which develop the 
media content to be accessed by these devices has been especially notable when examining 
case studies from the past. This phenomenon, as well as the effect of cross-boundary 
disruptors in such situations, will be investigated in Chapter 4. 
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4. The Contention Phase 
 
―Lawsuits against new technologies provide opportunities for little minds to usurp the gains 
of genuine inventors, and under the smug protest of righteousness, work a hold-up game in 
the most approved fashion.‖ 
– Henry Ford 
 
 
This chapter makes a case that it is contention between technology and media content 
companies, resulting from a resistance to technological change and subsequent business 
model adaptation among top-level management in entertainment companies, which 
aggravate consumers and present lush opportunity for cross-boundary disruptors to provide 
alternative products and services more aligned to consumer needs. Cross-boundary 
disruptors are capable of altering entire industry structures and may render incumbent 
companies superfluous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1976 marks a significant year for this study, in that it represents a common occurrence 
among incumbent companies in the media and entertainment industry when confronted 
with new technologies which can potentially disrupt established business models. Led by 
Universal, several motion picture studios initiated a process in that year through which it 
attempted to illegalise the videocassette recorder, due to concerns that the VCR would 
instigate "a tidal wave of piracy, which would cripple the industry” (Currah, 2007). 
Observable from the VCR and other specific case studies is a particular reaction incumbents 
and even entire sectors of the media and entertainment industry have exhibited toward 
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disruptive technologies, one which Meza straightforwardly classifies as "fear" (2007). This 
fear often results in attempts to eradicate threatening technologies through regulation and 
leaves incumbents oblivious to the possibility of these threats being complements to their 
business and enablers of new revenue streams. The motion picture studios ultimately lost 
the legal battle they launched in 1976 against Sony, the manufacturer of the Betamax VCR 
(Universal City Studios, Inc., et al. v. Sony Corp. of America, Inc. et al., 480 F. Supp. 429, 
1979), when the Supreme Court ruled in 1984 that VCR manufacturers were not committing 
"contributory copyright infringement" in view of the fact that users could utilise the device 
for non-violating purposes (Sony Corp. of America, Inc. et al. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. et 
al., 464 US 417, 104 S. Ct 774, 1984). It is interesting to note that Sony won its case before 
the US Supreme Court with only a single vote and, ironically, recorded video content 
subsequently accounted for 52.2% and 57.6% of total film studio revenue globally 
(Datamonitor, 2009) and in the United States (Datamonitor, 2010) respectively in 2009. 
Should fear, or the initial reactive conservatism and overprotective inclination of motion 
picture studios displayed in 1976 have prevailed, then today the film industry would've been 
devoid of a source of income responsible for more than twice the revenue which is garnered 
through traditional film exhibitions.  
 
Many companies in various sectors of the media and entertainment industry have 
historically failed to take advantage of revenue opportunities presented by disruptive 
innovations due to short-sightedness or a traditionalist mindset. Moreover, contention 
between different entertainment sectors or between media and technology companies has 
often culminated in legal battles and unconstructive regulations which have fundamentally 
altered the way business is done in the entertainment industry from business models prior 
to the emergence of disruptive technologies. This phenomenon of intra-industry conflict will 
now be further explored and substantiated. 
 
4.1 Radio vs. Recorded Music 
Conflict between radio broadcasters and incumbents in the music industry has existed long 
before NBC and CBS were officially established as America's two major national radio 
networks in the late-1920s. Some of the first manifestations of tension between 
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broadcasters and music copyright owners occurred with the formation and subsequent 
exploits of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) of which 
composers Victor Herbert and Irving Berlin were founding members in 1914. According to 
Allen (1940), ASCAP first established itself as formidable representative of musicians when it 
won a lawsuit against live performers of copyrighted music in 1917 (Herbert v. Shanley Co., 
242 U.S. 591, 1917), the Supreme Court's ruling being that recitals of music in public are 
illegal in light of the Copyright Act of 1909, if royalties are not paid accordingly to copyright 
owners. The judge’s decision was also applicable to live performances in restaurants and 
hotels. 
 
Encouraged by its legal victory in 1917, ASCAP focused its efforts on eliminating and 
sometimes capitalising on copyright infringement in the radio broadcast sector. ASCAP filed 
a lawsuit against radio technology patent holder AT&T in 1923, accusing the AT&T-owned 
broadcast station WEAF of neglecting to pay royalties to ASCAP-affiliated musicians yet 
broadcasting other musicians performing their music. Settling for what would become an 
industry standard, AT&T accepted responsibility and obtained a license to broadcast all 
ASCAP-licensed songs for $500 per year. 
 
Allen (1940) mentions that the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
continued to take legal action against broadcasters and to increase its license fees until 67% 
of a radio broadcaster's yearly income (typically $4.3 million, equivalent to $67.3 million in 
2011) finally went to ASCAP by 1939. Whereas license fees collected from radio 
broadcasters accounted for only two thirds of ASCAP's total income, broadcasters were 
dependent on ASCAP for providing nearly all of its content music-wise by the end of the 
1930s. Although broadcasters persistently objected to unreasonable increases in ASCAP 
license fees, station managers ultimately had no other choice but to withdraw their 
protestations due to a lack of alternative content providers. Meza (2007) opines that ASCAP 
and the radio broadcasting sector were actually complements that could have benefited 
from a positive working relationship with one another, but that ASCAP's "greed" and "a fear-
mindset" negatively affected broadcasters' perception of the organisation. ASCAP had 
become a monopoly, and instead of partnering with broadcasters under reasonable terms 
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and thereby develop new audiences for musicians through the newly-invented medium of 
radio, it polarised the main source of its income.  
 
Frustration among broadcasters led to the establishment of another rights management 
agency, named Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI), with the aim of substituting ASCAP. 
CBS attorney Sidney M. Kaye founded BMI in 1939 and broadcasters agreed to capitalise the 
new organisation by donating the equivalent of 50% of the license fees which had been 
made to ASCAP in 1937, raising more than $1 million in only one year. Contributing 
broadcasters received non-dividend-paying shares in BMI in return (Broadcast Music, Inc., 
2010). ASCAP, however, seemed undeterred by the formation of its new competitor and 
increased the yearly fee broadcasters had to pay for playing ASCAP-licensed music with 100% 
in 1941. Orlik (2003) alludes to ASCAP's severe fee increase as the motivation for 650 
broadcasters choosing to sign with BMI rather than with ASCAP at the end of 1940. Only two 
radio stations remained willing to pay the excessively-high fee for broadcasting ASCAP-
licensed music.  
 
For all practical purposes, ASCAP had been boycotted by broadcasters in 1941 (Orlik, 2003). 
Allen (1940) goes on to say that not only the radio sector experienced conflict with ASCAP, 
but the motion picture sector as well. However, whereas film studios like Warner Brothers 
had failed in earlier attempts to supplant ASCAP by establishing their own rights 
management agencies, Kaye had succeeded in instituting an alternative agency by launching 
BMI. After its formation, broadcasters preferred signing with BMI even though the number 
BMI-licensed songs was initially dwarfed by ASCAP's catalogue. Sanjek and Sanjek (1991) 
write that 97% of the most-played titles on radio had been ASCAP-affiliated songs in 1940, 
but that in 1941 hardly any songs on the top-played list were ASCAP-licensed.  
 
Radio technology also presented another threat to ASCAP's business. Although musicians 
were provided with a new platform for releasing their music to wider audiences more 
promptly which aided in popularising certain songs, radio also shortened the time a hit song 
spent on popular music charts from sixteen weeks to approximately eight between 1925 
and 1940. Sheet music and record sales also dropped 90% and 75% respectively during the 
same period (Allen, 1940).  
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Ryan (1985) notes that ASCAP eventually regained credibility as a rights management 
agency, but not before it suffered a "blackout" during which its share in the sector had 
decreased to almost zero. By the 1950s, an equal number of BMI and ASCAP-licensed songs 
were played over the radio. Vogel (2011) writes that royalty streams remain a major source 
of income for musicians, and that ASCAP and BMI are still the two largest rights 
management agencies today. Due to its large catalogues of songs, BMI recorded an income 
of $779 million and ASCAP an income of $749 million for the year 2005. These two agencies 
collectively accumulate more than 95% of all performance royalties in the United States, 
regardless of whether the music is performed informally by university bands, by 
professional orchestras, at nightclubs, set to movies or broadcast over radio. Flick (1988) 
records that there are several legislative changes that have been implemented due to 
disputes over the size of license fees between the agencies and broadcasters over the years. 
 
Interesting to note is that while radio technology elicited fear leading to short-sightedness in 
music industry incumbents when the radio set crossed the chasm of early adoption, the 
recorded music sector had the same effect on the radio broadcast sector when the LP 
started gaining traction.  
 
When major radio broadcasting networks NBC and CBS first started airing content over 
America's airwaves, archaic business principles of the industry dictated that prerecorded 
programming was “lazy” and that, apart from sound effects, all programs therefore had to 
be performed live and transmitted in real-time to the nation's listeners. Affiliates to the 
respective networks would receive the live-produced content via AT&T telephone lines and 
broadcast it directly to local listeners. Due to significant time zone differences in different 
parts of the USA, programming had to be produced and transmitted to affiliate stations 
several times a day, an operational inefficiency which finally persuaded networks to 
reconsider their stance on prerecorded programming, according to Barnouw (1968). Indeed, 
recordings (usually taped on sixteen-inch disks) became such an integral element of the 
radio broadcasting business model that live performances were reduced significantly by the 
networks who chose to sign agreements with only a small number of musicians. This 
decision elicited a certain reluctance among musicians to allowing the broadcast of their 
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recorded work over airwaves, although these sentiments were overruled in 1941 when the 
Federal Court declared it lawful for radio stations to transmit recordings which they had 
purchased over airways and with the US Supreme Court's subsequent refusal to reassess the 
case (Barnouw, 1968). Meza notes that 40 years after Reginald Fessenden succeeded in 
broadcasting music for the first time on Christmas Eve of 1900, recorded music would 
henceforth enjoy an ever-increasing share of broadcast time as "the age of the disk jockey 
[had been] born" (2007). 
 
Bruck (2003) points to the invention of the jukebox, the establishment of disk jockeys and 
the declining employment of live performers by radio stations, as well as the influence of 
the burgeoning motion picture industry, as the rationale behind a strike organised by the 
American Federation of Musicians (AFM) in 1942 against the skyrocketing unemployment 
rate of musicians. Notwithstanding the objection of recording companies, AFM president 
James C. Pertillo demanded that musician employers compensate performers by 
contributing towards a welfare fund for musicians, a claim which was advocated for two 
years by the union before recording companies finally conceded and the strike was 
cancelled. 
 
The cases which have been discussed in this section are only a few examples of contention 
between the radio broadcasting sector and different role-players in the music sector up to 
the mid-20th century, and Vogel (2011) remarks that companies in these sectors have been 
subject to conflict and legislative changes frequently afterwards. Not even recently-
launched online radio stations have been exempt of this phenomenon. Attempts at 
capitalising on the growing phenomenon of online community-forming have proven to be 
unsuccessful as yet for online radio stations. The radio sector was inadvertently affected by 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) when record labels demanded online radio 
stations to pay them royalties after the announcement of the new legislation. Boslet and 
Fleetwood opine that the entire concept of online radio had consequently been marred as a 
result of the DMCA, as it could possibly have provided a lucrative channel for broadcasting 
music in conjunction with traditional means (2006). Broadcasting music over the Internet 
has yet to demonstrate sustainable profitability. 
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4.2 The Motion Picture sector vs. Television Broadcasting 
After its invention, motion picture studio heads perceived television to be a new technology 
with disruptive capabilities and therefore a major threat to profitability enjoyed by the 
sector between the 1920s and 1940s. Even though this period is characterised with war and 
economic recession, the lucrative film business seemed unaffected during that time. 
Nardone (1982) has shown that the film sector displays a contracyclical performance when 
compared to the state of the international economy. Box office revenues commonly tend to 
increase during times of depression regardless of financial difficulty. Psychological factors 
such as escapism generally answer for this phenomenon (Datamonitor, 2010). Contracyclical 
trends in the film sector occurs 87.5% of the time during peaks and 69.3% of the time during 
troughs (Nardone, 1982). However, Scott (2004) goes on to say that Hollywood motion 
picture studios justifiably displayed an attitude of hostility towards the fast-growing 
television broadcasting sector as the number of adopters of television in America increased 
from a mere 200 in 1945 to 80 million in 1955. Figure 8 on page 73 graphically demonstrates 
the adoption of television in the USA since 1945, as the commercialisation of television only 
commenced at the end of World War II. The immediate post-war decades are marked with 
competitive battles between the motion picture sector and the television broadcasting 
sector as a growing number of entertainment consumers exchanged the movie theatre 
experience for the comfort of their living rooms (Epstein, 2005b). Vogel (2011) notes that 
movie ticket sales peaked in 1946 and from then on decreased until 1971 due to the 
influence of television, yet never reached 1946-record levels again. Gomery (1994) states 
that this phenomenon caused an intense crisis in the film sector, although Burgelman and 
Meza (2003) comment that several other factors also contributed to the ultimate business 
model adaptation for the film sector halfway through the 20th century: 
 the divestiture of exhibition departments as dictated by the Paramount Consent 
Decree of 1948, 
 a shift in buyer needs due to consumer dissatisfaction with the quality of content 
delivered by studios at the time, 
 the post-war migration of Americans from cities (where movie theatres were 
situated) to the suburbs (where theatres were not), and 
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 the transformation of actors' and directors' contract systems from multiyear studio-
specific fixed wage contracts to uncoupled profit-sharing contracts. 
 
Besides the transmission of video content via UHF and VHF signals to television set 
antennae for 'free', largely enabled by advertising dollars, three alternative business models 
for television broadcasting were tested in the first few years after the commercialisation of 
television (Conly, 1944): 
 Metered television: The idea of connecting a metering device to a home television 
and then charging audiences a predetermined price for watching a particular show 
was conceived by the DuMont Television Company, a vertically integrated company. 
The DuMont network was introduced in section 3.4 on page 71 as a new entrant to 
the television broadcasting sector in the early-1940s which aimed at competing with 
incumbents NBC and CBS by both manufacturing television sets and broadcasting its 
own content, albeit unsuccessfully at the end of the day. Two methods for accessing 
content were tested: throwing coins into a coin box and using celluloid key cards. 
The coin-box method was tested in California by Paramount, a former investor in 
DuMont, in the early 1950s. To watch a particular football game or movie, 
consumers had to deposit $1.00 or $1.35 respectively, enabling a built-in 'telemeter' 
to descramble scrambled content signals which were sent to television sets via 
telephone connections. 
 Theatre television: The concept of transmitting television content directly to movie 
theatres was tested before World War II, yet failed to gain traction afterwards 
because of the limited range of frequencies offered by the FCC for this purpose, 
rendering the business model unfeasible. In addition, film studios were ambivalent 
as to how theatre television would be standardised, and with the separation 
between production houses and theatres, the idea of theatre television was finally 
abandoned (Balio, 1990). 
 Wired television: According to Young, Gong and Van der Stede (2010) cable 
television allows a subscriber to directly order movies through a JV which licenses 
content from all major film studios, offering an alternative to signal reception. Wired 
television was a business model envisioned by MacDonald already in 1944 (Conly, 
1944). Cable, also commonly referred to as Pay-Per-View television, has since 
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become an extremely successful business model with 4 135 million subscriptions 
worldwide by 2007 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010a). 61.4% of Americans (Motion 
Picture Association of America, 2007) and 163 million Chinese subscribers (Jingchen 
and Zhongping, 2010) contributed to the success of this business model in that year. 
 
Even though some of these business models were never implemented successfully, creative 
industry change in the television broadcasting sector, multiple incremental innovations such 
as colour TV, thriving television set sales and general excitement among advertisers over the 
potential of the new medium add to the aforementioned reasons cited by Burgelman and 
Meza (2003) which contributed to the antagonism between film studios and television 
networks. Film studios even prohibited the movie stars which signed contracts with them 
from starring in television shows. Regardless of fearful responses such as these, television 
became a popular medium among entertainment consumers in the years following its 
invention and commercialisation. Declining movie theatre revenues are contrasted with 
increasing television revenues for the global market in Table 5 with equivalent values in 
2011 for comparative purposes (Epstein, 2005a): 
 
Table 5: Sources of Revenue for the Global Film Sector, Theatres vs. Television: selected years 
between 1948-2004 
Year Movie theatre revenue, in 
US$ billions 
Film industry revenue 
from TV2, in US$ billions 
1948 $7.80 
($73.06 in 2011) 
0 
1980 $4.50 
($12.86 in 2011) 
$3.74 
($10.69 in 2011) 
1985 $3.04 
($6.33 in 2011) 
$6.81 
($14.17 in 2011) 
1990 $5.28 
($9.18 in 2011) 
$9.26 
($16.10 in 2011) 
1995 $5.72 
($8.37 in 2011) 
$10.53 
($15.42 in 2011) 
2000 $6.02 
($7.84 in 2011) 
$14.23 
($18.53 in 2011) 
2004 $7.40 
($8.80 in 2011) 
$16.60 
($19.74 in 2011) 
 
                                                     
2
 Figures for television Include PPV, subscription pay TV, local stations, network TV and cable TV. 
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4.3 The Motion Picture and Television Sectors vs. the VCR 
Although Ampex failed to commercialise its first VTR prototype, this company did succeed in 
recognising the potential for capitalising even more on the nascent television business with 
its recording technology (Rosenbloom and Freeze, 1985). Other companies made an effort 
to exploit this opportunity spotted by Ampex. Possessing large pools of talented human 
resources without a shortage of capital, Sony, Matsushita and JVC were established 
technology companies with reputable brands in the consumer electronics industry which 
meet Burgelman and Grove's (Burgelman and Grove, 2007) requisites for being classified as 
cross-boundary disruptors. The fact that these companies did not actually invent the 
disruptive technology of the VCR yet only utilised and developed it confirms the context in 
which Burgelman and Grove identify the XBD. 
 
Companies commonly resort to litigation as a means for conflict resolution when new 
technologies threaten to disrupt customary revenues and existing industry structures. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this section of the study, film companies Universal Studios 
and Walt Disney Productions sued Sony Corporation, as well as Sonam and DDBI (the 
advertising agencies responsible for marketing Sony's Betamax) in 1976 because the 
Betamax VCR was perceived to be a device which chief purpose was to violate copyrights on 
producers' content. The film studios claimed injunctive relief, declaratory relief, damages 
and profits from the technology and advertising companies. Meza (2007) suggests that 
Universal Studios might have had a hidden agenda with the lawsuit against Sony, as it was 
planning to release a VTR through MCA, the company which owned Universal, and did not 
want to concede home video market share to the Betamax. Although an appeals court 
initially ruled in favour of the plaintiffs that VCRs indeed encourage copyright infringement, 
the Supreme Court reversed that decision in 1979, albeit by a narrow margin of five votes to 
four in favour of the defendants. After three years of litigation and a five-week long trial the 
Supreme Court's findings were finally issued as follows (Universal City Studios, Inc., et al. v. 
Sony Corp. of America, Inc. et al., 480 F. Supp. 429, 1979): 
  
a. "Neither the Copyright Act of 1909 ("Old Act") nor the revised Act of 1976 ("New 
Act") gave copyright holders monopoly over an individual's off-the-air copying in his 
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home for private, non-commercial use. This court is not deciding whether tape 
duplication or copying from pay television is prohibited. Nor is this court ruling on 
off-the air recording by individuals or groups for use outside the home. 
b. Even if the Copyright Act did prohibit home-use copying, Sony, Sonam, DDBI and the 
retails stores would not be liable under any of the theories of direct or contributory 
infringement of vicarious liability. 
c. The retail defendants have not infringed plaintiffs' copyrights. 
d. Even if home-use copying was infringement and defendants were deemed liable 
therefore, this court could not grant the injunctive relief requested by plaintiffs. 
e. None of the defendants has unfairly competed with plaintiffs or interfered with their 
advantageous business relations." 
 
The "time-shifting" specification of the video recording technology was one of the factors 
which contributed most to the Supreme Court's favourable decision not to illegalise the VCR, 
as it is considered a non-violating use for the device (Cook and Wang, 2004).  Time-shifting 
enables users to watch a television show on one channel while simultaneously recording a 
program on another. Along with product characteristics such as high picture quality, on-
screen display, multi-channel TV sound decoding and stereo sound, consumers rapidly 
adopted VTR technology after its introduction to the American public (Park, 2004). As noted 
in the section 3.5 from page 74 onwards, consumers favoured the VHS video recording 
format invented by Matsushita over Sony's Betamax. Many Betamax-producing companies 
ceased operations while many other technology companies in the consumer electronics 
industry entered the market as VHS-manufacturers. RCA also started manufacturing VHS 
machines and each purchase of an RCA VCR was accompanied with two free videos. The 
Video Club of America opened the first shop from which videos could be purchased, while 
George Atkinson launched the first shop from which videos could be rented. Klopfenstein 
(1985) notes that both videotape sales and movie rentals grew exponentially from then on, 
nearly doubling yearly between 1982 and 1986. The stacked area chart in Figure 10 displays 
the revenues generated from the sales and rentals of VHS videos in the USA from 1981 to 
1996, the year before the DVD format was commercialised (Currah, 2007). Equivalent to 
$21.7 billion in 2011, cumulative revenues amounted to $15.2 billion in that year. 
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Figure 10: Increase in Total VHS tape revenues in American homes: 1981-1996 
 
Video recording technology influenced the motion picture companies in a similar fashion as 
television had since the 1940s. It may be regarded as an additional factor contributing to the 
decrease in movie theatre ticket admissions. As producers of a cross-boundary disruptor 
technology, VCR manufacturers had effectively disturbed the equilibrium of the filmed 
entertainment sector. 
 
4.4 Entertainment companies vs. Technology companies 
A historical study of media and entertainment industry reveals that not only did several 
sectors and companies in this industry enter into a phase of trepidation due to consumer 
adoption of new technological innovations, but a great deal of contention also transpired 
between entertainment organisations, or content creators, and companies specialising in 
consumer electronics or technological devices for exhibiting or playing that content. 
Sometimes the dealings between companies associated with different industries have even 
positively resulted in cross-industry convergence (Chon et al., 2003), a phenomenon which 
Chapter 5 discusses in more detail. According to Currah (2006), the Internet especially has 
enabled new models for the economic reproduction of intellectual property, bolstering 
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creativity in entertainment companies. Nevertheless, several incidences of legal action still 
ensued as a result of entertainment companies' fear and failure to recognise the potential of 
new technological innovations. In particular, technologies which enable filesharing of 
digitised content over the Internet have provoked intra-industry conflict, lawsuits and 
regulations (Schwender and Leet, 2008). Yet not all litigation which has proceeded from 
periods of contention has been entirely unconstructive. A law passed in 1992 is one such an 
example. 
 
In 1992, the United States Congress passed a law which became a noteworthy catalyst to 
the overall convergence and conflict between technology companies and the recorded 
music sector specifically. As an amendment to the American federal copyright law of 1976, 
the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) was passed to enforce the integration of a serial copy 
management system (SCMS) with the manufacturing of every digital recording device. An 
SCMS enables first-generation copying of digitally recorded discs, yet forbids additional 
copies to be made from already-copied disks. Moreover, the AHRA states that up to $8 per 
newly produced recording machine should by paid by the manufacturer thereof, as well as 3% 
of the cost per copied disk, to song copyright owners as royalty tax. In return, owners of 
copyrighted music give up the right to accuse users of digital recording devices of copyright 
infringement when disks are copied for non-commercial purposes under the fair use 
limitation of the copyright law. Computers, however, are not subject to AHRA requirements 
as these are not regarded as digital audio recording devices (Gaffney, 2000). 
 
Although the AHRA was considered a welcome contribution from the United States 
government in an attempt to address digitalisation-related concerns by incumbents in the 
recorded music sector at the time, Bridy comments that digital rights management 
measures like AHRA have only served to encourage piracy: "content controls have been 
received by ordinary consumers as a frustrating impediment to lawful use and by hackers as 
both an affront to digital freedom and an opportunity to prove their mettle (2009)." 
 
As a matter of fact, piracy has only escalated since 1992 with the popularity of digitalisation 
and the ubiquity of digitised content in spite of efforts to counter illegal filesharing through 
technological means (Rupp and Smith, 2004). In addition to suing technology companies like 
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Napster in a bid to protect copyrighted content, entertainment companies started 
employing digital rights management (DRM) technologies as another tactic for countering 
copyright infringement, albeit unsuccessfully to a large extent still, according to Bridy (2009). 
Hackers have indeed been able to circumvent most DRM measures embedded in content 
disks up to now. Fears displayed by recorded music companies in the early 1990s 
surrounding the digitalisation of content were confirmed after Napster's demise in 2001: as 
piracy increased, music sales dropped. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Decrease in Album and Singles Sales: 1998-2010 
  
Figure 11 shows the decline in retail dollar value of singles and full album shipments from 
1998 to 2009 as tracked by the Recording Industry Association of America (2011a) and 
(2009). Vaccaro and Cohn (2004) note a correlation between these declining record sales 
and the increase of illegal filesharing: physical music sales worldwide decreased by 
approximately US$2 billion between 1999 and 2002 and have shown to regress ever since; 
the number of content files being shared illegally over the Internet has, on the other hand, 
increased from 500 million in 2002 to an estimated 1 billion just one year later in 2003. In 
that year, filesharing company KaZaA registered 230 million downloads compared to 
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Napster's biggest user base of 80 million in 2001. A Pew Internet survey reveals that by 2008, 
15% of adult Internet users were sharing or downloading files illegally via P2P applications 
(2009). BigChampagne Media Measurement also states that the number of personal 
computers globally on which P2P applications were installed has been growing steadily in 
the 2000s, as demonstrated by Figure 12 (Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2009). As a 
convincing indication of how much piracy has escalated, most-recent studies by the Digital 
Music Research Group reveal that front-running P2P application LimeWire can now be 
found on 36.4% of all personal computers worldwide compared to only 18.3% of PCs in 2007 
(Resnikoff, 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Number of Personal Computers Worldwide on which One or More P2P 
Applications are Installed: 2006-2008 
 
Although Oberholzer-Glee and Strumpf (2007) concluded from statistical studies that digital 
filesharing has no significant effect on CD purchases, citing poor macroeconomic conditions, 
fewer album releases, a smaller variety of records and competition with other forms of 
entertainment as reasons for declining record sales, most other academics have 
subsequently differed in their deductions by stating that exactly the opposite is true. 
Liebowitz (2008) especially has strongly opposed their conclusions, stating that "Oberholzer-
Glee and Strumpf's is... the only paper to find a benign impact of file sharing" and that 
"there are important problems with that paper." Conducting his own study, Liebowitz 
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empirically investigated the extent to which P2P filesharing has caused a decline in recorded 
music sales in the USA between 1998 and 2003. To eliminate the Internet penetration 
coefficient (the impact that the Internet has had on recorded music sales in general), he 
examined the effect of the Internet on other entertainment activities such as television and 
radio and subtracted it from recorded music sales. From his analysis, the conclusion was 
that P2P filesharing is responsible for not only some but the entire decline in recorded music 
sales during that period (Liebowitz, 2008). Bhattacharjee et al. (2007) examined the impact 
of filesharing on the performance of specific albums on Billboard charts and came to the 
conclusion that, except for work by "cream of the crop" musicians, music albums display 
significantly reduced chart survival in the post-P2P age. Quantifying the effect of filesharing 
technology on the recorded music sector, Elberse (2010) found that every 1% increase in 
illegal music downloading has led to a 6% decrease in album sales.  
 
Diminishing profits were initially blamed solely on the technology companies which enabled 
users to download files illegally, attracting numerous P2P-focused lawsuits from the RIAA 
after Napster's demise. The recorded music sector, however, diverged somewhat from its 
strategy of suing Internet-based filesharing companies like Napster to prosecuting individual 
pirates when a recorded music sector trade group took legal action against Verizon 
Communications before the District Court of Columbia in 2003. Under the DMCA, Verizon 
Communications was ordered to disclose the identity of a fileswapper who shared 
numerous copies of copyrighted songs over the Internet using a Verizon-provided 
connection (Recording Industry of America v. Verizon Internet, 351 F. 3d 1229, Court of 
Appeals, District of Columbia, 2003). Verizon, however, won the appeal launched against 
the District Court’s decision and when the plaintiffs wanted to further their case, the US 
Supreme Court conclusively declined to hear it (Stern, 2003). 
 
The RIAA continued suing individual fileswappers for five years after the Verizon case, 
accusing more than 35 000 individuals of sharing audio content files illegally over the 
Internet during this period. Apart from acting as regular representative for recording 
companies in these suits, the RIAA has assumed a role of industry watchdog since 2003 by 
educating entertainment consumers and campaigning aggressively against piracy. Many 
companies and universities received warning letters from the RIAA stating that their 
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networks and resources were being used for the distribution of copyrighted music and that 
they had to resolve this problem to avoid legal action. The RIAA also encouraged the 
development of technology-based digital rights management systems and at one stage even 
suggested that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) pay a levy to labels for providing the 
infrastructure which enable consumers to freely access online filesharing services. This 
endeavour to eliminate piracy through individual-directed lawsuits proved to be costly for 
record labels in many more ways than only financially. Chiefly, the entire recorded music 
sector suffered a loss in reputation as the tactic of suing individuals who "shared even one 
song" attracted tremendous ill will from entertainment consumers. Intellectual Property 
expert Alan Hartnick (2009) criticises and rates this tactic as highly unsuccessful, as not only 
did post-Verizon record sales reflect consumers' negativity towards the industry, but illegal 
filesharing of music has not been entirely eradicated to this day.  
  
Video files are generally much larger than audio files, making it more difficult to exchange 
movies or clips on the Internet as more time and capacity are required to upload or 
download a video file onto or from a P2P network server. An increase in Internet bandwidth 
and connection speed along with the advancement of video compression technology over 
the last 10 years, however, has allowed for larger content files to be distributed over the 
worldwide web, thereby enabling piracy of not only music but video files as well (Cook and 
Wang, 2004). According to Das (2008), additional technological advantages like larger hard 
drives and better open-source filesharing software programs have aided in the reduction of 
both the temporal and monetary cost of downloading files over the Internet. This 
occurrence has given television broadcasting and filmed entertainment companies a similar 
headache as record labels have been experiencing since the inception of filesharing 
technology as popularised by Napster at the turn of the 21st century. The piracy of motion 
pictures over the Internet and the legal battles which occur thereafter provides another 
case in point of contention between the entertainment industry and technology companies 
with the mass adoption of a disruptive technology. 
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4.5 Chapter Conclusion 
Burgelman and Grove's cross-boundary disruptor (XBD) theory (Burgelman and Grove, 2007) 
identifies a change agent which serves as a catalyst to industry transformation. As 
mentioned in section 2.2 of this document, an XBD has the capability of influencing not only 
organisations in the same sector or industry as itself, but also how business is conducted in 
industries which are characteristically quite dissimilar. The case studies discussed in this 
chapter revealed general trepidation and protectionism regarding new technologies among 
entertainment companies rather than an enthusiasm to explore potential new business 
models. Yet as organisations contended with each other in either broad or narrow industry 
sectors, new opportunities for business creation emerged, some even leading to cross-
boundary disruption.  
 
Adhering to Burgelman and Grove’s list of XBD characteristics, CBS already had a strong 
product market in the radio broadcasting sector, possessed capital and human resources 
and had technology-related brand appeal when Sidney M. Kaye founded BMI in 1939. Kaye 
was therefore ideally positioned to introduce BMI as an XBD while ASCAP was busy 
exploiting radio broadcasters and film studios due to deteriorating sheet music sales caused 
by radio technology. Regardless of movie studios’ fear of the effects of television on theatre 
attendance, the invention, commercialisation and use of television as an alternative 
distribution channel has led to an entire new sector in the media and entertainment 
industry. Resource-rich companies Matsushita and RCA also became XBDs when they 
manufactured VHS-standard VCRs amidst film studios’ legal contention with Sony over the 
“industry-crippling” potential of its Betamax video recorder. Amidst a myriad of legal battles, 
some of which were described in this chapter, conflict between entertainment companies 
and technology companies over the development of P2P-filesharing technology gave 
opportunity for companies like Apple, Redbox, Hulu, Netflix and Google (which owns 
YouTube) to also present XBD offerings to entertainment consumers in the 2000s, leading to 
the transformation of the recorded music and filmed entertainment sectors as they existed 
in the 1990s.  
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The new business models, markets and channels which were created by disruptive 
innovations that endured the contention phase, as well as the consequential industry 
structures and financial performance of the sectors they disrupted, will be discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
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5. The Sensation Phase 
 
―To use technology to create magic is what appeals to me‖ 
– Francis Ford Coppola 
 
 
This chapter shows the economic benefit of convergence and close collaboration between 
technology companies and organisations in the media and entertainment sector, as well as 
the possibility of creating new markets when trepidation towards new innovations and 
strategies which ostracize consumers are relinquished and new business models developed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When The Walt Disney Company released their latest animated film The Lion King in 1994, 
the film earned a company-record $250 million in the USA alone and even twice as much in 
the rest of the world in the first two months of screening. Within the next two years 
following its theatrical release a staggering $1.5 billion was added to that total through the 
sale of almost $600 million worth of videos as well as retail merchandise, provoking Hawkins 
(1995) to proclaim that "The Lion King isn't [just] a movie. It's an industry!" (Reavis, 1998). 
Although re-releases of the film on IMAX screens in 2002 and 3D screens in 2011 added 
another $15.7 million and $93.1 million to the film’s total revenue respectively, VHS tape 
and DVD sales of 4.5 million and 2 million on only its first day of release respectively just 
enforces Hawkins’s sentiments (Box Office Mojo, 2011). As soon as film studios started 
relinquishing their fears and contention with technology companies over the video cassette 
recorder, they started benefiting from the adoption of the nascent technology in a new 
market space.  
Disruptive 
innovation
Chasm 
challenge
Industry 
reacts
XBD 
enters
Adoption
New 
industry 
structure
Innovation Contention Ascension 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
103 
 
  
In spite of qualms that the entertainment industry would be "crippled" by the VCR, as a 
cross-boundary disruptor technology it has spawned an entirely new sector of the media 
and entertainment industry since Sony's legal victory over Universal City Studios in 1979. 
Video recording technology has furthermore revolutionised both the filmed entertainment 
and television broadcasting sectors and necessitated new business models for companies in 
both these sectors as incumbents started capitalising on the potential of video rentals as an 
additional source of revenue. Weinberg (2005) states that the subsequent invention of DVD 
technology and studios' interest in sell-through rather than only renting videos even 
enhanced this effect, leading to a significant decrease in the contribution of theatrical 
sources to movie industry revenues from 100% in 1948 to 20.5% in 2007 due to the 0% to 
41.7% contribution of videos/DVDs alone for the same years(Epstein, 2010).  
  
Periods of sensation, however, do not last particularly long as newer technologies 
constantly threaten to disrupt existing business models and industry structures. The 
digitalisation of media files and the ubiquity of Internet-connected PCs have again prompted 
contention between filmed entertainment and technology companies with the 
popularisation of YouTube, Hulu and other online video-sharing websites. ReadWriteWeb 
(2008) reports on a study by Ipsos MediaCT which shows that in just a year, television as 
dominant video consumption mode in the USA has decreased from 75% overall watching 
time in 2007 to 70% in 2008, while watching time on a PC has increased to 19% in 2008 from 
11% in 2007. More telling might be statistics for the influential 12-17 age group which 
watched 24% of video content on PC in comparison to 55% on TV in 2008. In the same year, 
80% of Chinese teenagers cited the Internet as their preferred source of entertainment over 
television while the Korean Film Council revealed that domestic DVD and film sectors are 
adversely affected by the 33% of South Koreans who now primarily watch movies online. 
Revenue opportunities abound in these countries, as online advertising in these two 
countries along with Japan have been forecasted to increase from US$10.3 billion to 
US$15.1 billion from 2009 to 2012 (Walsh, 2009). Television broadcasting and motion 
picture production companies are again forced to assess the effectiveness of traditional 
business models should they want to benefit from emerging digital aggregators.  
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This chapter explores a sensation phase of prosperity which entertainment companies have 
entered or failed to reach due to their response to technological change and their 
willingness to embrace new business models or alter existing value chains across traditional 
boundaries of industry. The resulting structures of the different sectors of the media and 
entertainment industry as they are currently organised globally and in South Africa are also 
examined. 
 
5.1 Radio and Recorded Music 
Music composers and artists initially encountered considerable opposition when trying to 
collect royalties for the broadcasting of their performances over radio. With confidence 
gained from the rising demand for radio sets throughout the 1920s, radio station owners 
argued that once they had purchased recordings, these could be used without further 
obligation to compensate artists for their material. Radio stations, of course, had to revise 
this policy with the popularisation of LP vinyl records and the establishment of royalty 
associations ASCAP and BMI. After its near-boycott due to severe exploitation of radio 
broadcasters in 1941, ASCAP was forced to match BMI's royalty formula based on 2.75% of 
stations' yearly advertising revenue. 
 
Following the contention between broadcasters, recording companies and rights 
management agencies, radio remained the primary medium used to expose latest and 
popular records to the public until the popularisation of digital media. Sanjek and Sanjek 
(1991) write that by 1953 ASCAP licensed more than 19 million performances to radio 
stations, for which song writers and publishers received 8 cents (66 cents in 2011) and 24 
cents (US$1.97 in 2011) per airplay respectively. As mentioned previously, sheet music sales 
dropped drastically with the newly-established synergy between radio broadcasters and 
record labels (Allen, 1940). For the sale of every sheet music copy of a popular song 
between 50 and 75 records containing hit songs were sold in comparison due to the affect 
of radio and television, resulting in the growth of the recorded music sector from a $100 
million to $6 billion industry between the 1940s and 1980s (Sanjek and Sanjek, 1991). 
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Vogel (2011), however, notes that FM radio with its wide-range "high-fidelity stereo-signal 
capability" only became financially viable during the late 1960s. Broadcasters obtained 
profitability by successfully marketing album-oriented popular music to the fast-growing 
group of affluent teenagers and young adults of the time. AM radio, on the other hand, 
gained traction in the 1970s by becoming a local service rather than a national one, giving 
marketers the opportunity to advertise to narrowly-defined segments of radio audiences. 
 
The radio broadcasting sector and the recorded music sector effectively entered into a state 
of corporate symbiosis as radio became a significant catalyst for selling music albums. 
Although broadcasters receive some public funding from government, Barnouw (1966) 
mentions that the sustainability of radio's business model relies heavily on advertisers' 
recognition of the medium's marketing potential. Companies will always want their 
advertisements to reach audiences that would be most interested in buying their products 
or services. In view of that, advertising agencies endeavour to identify radio stations or 
programs which attract their target markets in terms of demographics, personal income and 
ethnicity. This practice of radio advertising gained popularity as more listeners tuned into 
radio stations to listen to shows playing latest hit songs. The success of a radio broadcaster 
in drawing audiences is measured by a gauge called rating points. Rating points refer to the 
percentage of all households in a particular area which own radios (or televisions) and are 
tuned to a particular program at a particular moment. For example, radio is currently the 
most ubiquitous medium in South Africa with approximately 10 million households who 
own a radio set. If 1.2 million households are listening to a soccer game on a particular radio 
station, that station's national rating is said to be 12.0 (1.2m / 10m = 12.0%). A particular 
radio station's share, however, refers to the percentage of switched-on radio sets which are 
tuned to a specific show. For example, if South Africa has 10 million households which own 
radio sets but only 6 million of these are switched on and 1 million listeners are tuned to 
Station X, then Station X's share can be said to be 16.67 (1m / 6m = 16.67%). The combined 
ratings of all radio stations during a specific time period consequently provide an estimate 
of the number of persons using radio (PUR). A station's share, then, can be expressed 
arithmetically as follows: share = 100 x rating / PUR (Vogel, 2011). The AC Nielsen Company 
has historically been the most prolific company offering regular measurements of shares 
and ratings over specific designated market areas (DMAs). 
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The network with the most popular programs consequently attracts the largest audiences, 
earning higher ratings. Marketers are interested in advertising during shows which have 
high ratings because these programs provide consistency and reach - a large percentage of 
targeted households are exposed to an advertisement at least once over a predetermined 
period. The relative cost and efficiency of message delivery via different media are 
measured by marketers on the basis of cost per thousand households (CPM), which can be 
obtained from stations' rate cards. Rate cards indicate advertising cost per half-minute for 
specific periods during a day, week or season. The station who is the ratings leader for a 
specific time period can therefore command higher-than-average CPMs due to the fact that 
advertising time on more-popular shows are in short supply when compared to advertiser 
demand.  
 
Distinction can be made between three different types of advertisements broadcasted over 
the airwaves: national advertisements, national spot advertisements and local 
advertisements. Television advertisements can be similarly differentiated (Vogel, 2011):  
 National advertisements, sometimes termed network ads, refer to those 
advertisements released by large brand-name organisations (typically those who 
distribute their products nation-wide) which are aired by purchasing national-
network time via agencies. On average, these agencies receive fees in the area of 15% 
of companies' gross billings. This type of advertising is usually costly, but the least 
expensive if measured on a cost-per-viewer basis. 
 National spot advertisements are also utilised by companies who distribute their 
products nationally, although spot ads target specific local audiences more 
effectively through consulting regional station representatives who are familiar with 
program research demographics and rates. Firm representatives typically charge an 
average commission of 7% or 8% of net billings (Rand paid for advertising minus 
advertisement agency commissions). 
 Local advertisements are those utilised by smaller businesses that purchase 
broadcasting time directly from local radio stations. Local advertising rates are 
ordinarily not published but determined on a one-on-one basis. 
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The radio broadcasting sector entered its sensation phase in the 1960s due to its success as 
distribution channel for latest songs as well as efficient marketing medium. Advertising 
expenditures, as a reflection of the growth of the sector, have climbed steadily from the 
1970s to the year 2000, with growth levels decreasing in the new millennium as indicated in 
Figure 13 (Vogel, 2011): 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Annual Radio Advertising Expenditures in the USA per Category: 1970-2005 with 2010 
forecast 
 
The success of radio as advertising medium and means of cultivating a demand for new 
music, coinciding with the popularisation of television, had a positive effect on music album 
retailing with annual record sales exceeding US$500 million by the late-1950s (Sanjek and 
Sanjek, 1991). With the help of radio, the music recording industry subsequently grew into a 
$40 billion industry in 1998 - a record year before filesharing and piracy started challenging 
the prosperity of the recorded music sector significantly. Radio broadcasting, today, is a 
multi-faceted, heavily-regulated sector in the media and entertainment industry which has 
entered a period of maturity. With the exception of the introduction of online radio, which 
according to Boslet and Fleetwood (2006) has yet to become a profitable enterprise, 
1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010*
Network (national) $56 $183 $482 $480 $780 $814 $930 
Spot (local) $881 $2,740 $6,609 $8,899 $14,847 $15,375 $17,566 
Spot (national) $371 $779 $1,635 $1,959 $3,668 $3,469 $3,963 
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expansion in this sector has slowed down since its peak in the 1960s. The contribution of 
radio as marketing medium towards total advertising in the USA, for example, has remained 
steadily around a share of 7% from 1960 until 2005, in comparison with television which has 
grown in popularity as marketing medium from a 14% share of total advertising in 1960 to 
25% in 2005. Even so, radio broadcasting remains a sector in which profit margins are 
significantly higher than other media and entertainment sectors, and broadcasters have 
consistently been able to maintain high cash generation. Recovering from the 2008/2009 
recession, the radio market both globally (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010a) and in South 
Africa (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011) is forecasted to grow positively between 2011 and 
2015 as demonstrated in Figure 14 and Figure 15.  
 
 
 
Figure 14: Global Radio Market: 2006-2015 with forecasted 2011-15 CAGR = 3.5% 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015*
Market $47,2 $48,3 $47,4 $43,1 $44,8 $45,6 $47,3 $49,3 $51,3 $53,1
% change 2.9% 0.7% -4.5% -14.3 1.8% 3.4% 4.2% 4.8% 5.0% 3.4%
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Figure 15: South African Radio Market: 2006-2015 with forecasted 2011-15 CAGR = 6.3% 
 
Apart from the profitability of radio due to its continued success as an advertising medium, 
some other arguments why this particular entertainment medium remains so lucrative may 
be the following: 
 Only one sense in the human body is utilised with radio broadcasts, a characteristic 
of this medium which enables listeners to concentrate on other tasks such as driving 
or doing work during transmissions. Television and P2P filesharing are mediums 
which require users’ full attention for specific periods of time, rendering 
engagement with these forms of entertainment exclusive. Radio, then, becomes one 
of the main forms of media which entertainment consumers may engage with if they 
spend the greater percentage of their time at work or in traffic. 
 Breaking news and talk shows enjoy a noteworthy platform in radio, and a 
perception exists that a greater measure of credibility and morality is retained in 
broadcast opinion because of radio’s accountability to broadcasting and complaints 
commissions, as opposed to Internet forums which are generally unmoderated 
considered as unreliable. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015*
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 Talk-show radio provides a real-time opportunity for social networking without 
requiring Internet usage – listeners can phone in and provide opinions on either 
relevant or frivolous topics and thereby form part of a virtual community. 
 Radio remains one of the most significant distribution channels for new popular 
music and is based on disk jockeys’ “expert” opinion, not requiring intensive 
individualised Internet search attempts. 
 
At least for the foreseeable future, radio broadcasters will continue to be a considerable 
force in the media and entertainment industry and will remain so should incumbents 
increase their experimentation of new technologies like web radio which may very well 
render traditional radio sets obsolete one day. 
 
5.2 Filmed Entertainment and Television 
Buying a 65-cent movie ticket back in 1920 would not only ensure admission to the week's 
latest film but guarantee a complete experience constituting big comfortable seats, formal 
wear, complimentary coffee and the ambience which can only be sensed in a gilded theatre 
palace with marble floors. 65 cents back then is worth $7.54 in 2010, comparable to an 
average of $7.50 paid for a movie ticket today for a less exclusive cinema experience(Motion 
Picture Association of America, 2009). Fielding (1967) suggests that constantly-developing 
technology has been one of the major driving forces which have aided in positioning cinema 
as successful entertainment medium and art form, ultimately changing the way in which 
movies are enjoyed today in comparison with the 1920-experience: 
 Joseph Tykochiner invented the variable-density sound track which is (still today) 
placed on the side of image frames of moving pictures, producing the audio 
technology which has revolutionised film production. The first feature film with 
sound, commonly referred to as "talkies" at the time, was released by Warner 
Brothers in the form of The Jazz Singer in 1927 (Anderson, 2002). Sanjek (1988) 
notes that with the commercial success of The Jazz Singer and 1939-Best Picture 
Oscar-winner Gone with the Wind "talking pictures had become the principal means 
for plugging popular music.” Theatre admissions were favourably affected with the 
addition of sound to pictures, allowing film studio heads to declare a general 
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consensus in 1935 that "a successful film song added significantly to box office 
returns." 
 Although Steamboat Willy featuring the as-yet-unknown cartoon character Mickey 
Mouse was the first animated story created in 1928, Snow White and the Seven 
Dwarves was the world's first animated feature film (Downes, Russ and Ryan, 2007), 
a film which also proved popular with audiences thus indicating the financial 
feasibility of hand-drawn films. Since the success of Snow White and the Seven 
Dwarves, movies featuring animation technology have been contributing 
significantly to overall profits for film studios: adjusted for inflation, 14 of the 100 
highest-grossing films in the USA of all time are animated films, with Snow White 
earning US$870 million on its own (Box Office Mojo, 2010). 
 Special effects created by means of advanced computer aided design (CAD) 
programs and electronic editing and composition software demonstrate another 
way in which technology has changed filmmaking operations, developed the art of 
cinematography and spurred profitability in the filmed entertainment sector. A 
particularly influential innovation in special effects is the development of computer 
generated imagery (CGI) technology, which enables filmmakers to create detailed 
digital models or simulate completely-lifelike characters and digitally integrate these 
into a film during post-production. Since the 1970s, CGI- or visual effects-driven films 
like 1977's Star Wars, 1993's Jurassic Park, 1995's Toy Story, 1999's The Matrix, 
2001-2003's The Lord of the Rings Trilogy and 2009's Avatar have dominated the 
global box office. Statistics on boxofficemojo.com (2010) reveal that special effects-
driven films represent at least 34 of the 100 highest-grossing movies in the USA of all 
time. 
 
No other disruptive technology, however, has been as important in altering the film sector's 
economic and physical structure as the ready availability and mass adoption of television. 
Figure 8 on page 73 revealed that 90% of American households already owned television 
sets by 1970. Television penetration in the USA has since increased to more than 98% of 
households (Motion Picture Association of America, 2009). Films broadcasted over 
television have not only become competitive with theatrical exhibitions, traditionally the 
core business of the filmed entertainment sector, but global revenues from this mode of 
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exhibition have eclipsed that which is earned at the box office since the mid-1980s (Epstein, 
2005a). Progress in TV program distribution as well as recording capability enabled 
entertainment consumers to watch a myriad of films according to their preferences in the 
comfort of their own homes - an advantage over specific release windows and scheduled 
shows at movie theatres.  As mentioned in the previous chapter of this study, the 
popularisation of television along with videocassettes initially caused a fear that theatres 
would become redundant and consequently instigated great contention between film 
studios and television broadcasters. Moreover, the promise of multiple system operators 
(MSOs) using direct broadcast satellite (DBS) technology or cable networks to distribute 
content, rather than with wireless sets, sat well with entertainment consumers. According 
to Parsons and Frieden (1998), cable television was originally utilised as a means of 
transmitting broadcast television to areas in the United States which could not receive 
signals due to geographical obstructions like mountains, yet today offer content on a pay-
per-view basis to more than 65% of American households.  
 
The unprecedented access to old and new movies plus the consumer benefit of being able 
to dictate the time and place of viewing, conversely, opened the way for new revenue 
streams for film companies and adjusted the economic power of film studios. By 
broadcasting a film via a television network studios could earn $150 000 per movie in the 
early-1960s, a figure which grew to approximately $400 000 per film by the end of that 
decade (Balio, 1990). Revenue generated by transmitting films over television airwaves and 
pay cable systems only increased from then on. Although the standard variation for this 
figure is moderately high, Vogel (2011) shows that the estimated average revenue attained 
through ancillary markets for a "typical" MPAA-member movie increased to US$30 million 
by 2010. This figure is expounded in Table 6. Noticeable is that the approximate income 
generated per person for these ancillary markets is lower than for film distributors, who 
earn anything between $3.00 and $5.50 per person per film.  
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Table 6: Estimated average income generated by ancillary revenue streams for a "typical" MPAA-member 
movie in 2010 
Ancillary market Estimated cost of movie 
viewing per person-hour 
Standard license fees or 
revenues per movie 
Pay cable $0.50 $10 million 
Network television licenses 
$0.06 
$2.5 million 
Television syndication $1.5 million 
Foreign television $3.0 million 
Home video (cassettes and DVDs) $0.60 $13.0 million 
TOTAL:  $30.0 million 
 
Young et al. (2008) go as far as to state that, even though film executives attach great 
significance to the opening weekend box office performance and closely monitor the 
theatrical run of a film, only 20% of a film's revenue comes from cinema exhibitions and that 
as much as 80% of revenues are accrued from the ancillary markets of television and 
recorded media for a film released in today's economic context. Adapted from Eliashberg, 
Elberse and Leenders, (2006), Figure 16 graphically portrays the motion picture sector value 
chain as it exists today in conjunction with ancillary markets: 
 
 
 
Figure 16: The Motion Picture Sector Value Chain 
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One catalyst for the radical industry change experienced by the filmed entertainment sector 
and the switch of opinion regarding television's collaborative potential and was the 
Paramount antitrust consent decree of 1948. That legislation rendered it illegal for film 
production and distribution companies to exhibit movies themselves and to exercise 
ownership over retail theatres in any way. Studios' reaction to declining theatre admissions 
and the divestiture of theatre chains was to first reduce the number of films being produced 
(having initially thought it necessary to produce a new film every week), and secondly to 
establish specialised television-programming divisions themselves (Balio, 1985).  
 
According to Bruck (2003), Lee Wasserman was the first executive to pragmatically act on 
his belief that television could be of commercial benefit to the film industry. Wasserman 
headed up Hollywood talent agency MCA and in the early-1950s succeeded in convincing 
the Los Angeles actors' union named Screen Actors Guild (SAG) that actors would benefit 
with regards to employment opportunities should MCA be allowed to produce pre-recorded 
television programs without relinquishing its talent agency endeavours. Prior to SAG's 
consent for MCA to produce television shows, talent agencies were prohibited from 
producing movies, as the actors' unions considered such operations to be a conflict of 
interest. MCA commenced with television production soon afterwards. Before producing 
their own shows, motion picture studios merely leased old films to television broadcasters - 
earning pure profits due to the fact that these movies had already been fully amortized in 
the past. Newer films cost broadcasters more, as SAG and the Writers Guild of America 
(WGA) demanded a cut of these profits through residual compensation schemes (Balio, 
1990). MCA also decided to purchase all of Paramount's old films (made prior to the 
Paramount consent decree of 1948) for $50 million in 1957 (equal to $397.1 million in 2011), 
considered to be a good deal for Paramount at the time, and impressively made an 
estimated $1 billion off it as consumers developed a taste for old films via television. MCA 
expanded its entertainment interests when it acquired Decca Records for an inexpensive 
$11.25 million in 1959 ($85.3 million in 2011), a company which seemed to be nearing 
liquidation. But Decca Records owned Universal Pictures Company, a motion picture studio 
which enabled Wasserman to now also produce new motion pictures. This acquisition saw 
Wasserman's company expand into the world's first entertainment conglomerate consisting 
of a talent agency, a television production department, an old-movie library and a motion 
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picture studio. Bruck (2003) writes that Wasserman's foresight into the success of television 
and his belief in collaboration between different sectors in the entertainment industry 
enabled MCA to become the dominant producer and distributor of television content in the 
world by 1960.  
 
While the hub of television production as dominated by NBC, ABC and CBS found itself in 
New York by the end of the 1950s, this centre of influence gradually started migrating to 
Hollywood in Los Angeles as film studios started utilising television as a distribution channel 
for their own products. Scott (2004) writes that a so-called "New Hollywood" organisational 
structure developed over the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the marriage between 
television-program production and the motion picture production - an industry structure far 
different to the autocratic mass production studio system of the “Golden Age”. 
Deregulatory measures implemented in 1991 opened the door for networks of every type to 
not only broadcast television programs but also to produce them in-house rather than 
purchase them from auxiliary production companies - an example of how legislation can 
enable industry growth rather than inhibit it due to a fear-motivation (Cantor and Cantor, 
1992).  
 
Emulating MCA's example of the 1960s, most Hollywood studios now form part of what 
Currah (2007) terms a "concentrated oligopolistic structure", an industry configuration 
demonstrated in Table 7, adapted from Young, Gong and Van der Stede(2008) and Scott 
(2004). The Hollywood production hierarchy has since the 1960s been governed by a 
handful of major media and entertainment companies which constitute various different 
specialised divisions including motion picture and television show production. Even though 
the filmed entertainment sector's economic geography has shifted over the past fifty years, 
the chief corporations involved in film production have essentially remained the same, 
albeit with numerous changes in title and ownership as well as the expansion of their 
entertainment portfolios. Six large motion picture studios, colloquially termed 'majors', 
comprise the core of the filmed entertainment sector today: Walt Disney Pictures, 20th 
Century Fox Film Production, Warner Bros. Pictures, Columbia Pictures, Paramount Pictures 
and Universal Pictures. Large, vertically integrated global companies, who each boast a 
broad portfolio of media and entertainment businesses, own these film studios, who 
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account for about 90% of revenues in the United States (Young, Gong and Van der Stede, 
2008). The majors are gradually being integrated into even bigger and more complex 
multinational media conglomerates as evidenced by Sony's acquisition of MGM in 2004, 
Paramount Pictures' acquisition of DreamWorks in 2005 and Walt Disney Pictures' 
acquisition of Pixar Animation in 2006 (Currah, 2006). Each of these major motion picture 
studios has subsidiary studios which produce small- and medium-budget movies. The film 
and television production landscape is completed with a myriad of smaller independent 
companies, colloquially called 'independents', who sometimes partner with the majors with 
regards to financing or creative collaboration. 
 
Table 7: The Major MPAA Motion Picture Studios, Major Subsidiary Studios, Distributors and Television 
Production Facilities for Media Conglomerates 
Major Studios 
Major Subsidiary 
Studios 
Distributors 
Television 
Broadcasters 
Parent 
Corporations 
Walt Disney Pictures  Miramax Films 
 Pixar Animation 
 Touchstone Pictures 
Buena Vista 
International, Inc. 
 ABC Productions 
 Touchstone Television   
Productions 
 Walt Disney Television 
Network 
The Walt Disney 
Company 
20th Century Fox Film 
Corporation 
 Fox Searchlight 20th Century Fox 
International 
Corporation 
  20th Century Fox 
Television 
 
 
News Corporation 
 
 
Warner Bros. Pictures  New Line Cinema Warner Bros. Pictures 
International Theatrical 
Distribution 
 HBO Downtown 
Productions 
 Warner Bros. 
Television 
 TBS Productions 
Time Warner 
 
 
Columbia Pictures 
MGM 
United Artists 
 Screen Gems 
 Sony Pictures Classics 
Columbia TriStar 
Motion Picture Group 
 Columbia TriStar 
Television 
 
 
Sony Corporation 
 
 
Paramount Pictures  DreamWorks Pictures 
 Paramount Vantage 
Paramount Pictures 
Corporation 
 CBS Productions 
 BET Television 
Productions 
 
Viacom, Inc. 
 
 
Universal Pictures  Focus Features Universal International 
Films, Inc. 
 NBC Studios 
 Universal Television 
 
General Electric 
Company 
 
 
 
Film studios obtain revenue from television stations for content leased or sold to them. 
Television stations' revenues, conversely, are largely modelled on the radio broadcasting 
sector's business model as it also depends on advertisers buying programming time. As with 
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radio, television broadcasters sell programming time to advertisers by utilising the concepts 
of gross rating points, reach and frequency. These terms were defined in section 5.1 of this 
chapter. The percentage of switched on television sets tuned to one particular show is 
reflected in the following formula: share = 100 x rating/HUT, where HUT refers to the 
number of homes using television during a certain part of day (Vogel, 2011). For example, in 
South Africa the three SABC channels command a 90% share on average 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). The greater the share a television program has while 
airing, the more attractive the proposition for marketers to advertise during the broadcast 
of that show. Therefore the television networks with the most popular programs attract the 
biggest audiences, enabling them to put a premium on advertising spots during the 
broadcasting of these programs. As is the case with radio broadcasters, measurement 
companies like the AC Nielsen Company determine ratings for prime-time shows from a 
statistically selected sample of 10 000 American homes by means of meters connected to 
their television sets, VCRs, satellite dishes and cable boxes. Marketers wanting to advertise 
via television are interested in shows which either have high ratings according to the Nielsen 
television index, or those which provide reach among a specific target market with regards 
to demographics. For example, beer companies typically advertise during sports-events 
programs, while toy manufacturers might typically prefer to buy advertising time on 
children's programs. Local news broadcasts and daytime television shows with their large 
viewer bases command the highest premium on advertising time, and consequently 
represent the largest source of revenue for television stations (Steinberg, 2005). Advertising 
dollars, as well as constructive US government regulations, enabled UHF television to 
become financially viable and the three major television networks to earn profits during the 
1970s, finally ushering them into a sensation phase of prosperity. Figure 17 illustrates how 
advertising expenditure via the medium of television has increased from the 1970s to the 
mid-2000s. Interestingly, while radio advertising has consistently controlled an average 
share of 7% of total advertising dollars spent in the USA since the 1960s until now, 
television's share has increased from 14% up to 25% while newspaper advertising's share 
has decreased from 32% to about 17% of total advertising dollars spent for the same period 
(Vogel, 2011). 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
118 
 
 
Figure 17: Annual Television Advertising Expenditures in the USA per Category: 1970-2005 with 2010 
forecast 
 
Although national and local advertisements represent the greatest source of revenue for 
television stations, stations also receive some compensation from the networks with whom 
they are affiliated. Each of the major television networks has nearly 200 affiliate stations 
who for the most part broadcast regularly scheduled shows produced by their parent-
network along with content produced by outside contractors. The affiliate stations receive 
compensation to broadcast scheduled national programming which is provided by their 
parent network free of charge. Conventional income and expense category proportions for a 
typical television station are displayed in Table 8 (Vogel, 2011): 
 
 
 
1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010*
Major TV Networks $1,658 $5,130 $9,863 $11,600 $15,888 $16,128 $20,486 
Cable networks $0 $45 $2,000 $4,500 $11,765 $18,296 $23,240 
Syndication $0 $50 $1,109 $2,016 $3,108 $3,865 $4,909 
Spot (national) $1,234 $3,269 $7,788 $9,119 $12,264 $10,040 $12,753 
Spot (local) $704 $2,967 $7,856 $9,985 $13,542 $14,260 $18,113 
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Table 8: Typical Television Station Income and Expenses in Percent, by Major Categories 
Total Time Sales (Income)  Expenses 
Network compensation 
National and regional 
 advertisements 
Local advertisements 
7.5% 
47.5% 
 
      45.5% 
 
 
100.0% 
 Engineering 
Program and Production 
News 
Sales 
Advertisements and promotions 
General and administrative 
11.5% 
25.5% 
13.5% 
12.5% 
4.0% 
      33.0% 
100.0% 
 
Along with its smaller affiliates, NBC, CBS and ABC today each own and operate at least ten 
sizeable television stations in the foremost cities in the USA - New York, Los Angeles and 
Chicago. When the number of affiliates it licensed content to reached 25 in more than 10 
states in the late 1990s, News Corporation-owned Fox Broadcasting Company (FOX) joined 
these networks to become the fourth major network in the USA. The organisation of and 
interaction between the different role-players of the television broadcasting sector is 
exhibited in Figure 18, adapted from Owen, Beebe and Manning (1974): 
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Figure 18: Organisation of the Television Broadcasting Sector 
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In summary, the film industry entered a phase of sensation when it ultimately recognised 
that entertainment consumers were fond of the notion of watching films at home rather 
than just at theatres, and growth of the television broadcasting sector only escalated when 
the studios altered their business models and started capitalising on this trend in the mid-
1900s. By using similar resources and expertise needed to create feature films, the movie 
studios' business model centred on pre-recording television programs which could be aired 
at a later stage, while broadcasters in New York specialised in the production of shows that 
were aired in real-time in front of live audiences. Whereas 60% of network programming 
was still produced by the principal television networks in New York in the 1960s, the filmed 
entertainment sector in Southern California today oversees the production of over 90% of 
network programming as a result of film studios' embracing of the disruptive technology 
called television (Scott, 2004). By embracing a new business model which included the 
production of original television programmes in conjunction with the broadcast of 
previously-produced motion pictures, Hollywood conquered its antagonism towards 
television broadcasting and did so profitably: Hollywood conglomerates today control the 
major share of filmed content of all consumers worldwide (Datamonitor, 2010). Scott (2004) 
mentions that the success of Hollywood's amendments to its value chain and the resultant 
system is "under-girded by webs of associates, institutions and social networks that help to 
consolidate the powerful streams of agglomeration economies that emanate from it." 
Supported by these established collaborative partnerships among different companies along 
the television broadcasting value chain with their immense experience and vast inventories 
of programs, the global television subscription market is forecasted to be a $258.2 billion 
industry by 2015, as illustrated in Figure 19  (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010a). The South 
African television market, estimated to grow at CAGR of 9.9%, will be a R30.9 billion industry 
by 2015 with satellite television penetration expected to rise to 66% of HUT for the same 
year (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011) as demonstrated in Figure 20 and Table 9. 
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Figure 19: Global Television Market: 2006-2015 with forecasted 2011-15 CAGR = 7.0% 
 
 
 
Figure 20: South African Television Market: 2006-2015 with forecasted 2011-15 CAGR = 9.9% 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015*
Market $141.8 $152.9 $166.7 $178.3 $203.1 $217.1 $232.3 $248.5 $265.9 $285.2
% change 8.6% 7.8% 9.0% 7.0% 13.9% 6.9% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.2%
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Table 9: South African Subscription Television Growth: 2006-2015 
Subscription Television Households 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015* CAGR 
Subscription households 
(in millions) 
1.67 1.80 1.95 2.40 3.00 3.55 4.00 4.30 4.55 4.75  
% change 9.9% 7.8% 8.3% 23.1% 25.0% 18.3% 12.7% 7.5% 5.8% 4.4% 9.6% 
Subscription 
penetration of HUT (%) 
24.9% 26.5% 28.5% 34.8% 43.2% 50.7% 56.7% 60.6% 63.6% 66.0%  
 
 
Television audiences continue embracing programming as scheduled by the networks and 
90% of American households already owned television sets by 1970. Television penetration 
in the USA has since increased to more than 98% of households (Motion Picture Association 
of America, 2009), pushing TV to the end of its technology life cycle. Yet regardless of the 
continued growth of the global television broadcasting sector, content producers have yet 
again been forced to reassess the sustainability of their business model as technology 
enabling the digitalisation of video files have gained user adoption since the mid-2000s. The 
sensation phase during which television broadcasters and film studios have been enjoying 
prosperity is being challenged as consumer behaviour changes from taking pleasure in 
standardised one-to-many programming via TV sets, to enjoying more focused, niche 
content via MSOs and cable, to preferring an individualised video-on-demand (VOD) viewing 
experience via more than just one particular device. According to Berman, Duffy and 
Shipnuch (2006), the filmed entertainment sector is confronted with unparalleled levels of 
complexity as telecommunications firms and Internet companies like YouTube and Hulu 
recognised the change in entertainment consumer behaviour and started addressing 
viewers' needs. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, sensation phases for a 
technology only last as long as incumbent companies remain unprejudiced towards 
technologies which may potentially disrupt their industries. Content producers would do 
well to again choose to make provision for consumer preferences as film studios did when 
they altered their business model with the invention of television as just discussed in this 
section.  
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5.3 Filmed Entertainment and VCR/DVD 
The Lion King, the movie mentioned as an example in the introduction to this chapter, is just 
one of numerous films which have enabled film studios to profit from video recording 
technology and their decision to finally adopt the VCR rather than contend with 
manufacturers thereof out of fear. Compiled from the seven most-recent Pixar-produced 
films, Table 10 and Figure 21 show the extent to which this studio has benefitted financially 
from having VCR and DVD as distribution channels supplementary to cinema screens (The 
Numbers, 2011a).  
 
Table 10: Box Office and Home Video Revenue for Disney-Pixar Movies: 2003-2011 
Release 
Date 
Movie Name Budget US Gross 
Worldwide 
Gross  
Home Video 
Revenue in USA 
2003 Finding Nemo $94.0 million $339.7 million $867.9 million $300.0 million 
2004 The Incredibles $92.0 million $261.4 million $632.9 million Not Available  
2006 Cars $70.0 million $244.1 million $461.9 million $247.2 million 
2007 Ratatouille $150.0 million $205.5 million $620.5 million $189.2 million 
2008 Wall-E $180.0 million $223.8 million $532.7 million $142.7 million 
2009 UP $175.0 million $293.0 million $731.3 million $182.0 million 
2010 Toy Story 3 $200.0 million $415.0 million $1.064 billion $184.9 million 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Stacked Chart Illustrating Significant Contribution of Revenue from Video/DVD/Blue-Ray 
Sales for Pixar Films 
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While studios carry all production and advertising costs themselves yet share profits gained 
through film admissions with a whole range of role-players, illustrated by Figure 22, DVD 
profits go directly to studios themselves (Elberse and Anand, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a matter of fact, video recording technology does not merely represent a lucrative 
distribution channel for studios, but has sometimes even prevented great losses for studios 
when neither American nor international box office receipts could cover production 
expenditure at the end of a theatrical run. For example, 2002's Treasure Planet is 
undisputedly regarded as a box office failure when assessing its theatrical performance on 
The Numbers website (2011b). Treasure Planet cost The Walt Disney Company $100 million 
to produce and a further $30 million to market, while only earning $38 million in the United 
States and $54 million at the global box office during its run, indicating a substantial loss of 
approximately $38 million for the studio in 2002 - a damaging anomaly for big-budget 
animated films. Revenue equalling $64 million from home videos in the United States, 
however, ensured that Disney could at least cover its expenses and make a small profit from 
Treasure Planet after all despite its disappointing performance at the box office, albeit 
negligible when compared to what can be earned by animated films such as Pixar's.  
 
Yet many years before VCRs and DVD players became the main ancillary platform for filmed 
content it had not occurred to film studio executives that they could capture this 
distribution channel for themselves rather than just allow technology companies to sell 
VCRs to the public and expect consumers to buy blank videotapes from retailers on the 
Figure 22: Division of Income Earned per Movie Ticket with Studio Breakdown 
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periphery. External entrepreneurs and not studios themselves, Meza (2007) notes, came up 
with the ideas which later formed the foundation of video rental market which disrupted 
the filmed entertainment sector. A video-equipment entrepreneur called Andre Blay from 
Farmington Hills in Michigan established the first start-up which rented videos to the public, 
thus becoming another XBD in the narrative of how the VCR has altered the film industry. 
According to Lardner (1987), Blay recognised the opportunity of a market for renting movies 
on pre-recorded tapes when technology companies achieved incremental innovation 
enabling videotapes to record content longer than two hours. In 1976, concurrent to the 
time when the lawsuit between Universal and Sony was contracting great controversy, Blay 
pitched his idea in what Lardner terms a "cold call letter" to the CEO of every major 
Hollywood studio (other than Universal), requesting the studios to award him the rights to 
sell their films on videotape (1987). Only two of the studios replied, of which just one was a 
positive response. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer declined to sell the rights to their movies to Blay 
as MGM contemplated on selling videos as well in the future, but having already tested the 
market, FOX agreed to sell their rights to Blay, albeit only of films more than four years old 
and which have already been licensed to television networks. Signed in 1977, the FOX deal 
required that Blay pay the studio an advance of $300 000 in addition to the minimum of 
$500 000 payable per year against a royalty on each tape sold to him for $7.50. Financing his 
new company with a bank loan, Blay acquired fifty titles such as The French Connection and 
Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid and started selling them in the name of the Video Club 
of America - the very first video store ever opened (Young, Gong and Van der Stede, 2010). 
Andre Blay's idea of selling FOX's videotapes proved to be an immediate success. After 
placing an advertisement in the TV Guide magazine, Blay's pre-recorded videotape 
production equipment had to run at full capacity for 24 hours a day in order to meet 
consumer demand, reaching a maximum throughput of 24 000 VHS and Betamax 
videotapes a month. Consumers seemed unfazed by the high selling price of $50 per 
videocassette at the time. Lardner (1987) writes that more than 250 000 videotapes had 
been sold by the Video Club of America by the end of 1978. 
 
The popularity of video sales led the way for another entrepreneur XBD to start the video 
rental business in the USA. George Atkinson conceived of this business initiative while 
reading about Blay's success in the newspaper. Atkinson already possessed some business 
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acumen as to how a rental concern works as his Los Angeles-based business focused on 
renting old projectors, screens and classic films to consumers for $25 an evening. Atkinson 
tested his idea by placing a "Video for Rent" advertisement in the Los Angeles Times, giving 
readers the opportunity to send him requests for specific films. Meza (2007) writes that 
although Atkinson did not actually have any stock at the time, he was flooded by responses 
from his advertisement in the LA Times just a week after its placement. With a mere capital 
investment of $10 000, George Atkinson officially opened the very first video rental store 
(Young, Gong and Van der Stede, 2010), buying Andre Blay's videos as consumers requested 
specific titles. 
 
With the MPAA unable to provide clarity as to whether it was actually legal to rent out 
videos originally sold for private viewing exclusively and the non-existence of substantial 
barriers to entry, many opportunists followed in Atkinson’s footsteps and established rental 
businesses in the USA and UK. The business model of choice for these rental concerns 
centred on membership contracts, a tactic which both provided up-front capital for buying 
new cassettes and reduced the risk of patrons stealing them. Only after the popularity of 
video rentals became apparent and selling prices of video players themselves decreased 
following Matsushita’s success over Sony’s Betamax (as described in Chapter 3) did studios 
follow suit (Lardner, 1987). Their first attempt to enter the new market was unsuccessful as 
film studios failed to entice video rental entrepreneurs to first lease videos from them for a 
season before renting it out to the public as an alternative to buying cassettes permanently. 
Klopfenstein (1985) writes that film studios decided to adopt a different business model in 
their attempt to profit from the nascent video rental sector: a two-tiered pricing system. 
With this approach older films were sold to entertainment consumers at discount prices 
(sell-through) while sales of newer titles were specifically aimed at the rental market, at a 
premium. Hollywood Video and Blockbuster started opening franchised stores and their 
video rental chains eventually outnumbered the independent rental concerns in the USA.  
 
The popularisation of revenue sharing contracts between film studios and the major video 
chains in 1998 led to the establishment of a new business model in an attempt to further 
maximise profits from this ancillary market.  Mortimer (2008) writes that while the 
traditional method of distributing movies to value chain store operators involved the 
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procurement of videocassettes at a fixed linear price from film studios regardless of the 
popularity of the title, they could buy movies for a tenth of the rental market price under a 
revenue sharing plan on condition of sharing a percentage of rental revenues with film 
studios. These percentages were dependent on how well the particular film performed at 
the box office. Video chains were also allowed to sell older titles to consumers to recover 
capital expenditure under this agreement.  
  
The introduction of the DVD format to the media and entertainment industry has greatly 
impacted the profitability of the home video market for studios. Mortimer (2008) states that 
producing, packaging and distributing a pre-recorded videocassette tape cost approximately 
US$2, and film studios could expect to sell movies on VHS tapes for US$9 apiece Vogel 
(2011). Adding marketing costs of about US$4 a profit of US$3 on videocassette sell-through 
could be obtained. When one compares the cost breakdown and selling price of a movie on 
DVD, as displayed in Table 11, with that of a movie on VHS, it is observable that twice as 
much profit could be made from selling DVDs than videocassettes (Currah, 2006). The 
profitability of digitalised films sold over P2P networks is also displayed in Table 11: 
 
Table 11: Typical economics of DVD sales and digital sales for a “typical” feature film 
Cost and profit 
DVD Sale, in 
US$  
Digital Sale, in US$ 
Centralised 
Model 
Decentralised 
Model 
Reproduction 1 0 0 
Distribution 1 0.75 0.25 
Marketing 4 4 2 
Guild payments 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Total costs 6.75 5.50 3 
Price (sold by studio) 16 12-15 12-15 
Profit 8.25 6.50-9.50 9-12 
Profit margin 55% 54%-63% 75%-80% 
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DVD’s profitability coupled with significant consumer adoption provided an incentive for 
film studios to exchange the revenue sharing contract model for an ordinary consumer 
purchase model again allowing video chains to buy DVDs at US$15 wholesale. Even though 
revenue sharing was lucrative for both film studios and the rental chains for more than 20 
years, Vogel (2011) states that the decision of studios to focus on the sell-through market 
with the advent of DVD provided to a profitability structure more favourable to studios in 
the long run. As a continuation of Figure 10 on page 94, Figure 23 shows the effect of DVD 
on VHS sales after its introduction to the home video market in 1997 but before the 
commercialisation of Blue-Ray disks in 2006, with DVD sale and rental revenues finally 
overtaking that of VHS in 2002: 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Increase in Total VHS tape & DVD revenues in American homes: 1996-2006 
 
Observable from Figure 23 is that revenues from home video market have slightly decreased 
from 2005 onwards. In subsequent years it has become even clearer that the DVD market 
has approached maturity with the emergence of home entertainment modes centred on 
digital sales and rentals (Currah, 2007).  
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Table 11 shows that profit margins for studios are potentially much higher for electronic 
distribution of videos because packaging and distribution costs are now negligible. The 
Entertainment Merchants Association (2011) reports that spending in the American home 
video market totalled US$18.8 billion in 2010 while PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010a) writes 
that total spending in the home video market globally reached US$51.1 billion for the same 
year as displayed in  Figure 24: 
 
 
 
 Figure 24: Global Total Home Video Market: 2006-2015 with forecasted 2011-15 CAGR = 4.3% 
 
Even though a slight decline in American expenditure in the home video market has been 
noticed since the mid-2000s and the importance of video chain retailers somewhat reduced 
with PPV and VOD becoming more viable internationally, there is no doubt that the ancillary 
market created through video recording technology has forever altered the income 
structure of the entire filmed entertainment sector at large, with the home video market 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015*
Electronic $1,486 $2,275 $3,098 $4,037 $5,281 $6,655 $8,075 $9,507 $10,81 $12,08
In-store rentals $16,04 $16,09 $15,29 $15,34 $15,44 $15,44 $15,37 $15,35 $15,27 $15,14
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continuing to represent a significantly greater portion of profits for this sector than its 
primary theatrical market.  
 
Excluding the anticipated positive effect of PPV and VOD technologies from the likes of 
MultiChoice’s DStv and TopTV in the future, the filmed entertainment sector in South Africa 
is expected to be a R3 billion industry by 2012 as illustrated in Figure 25, with the home 
video market contributing well over R1.7 billion to this figure according to the South African 
division of PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010b and 2011).  
 
 
 
Figure 25: South African Filmed Entertainment Sector: 2006-2015 with forecasted 2011-15 CAGR = 4.5% 
 
5.4 Recorded Music and Filesharing Technology 
The 1950s to the 1970s marks a time period during which the recorded music sector saw 
noteworthy technological innovation. By that time performance rights management 
agencies like ASCAP and BMI in the USA and SESAC (Society of European Stage Authors and 
Composers) in Europe had become more stabilised and settled on similar royalty formulae 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015*
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as each other and 33 1/3 rpm-LPs, invented by CBS during the previous decade, had become 
popular as an alternative to slower configurations and even radio. Many independent 
companies joined major recording companies CBS, RCA and Decca as the cost of recording 
equipment decreased, only to be acquired in the 1960s by these majors then joined by 
PolyGram and Warner Communication. The smaller independent labels had been 
instrumental to the introduction of new music genres to mainstream America.  Not only did 
the major recording companies become more powerful by acquiring the small independents 
but, as was the case with the motion picture sector in the 1930s, they also underwent 
vertical integration as they became consolidated with record distribution companies. By 
readily embracing innovations such hi-fi stereo sound recording technology and the 
portable tape cassette player, the recorded music sector had entered a time of prosperity 
by the late 1970s. Vogel (2011) notes that industry sales had grown to $4 billion industry at 
that time ($14 billion in 2011) from $75 million before World War I ($1 billion in 2011) and 
$109 million in 1945 ($1.3 billion in 2011). When record sales suffered a definite dip in the 
early-1980s due to scanty quality control of vinyl pressings and an aging population base 
disinterested in new recordings, it was again the acceptance of a technological invention 
which reversed the negative trend and inspired entertainment consumers to purchase 
music: the CD, invented by Philips in 1983 (Rohlfs, 2001). These digitally encoded disks 
provided listeners with a sound which was completely free of distortion and instigated a 
growth in sales which reached an all-time high of about $14 billion again in the late-1990s, 
which translates to approximately $19 billion in 2011 (Recording Industry Association of 
America, 2009). However, as mentioned in section 4.4, recording companies became 
increasingly apprehensive that the controlled yet lucrative business model they employed 
was being threatened by increasing access to low-cost computers and the digitalisation of 
music files.  
 
Adapted from Cha and Rajgopal (2004) and CPS (2007), Figure 26 shows how the recorded 
music sector has traditionally been organised with the entire value chain dependent on the 
involvement of record labels. Record labels, according to Cha and Rajgopal, maintain 
extensive Artist and Repertoire (A&R) departments which are tasked with scouting for new 
musicians and developing their music to production quality. Garage bands are as likely to be 
signed on as are university graduates in music and, should this happen, record companies 
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will typically provide artists with a cash advance on performance royalties ranging from 
$150 000 to $1 million depending on how sellable the artist is. In addition to an A&R 
department, major record labels typically also employ their own manufacturing and 
distribution functions. CD production equipment and distribution infrastructure, although 
involving enormous capital expenditure at first, are advantageous for large production runs 
because of significant economies of scale (2004).  
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Vaccaro and Cohn (2004) summarise the traditional business model of the recorded music 
industry by stating that it is completely centred on the manufacturing of physical goods (CDs 
and DVDs) and the distribution thereof via brick-and-mortar stores, record clubs, on-line 
retailers and at live concerts. The estimated cost breakdown of a “typical” CD as released by 
a major recording company is displayed in Table 12, adapted from Vogel (2011): 
 
             Table 12: Typical economics of a “standard” major record label CD sold for $15.99, circa 2010 
Cost category US$ Percentage of 
Total 
Musician’ unions 0.16 1% 
Packaging / manufacturing 0.80 5% 
Distribution 0.96 6% 
Publishing royalties 0.80 5% 
Artists’ royalties 1.60 10% 
Marketing / promotion 2.40 15% 
Label overhead 2.88 18% 
Label profit 1.76 11% 
Retail overhead 3.84 24% 
Retail profit 0.80 5% 
Total 15.99 100% 
 
 
Four chief recording companies, all owned by international conglomerates, currently 
dominate the recorded music sector, and according to Bhattacharjee et al. (2007) these 
“majors” collectively account for more than 70% of the world music market. They are 
Universal Music Group, the world's biggest recording company with a global market share of 
25.5% in 2005, Sony Music Entertainment with a 21.5% share, followed by the Electric and 
Musical Industries (EMI) Group at 13.4% and the Warner Music Group at 11.3% 
(International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, 2005). Bhattacharjee et al. ascribe 
their influence to the fact that they don’t only exert considerable control when it comes to 
the recording of music albums but also with the distribution and promotion thereof, having 
access to strong financial support from their holding companies (2007).  
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An intricate series of mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and name changes characterises 
the global recorded music sector as it transformed into the four majors-dominated industry 
which it is today, one which the RIAA says “is part of a creative community that collectively 
exports more than $125 billion each year” (2011b). Notable shifts in the music industry 
which led to the establishment of the four major recording companies have been: 
 MCA’s acquisition of Decca Records in 1962, and with it, Universal Pictures, 
 Decca Records’s name change to MCA Music Entertainment Group in 1990 and then 
to Universal Music Group in 1996, 
 the acquisition of PolyGram by Seagram, Decca Records’s holding company, and its 
merger with Universal Music Group in 1998, 
 the establishment of Vivendi business unit Vivendi Universal Entertainment after the 
French conglomerate’s acquisition of Universal Studios from Seagram in 2000, 
 General Electric’s acquisition of an 80%-share of Vivendi Universal Entertainment in 
2004 (excluding its music recording division), leading to the formation of NBC 
Universal after GE merged its NBC unit with Vivendi Universal Entertainment, with 
Universal Music Group remaining a subsidiary of Vivendi itself, 
 the formation of CBS/Sony Records, a Japanese business JV between CBS and Sony in 
1968, 
 Sony Corporation of America’s acquisition of CBS Records in 1987 and the resulting 
name change to Sony Music Entertainment in 1991, 
 the establishment of a 50-50 JV between Sony and Bertelsmann Music Group (BMG) 
in 2004 and Sony’s subsequent acquisition of BMG’s 50% share in Sony BMG in 2008, 
 UK-based record label EMI’s acquisition by CitiGroup, an American financial services 
company, in 2011, 
 the 1990-merger between Warner Communications (originally called Warner Bros. 
Records) and Time Inc.  which led to the formation of Time Warner, 
 Time Warner’s merger with American ISP AOL in 2000, which led to the 
establishment of AOL Time Warner, a conglomerate which failed to acquire EMI in 
the early 2000s, 
 the sale of the music division of AOL Time Warner, Warner Music Group, to a group 
of independent investors in 2004, and 
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 the acquisition of Warner Music Group by international conglomerate Access 
Industries in 2011 (NBC Universal, 2011), (Christman, 2011), (The New York Times, 
1982). 
 
With the capability of converting audio files into MP3 format and personal computers 
becoming more ubiquitous to entertainment consumers a new business model in the 
recorded music sector emerged in the early 2000s with Napster as the first company to 
utilise it – one which Vaccaro and Cuhn term “the renegade business model” (2004). Based 
on the illegal sharing of content files over P2P networks, this business model incorporates 
two kinds of “native Internet” models: freeware and information barter or exchange. 
Lechner and Hummel (2002) opine that the offering of renegade content services by 
organisations like Napster, KaZaA and Limewire can legitimately be considered as business 
models “because of their contribution to economic value in the form of knowledge and 
content provided by the participants.” As mentioned in Chapter 3, the renegade business 
model was unsuccessful in ensuring profitability for Napster regardless of its 80-million 
strong user-base. Offering their content free of charge, other companies which utilise this 
business model support their endeavours through allowing unwanted advertisements, spam 
and pop-ups to be linked to their websites. A strong intention usually exists among 
companies utilising this business model to generate income from users themselves through 
premium services at a later stage (Vaccaro and Cohn, 2004). 
 
A business model dearth was caused by consumers’ frustration with limitations of the 
recorded music sector’s traditional business model and the fact that the renegade business 
model, centred on the development of filesharing technology, mostly operated illegally and 
prevented the sector from profiting from the creative content it produced. As discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4, music companies’ reaction to P2P filesharing technology and the 
renegade business model it operated on was one of protectionist fear, but Choi and Perez 
(2007) confirm that illegal filesharing has both “directly and indirectly” led to the recorded 
music sector’s realisation that it requires an improved business model should it satisfy 
consumers’ entertainment needs. But instead of developing just one ascendant business 
model which can replace the traditional and renegade business models of the past, 
Osterwalder (2010) suggests that success for the recorded music sector lies in a 
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combination of different business models: “While in the past the music industry was 
characterized by one dominant business model design (the one of the major recording 
companies), the future will be characterized by multiple competing business models.” Three 
such propositions may currently be observed: 
 An artist-centred business model, in which record labels, agents, A&R departments 
and expensive manufacturing companies are largely side-stepped because artists 
promote or manage themselves trough their websites or social network profiles, 
having direct contact with entertainment consumers and possibly choosing to sell 
their music directly to consumers on-line. 
 An application- or platform-based business model, in which music may be purchased 
in a digital format from specific websites, music applications on smartphones or 
tablet computers or via platform-specific software. 
 A subscription-based business model, which enables entertainment consumers to 
stream music for a monthly fee without having to actually buy songs – similar to 
internet radio, except that consumers have the ability to choose playlists themselves 
and without interruptions by radio presenters.  
 
The popularity and economic success of artist Justin Bieber serves as a case in point which 
illustrates the viability of the artist-centred business model as opposed to the traditional 
business model. Bieber gained a massive following in 2008 by posting performances of 
himself on YouTube and personally connecting with fans, without the consultation and 
financial aid of a record label or A&R department. He was only signed to a record company 
in mid-2009 and has since been labelled as “the king of the internet” due to garnering the 
most celebrity searches on search engines and the most plays of all YouTube videos of all 
time – 631 million views versus professional artist Lady Gaga’s 417 million as calculated in 
October 2011 (ReadWriteWeb, 2011b). Even much-derided artist Rebecca Black has 
managed to benefit from this business model after a YouTube video of hers went viral in 
early-2011, allowing her to earn at least $25 000 per week through digital sales (Forbes, 
2011). Without agent representation, Black manages herself through her titular website. In 
conjunction with social network profiles such as those on the abovementioned YouTube, 
websites like myspace.com/music, iLike.com, last.fm and OurStage.com enable burgeoning 
artists to connect with and distribute their content to entertainment consumers themselves, 
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thereby utilising an artist-centred business model. OurStage.com in particular describes 
itself as an integrative “community for artists hungry for exposure, music lovers with 
insatiable appetites and industry professionals committed to bringing incredible talent to 
the people – a digital platform where musicians get discovered (Ourstage, 2011).” As was 
the case with Justin Bieber, Scheibel (2011) mentions that major record labels now typically 
explore user generated content for potentially-successful talent, also making the artist-
centred business model a beneficial intermediary to the traditional record music business 
model. 
 
The subscription-based model was the first alternative business model which recording 
companies started experimenting with in December 2001 after the successful lawsuit 
against Napster, a tactic which Burgelman and Grove (2007) declare “an inertial strategic 
response on the part of music companies.” Choi and Perez(2007) substantiate this claim by 
stating that both PressPlay and MusicNet, the first two subscription offerings presented to 
entertainment consumers, were flawed due to high initial subscription fees, software not 
being user-friendly, very limited catalogues of songs and the fact that neither service 
offered content from all the major record companies, requiring consumers to register for 
both services if they wanted access to songs from all their favourite artists. However, the 
predominant reason for the initial failure of this business model was that PressPlay and 
MusicNet offered their registered members content in file formats which rendered it 
impossible to be written onto CDs, sent between PCs or even transferred to portable MP3 
players.  
 
A business model which has gained traction with recording companies, as it is largely 
responsible for the 1000% increase in digital music revenues from 2004 to 2010 (Internation 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry, 2011), is the application- or platform-based model. 
Regardless of the fact that it wasn’t the very first online digital music store, this business 
model has been popularised by Apple’s iTunes software – the chief motivation behind 
Burgelman and Grove’s branding of Apple as an XBD (2007). According to The Berkman 
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, Apple succeed in presenting iTunes 
to entertainment consumers in 2003 as a sensible alternative to PressPlay and MusicNet 
because it was the first service which offered content from all the major record labels à la 
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carte and because no subscription fees were charged (2004). With content priced at $0.99 
per song, speedy access to content via a user-friendly interface which resembles P2P 
filesharing websites, the convenience of not visiting brick-and-mortar stores to buy CDs and 
the easy integration between the iTunes Store and a user’s iPod, Apple had become the “the 
pacesetter in the digital music marketplace” with more than 70 million downloads in its first 
year of operation (The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, 
2004). 
 
Apple has since 2004 extended its product line by introducing entertainment consumers to 
its iPhone (smartphone) and iPad (tablet computer) ranges, which also utilise iTunes as a 
portal for purchasing multimedia content. Adapted from Osterwalder (2010), the platform-
based business model which Apple employs to sell its products and grant users access to 
multimedia content is illustrated in Figure 27: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: The Apple iTunes Business Model 
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Apple had invested heftily in R&D, utilised its core competency in software development 
and ultimately succeeded in entering a sensation phase with its iPod and iTunes software 
whereas offerings by traditional recording companies failed because of its heavy focus on 
eradicating piracy rather than providing a customer-centred solution to a need for 
ubiquitous access to content. Choi and Perez (2007) agree that technology companies like 
Apple have presented legitimate business models which changed the equilibrium of the 
recorded music sector because they had dared to relinquish industrial silo thinking and 
converged with other markets and industries. They opine that “companies who understand 
[the pattern of piracy pioneering new technologies, new market insight and market 
communities] and take advantage of the innovation offered by piracy have created 
substantial economic value.” Burgelman and Grove (2007) motivate Apple as a strong 
substantiation of cross-boundary theory exactly because of these reasons: 
 Through studying the underlying reasons why consumers responded frantically to 
filesharing technology, Steve Jobs, former chief executive of Apple, recognised that 
the key competence in the recorded music and consumer electronics sectors had 
shifted to software, whereas hardware like CD players, tape decks and LP players 
had determined how music would be enjoyed before mass-adoption of the PC. While 
Sony possessed industrial design and mechanical engineering acumen, Apple was 
well-acquainted with software design and developed its iPod around iTunes store 
(and subsequently is iPad around software applications and the iTunes store). 
 Apple recognised that for convergence between consumer electronics, computing 
and the recorded music sector to take place, it had to develop its hardware and 
software under one roof and ensure that royalties were paid to recording companies. 
Hardware companies had previously outsourced its software development to other 
companies, and little collaboration between technology companies and content-
delivering companies in the entertainment industry existed. 
 Apple focussed heavily on design, ease of use and brand appeal with its products, 
employing a customer-centric approach to which entertainment consumers have 
responded well – most of Apple’s products now begin with the letter “i” and have 
subsequently become commodities in the consumer electronics industry. 
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In 2011, Apple and its contemporary competitor, Amazon, both rolled out cloud computing 
services in the form of iCloud and Cloud Drive which enable consumers’ content to be 
stored on virtual servers rather than locally on hard drives, and wirelessly pushes it to all 
registered devices (Apple Inc., 2011). Cloud computing makes consumers’ content 
ubiquitous on all their devices and eliminates the necessity of uploading one content file 
multiple times on different platforms as was required in the past, a feat which has led to an 
increase in MP3 sales, according to ReadWriteWeb (2011a). Along with subscription-based 
business models, which have since regained popularity in the form of Spotify and 
Grooveshark – which stream content for a set monthly fee rather than selling downloadable 
songs one-by-one – digital channels accounted for 29% of total global revenues in the 
recorded music in 2010 to the equivalent of $4.6 billion (Internation Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry, 2011). As displayed in Figure 28, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010a) 
rates the contribution of digital channels even higher at $7.1 billion or 30.7% of total global 
revenues: 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Global Recorded Music Sector: 2006-2015 with forecasted 2011-15 CAGR = -1.1% 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 2014* 2015*
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Physical Distribution R 29,8 R 25,7 R 21,4 R 18,6 R 16,2 R 14,1 R 12,7 R 11,5 R 10,5 R 9,70
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A study of the South African recorded music sector reveal a similar trend of decreasing 
record sales as is the case worldwide, but with a 187% growth of digital sales from 2006 to 
2010 and a further forecasted growth of 25.4% between 2011 and 2015, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) predicts that the sale of digital albums will offset the 
decline in physical spending by 2015. Figure 29 exhibits the decline and projected growth of 
the South African recorded music sector from 2006 to 2015: 
 
 
 
Figure 29: South African Recorded Music Sector: 2006-2015 with forecasted 2011-15 CAGR = 0.1% 
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Technology adoption of the Internet in South Africa, as the vehicle for digital distribution, 
has taken place at a much slower pace than elsewhere due to infrastructure constraints and 
the socio-economic profile of the country. Figure 30 displays the estimated Internet usage in 
South Africa from 2000 to 2010, including a forecast for 2011, according to Internet World 
Stats (2009), World Wide Worx (2010) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011): 
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Figure 30: The Internet in South Africa: Absolute Number of Users and Household Penetration: 2000-2011 
 
World Wide Worx (2010) states that the following factors elicited growth in Internet 
adoption in South Africa between 2007 and 2010: 
 The installation of the Seacom major undersea cable along South Africa’s coastline in 
2009: Fibre-optic capacity in South Africa is almost 300 times greater post-Seacom. 
 License grants: More than 400 South African enterprises have been granted licenses 
from the Electronic Communications Network Service in this time, enabling Internet 
service providers to construct their own networks and to choose between a range of 
providers and rather than being dependent on acquiring network access from just 
one of the major telecommunications companies. Services provided by 
telecommunication companies are now customised and repackaged by smaller 
service providers according to individual specifications, prompting traditional 
providers to reduce prices on their services thus creating a more competitive.  
 Broadband penetration: Many small and medium enterprises are exchanging 
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broadband connection is officially defined as “an always available, multimedia 
connection with a download speed of at least 256kbps (Vermeulen, 2011).”  Internet 
access is being extended to more employees than just managers and in the process 
the Internet user base increases with 20 people for every one migration from a dial-
up connection. 
 
An additional four factors will contribute to exponential Internet penetration in South Africa 
in the coming years, enabling not only greater access to media and entertainment content, 
but also giving consumers the opportunity to connect with each other via social networks 
and providing them with the technology to share local content: 
 100% Broadband penetration in South Africa: South Africa’s Department of 
Communication has recently promised to provide access to broadband Internet for 
all South Africans by 2020, an ambitious endeavour which will lead to the creation of 
1 million ICT jobs, according to the Department’s roll-out plan, and broadband 
coverage for the entire South African population (Vermeulen, 2011).  
 The ubiquity and accessibility of cellular telephones which have the Internet 
connectivity: There are currently 47.5 million mobile telephone subscribers in South 
Africa. Spending on mobile Internet access will increase from R7.8 billion in 2010 to 
R22.5 billion in 2015, with 17.5 million South Africans expected to have mobile 
broadband Internet access, according to forecasts from PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2011). Users with Internet access via their cellular telephones will represent 77% of 
total Internet users in South Africa by 2015. 
 Convergence between technology companies and television content companies in 
South Africa: The South African government plans to switch from analogue to digital 
terrestrial television (DTT) by 2013, an act which will enable television audiences to 
access VOD services more easily and to connect to social network sites like Facebook 
and YouTube via their televisions through offerings from SouthTel, DStv, TopTV and 
the SABC itself, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) and Beach (2011). 
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 Increasing connection speeds and broadband capacity in South Africa as well as the 
rest of Africa: As displayed in Figure 31, the average connection speed in South 
Africa has nearly doubled between 2007 and 2011 (Muller, 2011). The 
abovementioned 1.28 Terabits per second (Tb/s) Seacom cable, along with other 
planned undersea cables which will be installed around Africa in the future, are 
displayed in Figure 32. The thickness of the lines in Figure 32 represents the 
capacities of these different cables which enable Internet Access to Africa, relative to 
one another. The West Africa Cable System (WACS) specifically, installed in 2011 but 
ready for commercial use only in 2012, has a capacity of 5.2 Tb/s, and will supply 
more broadband capacity to South Africa than the capacity of all currently-installed 
undersea fibre-optic cables combined. According to Song (2011), the Africa Coast to 
Europe (ACE) cable system will enhance broadband capacity in South Africa with the 
same capacity as WACS by the end of 2012, and that the planned installation of 
South Atlantic Express (SAex) cable system between South Africa, Angola and Brazil 
could enhance capacity with an additional 12.8 Tb/s. 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Increase in South African Internet Connection Speed: 2007-2011 
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Figure 32: Undersea Fibre-Optic Cables Providing Internet Access to Africa, adapted from Song (2011) 
 
5.6 Chapter Conclusion 
Although piracy has not been completely eradicated yet, it is clear that collaboration, rather 
than contention, between technology companies and entertainment companies have 
yielded economic value and innovative ways of distributing media content which would 
otherwise not have been feasible. As a discernable period in the process of technological 
change in the media and entertainment industry, the sensation phase described in this 
chapter occurred whenever organisations embraced disruptive innovations as complements 
and adopted new business models to incorporate these new technologies, rather than 
trying to outlaw their use through the legal system – which was often the case, as described 
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in previous chapters. Explored by this chapter, specific factors have contributed to 
continued organisational prosperity whenever new technologies have threatened the 
sustainability of incumbent companies and entertainment sectors: 
 A definite customer-focus: Radio, television, the VCR and the Internet all enjoyed 
speedy adoption by entertainment consumers regardless of musicians’ 
representative ASCAP’s aversion towards radio, movie studios’ fear that television 
and Sony’s Betamax VCR would destroy adversely affect their profitability and 
entertainment companies’ attempts to render filesharing technology illegal. 
Entertainment consumers have always dictated the way in which they wanted to 
enjoy content, whether it was through legal or illegal means, and the companies 
discussed in this chapter which achieved success were those who adapted their 
business models according to the requirements of their customers. Burgeoning social 
media sites have even increased the ability for content creators to engage with their 
consumers, and have led to success of such artists as Justin Bieber and television 
talent show winners. 
 Good or quality content: Even with more media options available, incumbent firms 
have almost always enjoyed success with their traditional business models when 
they offered quality content. Excluding ancillary markets, The Lion King and Finding 
Nemo still made $930.9 million and $867.9 million respectively through theatre 
ticket sales alone. Live performances continue to make money even after the 
inception of radio broadcasting, and the radio broadcasting sector has survived the 
introduction of physical music devices – still the sector with the highest profit margin 
due to its effectiveness as advertising medium. Artists Eminem and Lady Gaga still 
sold 2.5 million and 1.2 million copies of their newest CDs respectively in 2010, in 
contrast with full album sales of 852 000 and 884 000 copies of the same albums in 
digital format for the same year and excluding individual song downloads. Especially 
utilised by independent musicians, vinyl LP sales have actually increased to 2.8 
million between 2008 and 2010 as a niche market of music consumers realised 
certain content plays better in that format than on digital devices (Nielsen 
SoundScan, 2011). Even with the threat of piracy, TV shows like American Idol and 
Two and a Half Men still drew 25 million and 14.8 million viewers per episode in 
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2009/10, enabling the shows to make $32.4 million per 2-hour episode and $3.1 
million per 30-minute episode respectively (Forbes, 2010). 
 A willingness to alter organisational structures and business models: Some radio 
broadcasters, one of which is South Africa’s RSG, have adapted their business 
models to include the Internet as an additional distribution channel. As Currah (2007) 
writes, the entire filmed entertainment sector has been altered with the 
acknowledgement of television and video disk as enablers of viable ancillary markets. 
The increased conglomeration of this sector since the inception of these two 
innovations testifies of, among other things, film studios’ willingness to alter their 
organisational structures after they had recognised the possibility of new revenue 
streams in TV and the VCR. 
 Entrepreneurial ingenuity: BMI, Matsushita, RCA, Apple, Netflix and Redbox may all 
be described as cross-boundary disruptors in that it was their entrepreneurial 
ingenuity which not only created new entertainment markets or altered sector 
structures, but also led the way for incumbent companies to eventually adopt the 
new technologies and alter their business models to ensure sustained success along 
with them. 
 Convergence between media content and technology companies: Straubhaar, Larose 
and Davenport (2011) describe convergence in the context of entertainment as the 
“integration of mass media, computers, and telecommunications”. Collaboration 
between musicians, advertising agencies and radio broadcasters, and recently the 
Internet, has led to the creation of new markets and additional distribution channels 
for music. Farnsworth’s cathode ray picture tube technology has made way for LCD 
television screens originally designed for personal computers and MP3 players utilise 
hard drives, computer software and on-line stores to enhance the portable 
enjoyment of music. Partnerships between record labels, film studios and 
technology companies like Apple, Google and Netflix have enabled digital audio and 
video content to be sold over the Internet and played on PCs, tablets, MP3/MP4 
players, cellular telephones and television screens from one file, whereas content 
was previously restricted to particular platforms such as tape decks, CD players or 
television. Digitalisation from the 2000s onwards has especially enabled different 
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formats of content to be converted from analogue signals or film format into one 
which can be enjoyed on multiple platforms. 
 
A definite focus on entertainment consumers’ preferred ways of enjoying content, a 
sustained commitment to delivering quality content regardless of distribution channels, 
adaptability of organisational structures and business models, entrepreneurial ingenuity and 
a willingness to collaborate outside of enterprise and industry structures are all markings of 
the disruptive innovations which have transpired through a sensation phase of technological 
change. Growing Internet penetration and subsequent connectedness with the rest of the 
world especially through the ubiquity of cellular phones will enable South Africa and Africa 
to not only access digital content but also opportunity to employ the success factors 
identified in this phase of technological change. As a growing driver of spending in the 
media and entertainment industry as well as an enabler of inter-industry and intra-industry 
collaboration, the Internet will continue to affect business models in every sector in the 
media and entertainment industry as well as the way in which entertainment consumers 
and content producers engage with each other. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
―If the artistic and historical development of film and television are to be understood, then so 
must the peculiar marriage of art and technology which prevails in their operation. It is the 
involvement of twentieth-century technology which renders these media so unlike the other, 
older arts.‖ 
– Raymond Fielding, Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers 
 
 
This chapter provides a summarised overview of disruptive innovation management in the 
media and entertainment industry as documented by this study and suggests some 
possibilities for future research pertaining to this industry in the engineering management 
field. 
 
6.1 Document Overview 
In its Industrial Policy Action Plan composed for the period of 2010/11 to 2012/13, the 
South African Department of Trade and Industry (2010) identified the media and 
entertainment industry as a strategic sector in our country because of its growing 
contribution to economic development through both local and foreign investments, export 
opportunities and job creation potential, as well as the significant spill-over possibilities in 
industries like tourism and retail usually associated with emergent industries. Although 
listed as one of the sectors which can expect focussed development and broadened 
intervention from the government in the future, a lack of research and development is one 
of the notable constraints to ensuring the sustainability and competitiveness of local 
cultural industries. It is this deficiency and opportunity which this study seeks to address 
directly by means of a historical examination of disruptive innovations in the global media 
and entertainment industry, from a strategic and industry-level point of view, thereby 
providing a preparatory foundation for future research which will hopefully ensure a 
sustainable and competitive local industry. Justifying analysis on an industry-level, empirical 
research by McGahan and Porter (1997) revealed that industry effects account for more 
than 60% of profit variance in the Entertainment and Lodging economic sector. 
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As Crowston and Myers (2004) suggest, industry analyses may be conducted from three 
research perspectives: economic, institutional and social/cultural. By focusing on the 
structure of entertainment markets, products sold or services rendered by organisations in 
this industry, industry configuration, consumers and transactions between consumers and 
media firms, an economic research perspective was adopted by this study and economic 
data such as number of transactions, costs and profits utilised to execute this. Legal 
documents, court decisions and interpretations in academic journals were used to also 
study the media and entertainment industry from an institutional research perspective with 
the aim of providing insight on the regulatory frameworks which govern this industry and 
the organisations which regulate or constrain interactions with consumers and each other. 
This study also alluded to the organisational norms, beliefs and networks among 
entertainment companies resulting from technological change by utilising industry outlooks 
and expert opinions. These research approaches enabled the author to study several 
characteristics of industry transformation: structural changes in entertainment markets, 
changes in regulatory frameworks, changes in institutional arrangements and processes, as 
well as changes in social cultures and relations. 
 
Several research questions were employed and answered throughout this document to 
achieve the objective of this study: 
 
 Why is technology management an organisational necessity? 
In their book Technology Management: Text and International Cases, Harrison and Samson 
(2002) write that technology has become the chief attribute of competitiveness in the 
recent business context and predicted that it will probably become even more pervasive in 
the future, stating that “technology management is the ultimate battleground that will 
determine which companies and owners will be the winners and losers in the wealth 
creation game.” In this pursuit of creating value in the enterprise, Grant (2008) points to the 
vital importance of strategy implementation and organisations’ ability to provide an answer 
to one fundamental question pertaining to technology management: “How can a company 
create the conditions for nurturing innovation while planning the course of its 
development?” Based on a review of academic literature focusing on technological 
innovation as well as a range of case studies of organisations in a technology-based industry, 
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then, it has become clear that technology management has become an organisational 
necessity because of its vital role in firm competitiveness, and that it has to be integrated 
with a firm’s overall strategy, its organisational structure and the business models employed 
to sell its products and services to ensure value creation. Successful technology strategies 
require responsiveness towards changing market conditions as well clear direction from top-
level management as to how new technologies will be commercialised, as well as how a 
company’s structure will enable effective innovation management rather than inhibit it 
(Burgelman, Christensen and Wheelwright, 2008). This answer was expounded in this 
document in section 2.1. 
 
 What is a disruptive innovation, and how are organisations in the media and 
entertainment industry affected by technologies of such a nature? 
Discussed in detail and in context in section 2.2, a disruptive innovation may be defined as 
an innovation which helps to create a new value network, industry structure or consumer 
market, and eventually alters current markets or disrupts incumbent organisations by 
displacing existing technologies, although not necessarily rendering them extinct. In its 
simplest sense “disruption… is a theory of innovation—of how particular types of new 
products and services, or ‘solutions,’ come to achieve success or dominance in markets, 
often at the expense of incumbent providers”, albeit initially designed for a different set of 
consumers or perceived as technologically inferior (Raynor, 2011). Disruptive innovations 
are contrasted with sustaining innovations, which evolve existing markets with better value 
through continuous or discontinuous product and process improvements, but are unable to 
create entirely new markets (Christensen, 1997). Chapter 4 in this thesis argued that 
incumbent organisations’ response to disruptive innovations is usually one of trepidation, a 
reaction which has lead to legal battles and subsequent contention between technology and 
media content companies in the past. This contention, resulting from a resistance to 
technological change and subsequent business model adaptation among top-level 
management in entertainment companies, aggravates consumers and present lush 
opportunity for cross-boundary disruptors to provide alternative products and services 
more aligned to consumer needs. Cross-boundary disruptors are capable of altering entire 
industry structures and may render incumbent companies superfluous, a phenomenon 
which was described in greater detail in sections 2.2 and 4.5. 
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 What is the origin of the modern-day media and entertainment industry and which 
sectors officially constitute it? 
The modern-day global media and entertainment industry is founded on products and 
services which divert, amuse or cause consumers’ time to pass agreeably, possibly even on a 
mass scale. Vogel (2011) added that, more than just amusing or diverting one’s attention 
from work, offerings from the media and entertainment industry ultimately lead to “a 
satisfied and happy psychological state” through either active or passive means. The media 
and entertainment industry, consequently, are those groups of companies which engage in 
commercial activities with that aim of providing consumers with contented psychological 
states. Excluding printed media, modern-day mass media, then, finds its origin in Guglielmo 
Marconi’s use of wireless telegraphy technology in the late-1890s and the Wireless 
Telegraph and Signal Company which he established while still only 23 years old. Although 
not the first to transmit audio content over the airwaves, the wireless telegraph was the 
foundational technology of radio as we enjoy it today. Reginald A. Fessenden was the first 
inventor which succeeded in transmitting audio content over radio in the form of a Handel 
aria and some violin music in 1906. The origin of radio, recorded music, cinema, television, 
video recorders and filesharing technology are recounted in sections 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 
and 2.9 respectively. Mentioned in section 2.3 of this document, the sectors which 
constitute the media and entertainment industry today can be grouped into two segments: 
media-dependent entertainment (movies, television broadcasting, music, radio 
broadcasting, cable television, publishing, toys, games and video games) and live 
entertainment (gaming and wagering, sports, performing arts and culture, amusement parks 
and theme parks), although the different forms of live entertainment now often include 
media-dependent entertainment as part of their offerings. 
 
 Knowing that technology brings about change, in which ways has technological 
change impacted the media and entertainment industry historically?  
Examined during the course of chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, technological change has profoundly 
affected the media and entertainment industry. The commercialisation of new technologies 
since the late 1800s have made it easier and less expensive to manufacture, distribute, 
exhibit and exchange entertainment products and services. Some new innovations not only 
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impacted the manner in which incumbent companies conducted business and produced 
their offerings, but also led to the establishment of entirely new sectors or ancillary markets, 
as was the case with radio, recorded music, cinema, television, the VTR and filesharing 
technologies. Although disrupted, older sectors have rarely been rendered completely 
extinct by new platforms due to their popularity, the adoption of new business models and 
because of their inherent benefits, as was described of radio in section 5.1. Expounded in 
section 5.3, ancillary markets have, subsequent to their acceptance as legitimate media 
sectors, often provided disproportionately large returns or ensured profitability of 
entertainment products, as seen in the case of The Lion King in the introduction to chapter 5. 
The oligopolistic structures of the film entertainment and recorded music sectors and their 
constitutive conglomerates listed in sections 5.2 and 5.4 point to the significant cost of 
capital as a barrier to entry for companies wanting to enter entertainment markets, an 
observation attributed to the constant necessity of technological development – Jurassic 
Park is one example of an entertainment product mentioned in sections 5.2 which could not 
be produced without the most up-to-date technology in 1993, while the use of 1993’s 
production technologies would seem laughable today. The spatial and temporal structures 
of film and music release windows have also been affected by technological change and the 
tidal wave of piracy enabled by electronic copying devices and digitalisation. Enabled by 
new technologies, piracy has been discussed in detail in sections 2.9, 3.6 and 4.4, while 
Figure 33 illustrates the effect of digitalisation on movie release windows – technology has 
enabled entertainment offerings to be more readily available to consumers than before as 
reflected by the fact that release windows for films on specific platforms are shorter and 
occur earlier than in the past. Specific forces like digitalisation, the Internet, exponentially 
increasing computing power and the proliferation of networking capabilities have made two 
other phenomena possible: the ability to watch standardised digital content on various 
devices, not requiring the use of file conversion software, and the ability for entertainment 
consumers to participate in content creation, blurring the lines between ‘producer’ and 
‘consumer’ as they are traditionally defined. The success of reality television talent shows, 
offerings by Hulu and Netflix and the availability of Apple’s iCloud service for the iPod, iPad 
and Macbook portable computer are some of the examples which were referred to in 
sections 4.5 and 5.4 as substantiation of this last-mentioned observation.  
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Figure 33: The Effect of Digital Platforms on Movie Release Windows, adapted from IBM Business Consulting 
Services (2005) 
 
 
 What structural changes have media markets undergone in terms of costs, profit, 
number of transactions and legal frameworks as the result of disruptive 
innovations?  
Combining Meza’s concept of the ‘Road to Prosperity’ (2007) and Burgelman and Grove’s 
theory of the cross-boundary disruptor’s effect on incumbent industries (2007), this study 
showed that disruptive innovations have impacted the different sectors in the media and 
entertainment industry in a very distinct manner, as simplistically illustrated by the process 
flow diagram in Figure 34. Hypotheses on media companies’ reaction to disruptive 
innovations were stated in the opening arguments of each chapter as deduced from various 
case studies on organisations in multiple entertainment sectors: Following the invention of 
the disruptive technologies described in Chapter 2, a chasm challenge as identified by 
Moore (1991) had to be undertaken by each of the organisations that wanted to 
commercialise those technologies. The leveraging of positive network externalities 
ultimately determined organisations’ success or failure at commercialising their 
entertainment offerings and their ability to excel beyond the innovation phase into an 
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ascension phase, as discussed in Chapter 3. However, as new technologies emerged, 
incumbent organisations and even entire entertainment sectors displayed a reaction of fear, 
especially of piracy and revenue-loss, resulting in a contention phase as expounded in 
Chapter 4. The protectionist fear and misdirected tactics employed by incumbents when 
confronted with potentially-disruptive technologies often allows opportunity for 
organisations which exhibit some of the cross-boundary disruptor characteristics mentioned 
in section 2.2 (Burgelman and Grove, 2007) to realise the opportunities actually presented 
by these new technologies and eventually alter the industry structure of existing 
entertainment sectors. Several incidences of legal action ensued as a result of 
entertainment companies' fear and failure to recognise the potential of new technological 
innovations, with entertainment consumers’ needs often ignored during times of intra-
industry and inter-industry conflict. Significant antitrust regulations, legal frameworks and 
market changes in terms of costs and profit have been examined in section 3.3, Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 respectively, and it was observed that the laws which have impacted the 
industry most notably are the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 and the Consumer 
Broadband and Television Act of 2002.  Organisations which recognised the benefit of close 
collaboration and convergence between companies in different media sectors as well as 
with technology companies were able to transcend the contention phase and enter a 
sensation phase through the adaptation of old business models which cater to 
entertainment consumer requirements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: How Technological Change Propagates Through an Industry 
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 Why did certain innovations succeed as entertainment offerings while other 
innovations, some even exhibiting superior capability, failed to gain adoption? 
Specific success factors were hypothesised and stated in the concluding paragraphs of each 
chapter of this document, as deduced from various case studies on organisations such as 
Marconi’s companies, Westinghouse and GE in radio broadcasting, AT&T, the Victor Talking 
Machine Company and MCA in recorded music, Famous Players-Lasky, Paramount Pictures 
and Pixar in film, RCA, NBC and CBS in radio, recorded music and television and Napster, 
BitTorrent and Apple as Internet-based companies which utilise filesharing technology. 
Some of the insights gained through studying companies which failed to gain adoption, or 
conversely, successfully navigated through each of the phases of technological change as 
illustrated in Figure 34 are: disruptive innovations do not necessarily originate from clever 
start-ups, but also from existing organisations with prolific R&D departments or flat 
organisational structures, as well as from academia; successful disruptive innovations were 
not necessarily superior or even entirely-new technologies, but materialised through a 
combination of existing technologies offering new features; collaboration between different 
inventors increased the possibility of success of a disruptive innovation; continuous 
technology development was prevalent in the companies which commercialised disruptive 
innovations; an increase in complementary services and inter-industry attraction favourably 
affected technology adoption; companies which exhibited Burgelman and Grove’s XBD 
characteristics (2007), such as having a growth-oriented strategy or possessing an 
established customer-base in its domestic industry, were more prone to commercialising 
innovations which disrupted existing entertainment sectors; fighting new innovations 
through litigation and regulation has historically only had one effect: aggravation and 
alienation of existing consumer markets; a definite focus on entertainment consumers’ 
preferred ways of enjoying content and a sustained commitment to delivering quality 
content regardless of distribution channels marked companies which successfully 
commercialised disruptive innovations; companies which were willing to adapt their 
organisational structures and business models and collaborate outside of enterprise and 
industry structures followed XBDs to success, even after initial trepidation towards new 
technologies.  
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 What is industry convergence, which forces in entertainment organisations shape 
and contribute to this convergence, and how has it affected this particular industry?  
Defined in section 5.6 but investigated throughout chapter 5 in its entirety, convergence 
between media content and technology companies may be described simplistically as the 
“integration of mass media, computers, and telecommunications” (Straubhaar, Larose and 
Davenport, 2011). Another type of convergence observed in this industry is one between 
content producers and consumers, as examined in the YouTube and American Idols case 
studies and successfully exploited by video game companies (Arakji and Lang, 2007). Some 
forces which contribute to convergence are inter-industry and intra-industry partnerships, 
continuous technological innovation, open content reserves, transparent production 
processes, customer interaction and adaptable sales strategies and business models, as 
observed in the Apple case study in section 5.4. Collaboration between musicians, 
advertising agencies and radio broadcasters, and recently the Internet, has led to the 
creation of new markets and additional distribution channels for music. Farnsworth’s 
cathode ray picture tube technology has made way for LCD television screens originally 
designed for personal computers and MP3 players utilise hard drives, computer software 
and on-line stores to enhance the portable enjoyment of music. Partnerships between 
record labels, film studios and technology companies like Apple, Google and Netflix have 
enabled digital audio and video content to be sold over the Internet and played on PCs, 
tablets, MP3/MP4 players, cellular telephones and television screens from one file, whereas 
content was previously restricted to particular platforms such as tape decks, CD players or 
television. Digitalisation has especially enabled different formats of content to be converted 
from analogue signals or film format into one which can be enjoyed on multiple platforms. 
Adapted from IBM Business Consulting Services (2005), Figure 35 illustrates the effect which 
convergence between media content companies and technology companies, as well as 
convergence between content producers and consumers, has had on the nature of media 
and entertainment industry as a whole: 
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Figure 35: The Transition of Traditional Media to Pervasive Media as a Result of Industry Convergence 
 
 
 What contribution does an academic study on entertainment history make to aid 
with technology management today and in the future? 
Amidst the ubiquity of academic literature and research studies on the topic of 
technological innovation and technology management since the mid-1930s, organisations in 
the media and entertainment industry have enjoyed comparatively less academic scrutiny 
than their counterparts in the Manufacturing industry, Mining, Agriculture and Services 
sectors, in spite of the fact that they collectively constitute an industry which boasts global 
expenditure of one trillion US dollars annually (Vogel, 2011). The media and entertainment 
industry in South Africa boasts consumer spending of R100 billion per annum and is 
predicted to grow steadily at 7.4% per year for the next 5 years according to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011). Yet regardless of the notable size of the South African and 
global industries, and as hypothesised by this thesis, history has indeed repeated itself 
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pertaining to entertainment companies’ reaction to the development of disruptive 
innovations. Porter (2008b) claims that an organisation’s history can be instructive with 
regards to its future, as opposed to merely informative, and that by studying past 
organisational decision-making and industry trends “this sort of commitment may lead to 
*renewal of a company’s+ strategy and may challenge the organisation to recover its 
distinctiveness.”  Argued in sections 1.1 and 1.2 of this thesis, an increase in academic 
studies on this industry from an industry-level perspective may ultimately contribute to 
economic development in terms of employment, investment and export of entertainment 
offerings, as “a lack of research and development on cultural industries” has directly been 
attributed as one of the main constraints to further progress in this industry, which has been 
identified as a strategic sector in South Africa’s Industrial Policy Action Plan  (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2010).  
 
6.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
Employing Brown and Duguid’s (2000) opinion that “university research… is at its most 
effective when it conducts research that the private sector is unable or unwilling to pursue” 
as an underlying philosophy, a couple of possibilities for future studies are suggested as a 
next step to conducting research on the media and entertainment industry from an 
engineering management perspective: 
 The development of a strategic innovation management framework for the media 
and entertainment industry on the African content or for South Africa specifically – 
an endeavour which would include the mapping of the landscape of media firms on 
the continent, how they are connected, the nature of their relationships and existing 
technologies and the development of an industry growth plan. Such a growth plan 
could include the conceptual design of platforms which would enhance technological 
development and collaboration between content and technology companies, the co-
ordination of industry events such as the AfricaCast conference and suggestions to 
create markets for African entertainment outside of the continent itself. Case studies 
which could be utilised for such a project would include successes of Bollywood (the 
Indian entertainment industry) and Chinawood (the Chinese entertainment industry) 
in terms of their cross-over appeal to Western markets. Due to the immense scope 
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of such a project, the research domain might be limited to the motion picture sector 
and its ancillary markets. 
 Employing a more pragmatic approach, a specific media firm might be identified and 
approached for the development of a technology strategy and especially the 
enhancement of content development and production technologies with the aim of 
ensuring quality offerings for the international market. One such a company might 
be the SABC. Benchmark studies could be done on news channels which extended 
their offerings to international markets by offering specialised or local content but 
on an international standard, of which Qatar’s Al Jazeera, Russia Today and India’s 
IBN are examples. Insights might be gained from the Caribbean recorded music 
sector as to the successful marketing of cultural music to international audiences. 
 In the line of research done by such academics as Anita Elberse and Joshua 
Eliashberg on the determinants of success in the motion picture sector, determine 
the factors, as well as the extent of their interrelatedness, which positively 
contribute to revenues of entertainment offerings such as movies, music, video 
games and television shows on the African continent. Empirical methodologies such 
as regression analysis, probability modelling or event studies are suggested for such 
an endeavour. Elberse (2005) opined on the challenge yet feasibility of such studies 
by stating that “the complex, one-off nature of motion pictures [specifically] makes it 
extremely difficult to test hypotheses about the factors that drive success” but that 
through applying research approaches which address “methodological limitations”, 
significant determinants of success may ultimately be “uncovered”. Results from 
such a study may be used for artist hiring or casting guidelines or for talent 
compensation schemes, as the effect of ‘star power’ and artist remuneration 
rationale have traditionally been more subjective than scientifically motivated. 
 A possibility for future research exists on the economic and accounting structures, 
business models and the financial viability of entertainment offerings, in lieu of work 
done by Young, Gong and Van der Stede (2008, 2010). Many times only having a 
once-off opportunity for releasing audio or video content to consumers, 
entertainment companies often employ strong project-type organisational 
structures with the aim of successfully commercialising each product individually. 
Research by Vogel (2011) revealed that only 10% of films released account for about 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
161 
 
50% of box office revenue and he opined that box office failure is congenital: “No 
matter how large ancillary markets grow, they [mostly] cannot a golden goose of a 
turkey make.” Financially speaking, the odds are skewed against profitability in the 
motion picture sector and most films, which are just once-off projects in reality, fail 
to ever make money. This provides lush opportunity for engineers with project 
management skills and knowledge of project management methodologies to add 
real value to entertainment companies. A suggestion for research in this subject field 
may be to co-develop a stage-gate project management model for entertainment 
companies to aid them in determining which projects (radio shows, music, films, 
video games or television shows) to discard and which to allow commencement with 
production. 
 With the proliferation of cellular telephones as the technology which will connect 
many Africans to the Internet and subsequently to the world for the first time, how 
can the use of cellular telephones be used to enhance paid-for entertainment 
consumption as an African middle-class arises, which opportunities exist for creating 
a market for tablet computers as portable and wirelessly-connect devices for media 
consumption and how will local content development be influenced by exposure to 
international media? These questions can be researched in addition to exploring the 
possibilities for utilising wireless media platforms in other spheres of society such as 
education systems and small business ventures on the African continent. 
 In accordance with the subject of this thesis, a research study may be conducted to 
determine how firms in the South African media and entertainment industry can 
capitalise on open innovation models and digital consumer networks such as those 
suggested by Arakji and Lang (2007) to identify or even develop potentially-
disruptive innovations in both content creation and technology platform design 
spheres. Research by Arakji and Lang showed how organisations in the video game 
sector have recently engaged with entertainment consumers by successfully 
outsourcing parts of its video game design and development process to digital 
consumer networks (2007). 
 Partnerships between the University and certain media firms could be established 
with the aim of collaborating on specific projects or longer-term programmes, with 
graduate students possibly assisting with R&D initiatives, conducting market 
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research, suggesting and implementing entertainment product and process 
improvements, or establishing innovation frameworks. Progressing from mere “pay-
for-research” initiatives, two suggestions for university-industry collaboration 
offered by Richard B. Dasher are sponsored projects and research centres (2004). 
Dasher serves as Director of the US-Asia Technology Management Centre and 
Executive Director of the Centre for Integrated Systems at Stanford University, and is 
a member of Tohoku University’s Board of Directors in Japan. By means of a bilateral 
contractual relationship, sponsored projects are appropriate when specific outcomes 
or deliverables are desired, while research centres are established via multi-lateral 
partnerships with the goal of exploratory research in multiple academic disciplines 
(Dasher, 2004). Considering the projected growth in expenditure in the South African 
media and entertainment industry as displayed in Figure 1 on page 15, as well as the 
existing size of its counterpart-industries globally, greater university-industry 
collaboration merits further investigation. 
 
 
 
Raymond Fielding’s quote in the introductory paragraph of this chapter states that a very 
particular yet “peculiar marriage” exists between art and technology. Consequently, a true 
appreciation of entertainment content and an attempt at achieving progress in content 
creation require an understanding of production hardware and software, distribution 
devices, exhibition platforms and the business models which connect entertainment 
consumers with content creators. This study, then, specifically highlighted the intersection 
between technological innovation and business model innovation in the media and 
entertainment industry as a case for increased involvement from academia in an industry 
for which research studies have not been readily pursued traditionally. As graduates in a 
“new, broadly integrative and synthesis-focused enterprise engineering discipline” with the 
ability to “design and integrate the total enterprise system with its technical, financial, 
operational, organisational, marketing and human aspects within the global competitive 
environment”, engineering managers may find an extremely challenging yet intellectually 
rewarding subject of study in the media and entertainment industry. As Engineering 
Management authority Omurtag (2009) opines: “in the real world problems seldom appear 
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as simply a technical problem requiring an engineering degree or a management problem 
requiring a management education.” The challenges and opportunities highlighted by this 
historical analysis of disruptive innovations in the global media and entertainment industry, 
consequently, merit academic vigour which engineering management graduates are most 
apt at applying. 
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